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ABSTRACT 
This research examines the extent to which simulation can be used to 
train pilots of the Royal Air Force to fly and fight the Eurofighter Typhoon, and is 
the culmination of a series of trials over a period of 4 years. The approach was 
threefold, firstly examining the performance of students trained entirely on the 
Operational Conversion Unit’s full syllabus in the simulator and then tested 
against their peers on each of the four phases in live flight, secondly 
investigating the cultural acceptance levels of the present Typhoon pilots and 
lastly using lessons learnt to generate and test a syllabus to train Typhoon pilots 
to Multi Role Combat Ready in 40% of the present time.  It was found that 
increasing the proportion of synthetics from the lowest Live Synthetic Balance 
(LSB) of 75:25 used on the front-line meets a cultural and resource barrier at 
50:50.  This did not represent the maximum LSB achievable however with the 
heavily synthetic Multi-Role Syllabus reaching an LSB of 21:79 with successful 
completion of the end of course test.   
Cultural acceptance of the simulator had correlations with the squadron a 
pilot was assigned to, the manner in which the simulators were programmed for 
use and the experience level of the pilot. No evidence was found within the 
sample to suggest age had an effect.  Recommendations on minimum 
proportions of live and synthetic training was mapped for each of the required 
tasks and comparisons of these were made across complexity levels.  
Resource savings found by the generating and testing a Multi Role 
Combat Ready syllabus that recognised and incorporated all the strengths, 
weaknesses and lessons identified in the previous trials generated a saving of 
approximately 9 months and 100 Typhoon live flying hours per student, 
equivalent to approximately 1300 man maintenance hours that could be 
reinvested into personnel in the form of leave, adventurous training or 
development. 
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GLOSSARY 
A2A Air to Air Role. 
ACT Air Combat Training. 
AFRL Air Force Research Laboratory.  A US facility studying many facets of 
aviation, one of which is simulation. 
AFT Advanced Flying Training. 
AO Areas of Operation.  Possible areas of conflict around the globe. 
AOA Aircraft Operating Authority. 
ASTA  Aircrew Synthetic Training Aid: Very high fidelity simulator built by the 4 
nation consortium that is the standard simulator for all nations operating 
Eurofighter. 
AVM  Air Vice Marshall: A senior rank in the RAF. 
BFM  Basic Fighter Manoeuvres. 
BFT Basic Flying Training. 
CA  Counter Air.  A task that trains longer range combat using missiles. 
CAA Civil Aviation Authority.   The body governing civilian aviation in the UK. 
CAP Combat Air Patrol.  A tactically significant position from which a formation 
of aircraft will guard significant assets, usually established as an an orbit.  
CFT Crew Flying Task.  The tasks required to maintain each pilot at a suitable 
level of competency for particular roles.  The overall task sets the number 
of flying hours per month a pilot will be funded for. 
CR  Combat Ready. 
CT  Cockpit Trainer. 
  xviii 
C-T  Continuation Training.  Training undertaken by pilots to keep them 
current in particular skillsets. 
DA Defensive Actions. 
DACT Dissimilar Air Combat Training. 
DASS Defensive Aids Sub Suite:  The suite of sensors that detect 
electromagnetic emissions, classify threats and dispense protection eg. 
flares or jamming. 
DP Duty Pilot.  Experienced pilot positioned in the air traffic tower to assist 
with safety issues of airborne aircraft. 
ECM Electronic Counter Measures.  Methods of protecting an aircraft using the 
electromagnetic spectrum. 
EDCT Emulated Deployable Cockpit Trainer:  Mid-fidelity simulator built and 
operated by BAE Systems. 
EoP End-of-phase Check Ride. 
EWI  Electronic Warfare Instructor.  The RAF’s cadre of specialists in the field 
and employment of electronic warfare 
FAA   Federal Aviation Authority.  The governing body for US aviation.  
FOB  Flying Order Book. 
FMS Full Mission Simulators. 
FQMD Forward Quarter Missile Defence. 
HVAD High Value Asset Defence.  Training to protect High Value assets such 
as tankers. 
IP Instructor Pilots.  Qualified instructors that provide the instruction on the 
Conversion Unit. 
  xix 
IRT Instrument Rating Test. 
JAA  Joint Aviation Authority.  The governing body for European aviation. 
JAR Joint Aviation Requirements.  The requirements for European aviation as 
laid down by the JAA. 
JSF Joint Strike Fighter:  Next generation fighter produced by the US.  The 
RAF intends to have a combat fleet consisting of only Typhoons and JSF 
by 2020. 
LCR Limited Combat Ready. 
LOSB Live Optional and Synthetic Blend.  Stated minima (%) of the Live and 
Synthetic training, leaving an amount that could be opted to be 
undertaken in either environment. 
LRA  Long Range Aviation.  Russian long range patrol aircraft such as the 
Bear or Tu22. 
LSB Live / Synthetic Balance: The balance of live and synthetic training stated 
as a percentage ie 40:60 is 40% live 60% synthetic. 
LSJ  Life Survival Jacket. 
MEC   Mission Essential Competencies. 
MoD Ministry of Defence. Overarching body controlling the UK military. 
MoDREC Ministry of Defence Research Ethics Committee. 
MR  Multi Role:  A combat discipline involving air to ground and air to air skills 
in the same mission. 
NAO  National Audit Office. 
NME Shorthand for Enemy. 
  xx 
OCU  Operational Conversion Unit.  The training unit that takes student pilot 
proficient in the Hawk trainer and instructs them in combat operations 
using a front-line aircraft.  
PB Trial PANDORAS BUZZARD.  The first of three trials within this paper. 
POM Plane of Motion. The ability to recognise a manoeuvre of a hostile aircraft 
and position to employ guns against it. 
PSC Production Software Configuration.  A method of identifying the software 
standard resident a particular aircraft or simulator. 
QPI  Qualified Pilots Instructors, see IPs. 
QRA Quick Reaction Alert.  UK Homeland defence aircraft sitting at readiness 
24 hours a day, 365 days a year.  
QWI Qualified Weapons Instructor. 
RAF Royal Air Force. 
RCS  Radar Cross Section.  The measure of a target’s radar reflectivity.  
Dependant upon factors such as target aspect and host aircraft radar 
frequency.    
SA Situational Awareness.  The ability to visualise the 3D battlespace in 
order to maintain safety or prosecute an attack correctly. 
SAM   Surface-to-Air Missile systems. 
SME  Subject Matter Experts.  Individuals deemed to be suitably qualified, or of 
such experience, in a field as to be designated as expert. 
SOP  Standard Operating Procedures.  Explicitly stated methods of conducting 
processes that are learned by rote, intended to give common and safe 
ways of working when under pressure.  
  xxi 
SQ  Sub-Question.  A series of questions that collectively answer the 
research question. 
Sqn Squadron. 
SRF Sortie Report Forms. 
TNA Training Needs Analysis. 
USAF United States Air Force. 
VID Visual Identification.  Methods of achieving a position on an unknown 
aircraft to provide a visual identification of its type. 
VMS  Visual Mutual Support.  The standard fighting formation for a pair of 
aircraft – line abreast at 1.5 miles.  
WEZ  Weapons Engagement Zone.  The volume of space from which an 
aircraft can employ its armament upon the enemy.
  xxii 
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NOTATION 
α  Qualifying Significance level 
Ho  Null Hypothesis 
HA  Alternate Hypothesis 
Lc  Learning time of control group in the live environment 
Lx   Learning time of trial group in the synthetic environment 
Nmin  Minimal total cost per subject studied 
Spc   Support live flying required in the control group syllabus 
Spx   Support live flying required in the trial group syllabus 
Sx   Learning time of trial group in the simulator 
σx  Standard deviation 
P1,2 and 3  Number of pilots at Qualification Level 1,2 and 3 
p  Statistical significant of the value found  
t(n)  Degrees of freedom, where n is the number of 
?̅?  Mean of a sample 
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 1 
Chapter 1.  INTRODUCTION 
After providing a background and context to the problem the research 
question will be introduced.  The literature review will then expose the research 
to date as well as highlighting previous issues inherent in research of this type.  
The research itself seeks to triangulate a solution from three different 
viewpoints: performance of the student pilots, culture and resources.   
As will be explained the impact of this work has been to increase the 
synthetic proportion of the Typhoon Conversion Unit’s Syllabus from 40% to 
75%, to demonstrate a method of reducing the time to train a pilot to Combat 
Ready from 11 months to 3, and save a total of 137 flying hours and 1700 
maintenance man hours per pilot trained.  This represents £274,000 per pilot in 
terms marginal costs such as fuel and daily consumables, and £12,604,000 
when using the Royal Air Force’s (RAF) own full capitation figures.  In the 
process it has achieved the European first of a first solo in a fighter aircraft 
directly from the simulator without the use of surrogate aircraft or designated 
twin seat trainer.  
New knowledge has been developed in understanding the limits of 
simulation when using it within a high proportion of a syllabus.  Additionally 
relationships between the culture and the perceived limits of synthetics in daily 
training has also been explored. 
The work has resulted in the following achievements: 
a. Numerous presentations: the Royal Aeronautical Society’s Flight 
Simulation Conference (June 2013), the RAFs Central Flying School’s 
International Conference (2012) well as the RAF’s Chief of the Air Staff, 
Air Officer Commanding 1 Group and a number of US, German and 
French Officers of Air Rank. 
b. Award of the RAF’s Central Flying School Trenchard Memorial 
Trophy for ‘Excellence in the Art of Instruction’ (2012). 
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c. Joint award from the Company of Educators and No. 22 (Training) 
Group of the RAF for ‘The Most Significant Contribution to Education and 
Training’ (2013). 
d. RAF’s No. 1 Group Operational Innovation Award (2013). 
e. The award of an MBE in the New Year’s Honours (2014). 
1.1 BACKGROUND 
The Eurofighter Typhoon is the Royal Air Force’s Air Superiority Fighter 
for the next 30 years and with infinite resources all flying training would be 
conducted in the real-world environment (known as “live” training). However in 
the real world the RAF faces ever increasing fiscal restrictions, impacting the 
funding for fuel costs, spares, manpower and exercise participation to identify a 
few. The net results are substantial reductions in flying hours for pilots and a 
corresponding loss of knowledge to a level proportional to the hours 
experienced, impacting safety and effectiveness.  
Synthetic training (through the use of flight simulators) will be asked to 
restore elements of this knowledge imbalance and training deficit. True 
capabilities and limits of high-fidelity simulation in the instructional and 
knowledge-transfer role have yet to be tested and the lessons incorporated into 
RAF pilot training. This research intends to search for elements of those limits 
and collate evidence to determine the environment (live or synthetic) and the 
extent to which synthetics can be used within Typhoon training.   
Before defining the research question, and in order to provide context, 
the problem will first be framed through presentation of the pertinent historical 
needs, issues and difficulties facing the RAF with respect to this field before 
laying out the research question itself. 
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1.2 DEMONSTRATION OF THE NEED 
Three months after funding for this research was secured the Permanent 
Under Secretary for the Ministry of Defence (MoD) and two Air Vice Marshalls 
(AVMs), the Directors of Combat Air and Information Superiority, were asked to 
answer the questions of the Public Accounts Committee in the House of 
Commons (Hansard, 2011).  During questions fourteen to twenty three of the 
session the Committee expressed surprise at the small number of combat pilots 
trained to conduct Multi Role (MR) operations.  AVM Hillier, in his response, 
stated the reason for such a small number being trained as “flying hours are 
expensive, so what we do not want to do is apply flying hours to keep people 
with a particular skill set that we do not expect to deploy on operations.”  The 
Chair questioned the value for money of having 52 Typhoon aircraft with only 8 
pilots capable of using it to its full capability.  
In the same month as the senior RAF officers and civil servants faced the 
Committee, the National Audit Office (NAO) released their report as to the 
Management of the Typhoon Project (Chambers et al., 2011).  In their 
observations of the risks to training the NAO states that “shortfalls in the 
number of hours available for training reduce the range of flying competencies 
of pilots and increases flying risks” (p19).  
The need and reason for the funding of this research was highlighted 
during the preceding year, 2010.  Owing to a combination of factors flying hours 
available to train the pilots were becoming an increasing concern.  Figure 1-1 
from Chambers et al. (2011), shows the proficiency of pilots as a consequence 
of the flying hours received.  
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Figure 1-1.  Monthly Flying Hours Achieved by RAF Typhoon Pilots 
It can be seen that in the majority of months 50% or more of the pilots 
received training that provided only the minimum sustainable flying rate.  The 
result was that five pilots were temporarily grounded because, as AVM Hillier 
stated to the Public Accounts Committee, “they were not getting enough flying 
to maintain their currency and skills.” (Hansard 2011, question 70). 
These examples highlight, at the highest levels, the difficulties of 
providing training in expensive assets such as fast jets within the environment 
of ever increasing fiscal restrictions and the consequent drive to achieve 
maximum efficiency and effectiveness.  When one considers that in 2010 the 
cost per single flight hour of a Typhoon was given as £70,000 by Peter Luff the 
Permanent Under Secretary for Defence (Hansard, 2010), it can be seen why 
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comments are drawn from such high levels1.  The effect of these difficulties can 
be seen both visibly, such as the examples above but also at the non-
quantifiable individual level.  There are only a few Typhoon pilots and each one 
grounded or not able to undertake a particular role forces the remaining pilots to 
shoulder the extra duties such as Quick Reaction Alert (QRA), Falkland Islands 
detachments and combat duties such as Op ELLAMY (Libya).  This extra 
loading is felt not only by the pilots but their families as well.   
The deficiencies, questioned at governmental levels, showed that in 2011 
the RAF had a very public need: to train pilots more quickly and achieve greater 
competencies with the limited resources available and to do so within the 
environment of national cutbacks and global recession.  Whilst these 
observations were made within the context of 2011 the forthcoming desire to 
export the aircraft and conduct export pilot training as well as the, at that time 
unseen, Libyan operations would do nothing but raise this need higher in the 
priorities.  
1.3 BIRTH OF A REQUIREMENT 
The literature review will demonstrate that, during 2010, the RAF had a 
weak understanding that simulation might provide a solution to elements of the 
problem. It had, however not articulated this any more firmly than a verbal 
aspiration to achieve a 50:50 Live Synthetic Balance (LSB) by between 2015 
and 2020.  Papers produced (see section 2.2.1) drove desire for increased 
synthetics with headlines of savings that could be achieved. Arguing against the 
increased use of synthetics were the pilots themselves who would forcefully 
attack any idea that training on the scale proposed could be conducted in the 
simulator.  There was no practical understanding of the effect of moving large 
amounts of training into the simulator and the true capabilities and limits of high 
fidelity simulation in the instructional and knowledge transfer role had not yet 
been tested or any lessons incorporated into RAF pilot training.  
                                            
1 More recent figures place the Full Cost Capitation rate at £92,000 (Air Command HQ 2012). 
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The fast-jet fleet of the RAF in 2010 consisted of Harriers, Tornado 
GR4s, a few remaining Tornado F3s and Typhoons.  With the exception of the 
Typhoons all these aircraft were at least twenty years old, with the original 
design being much older.  Training for these various platforms had been built 
upon tried, tested and proven processes that centred around live flight.  The 
students would be instructed on the ground then shown a technique in the 
simulator, if it was capable, before being re-taught in a twin seat aircraft and 
repeating in an operational aircraft.  The process was costly in both time and 
money.   
Simulators for these tasks included a mixed fleet of older procedural 
trainers that, lacking any visuals, allowed training for sorties such as instrument 
tests and head-down cockpit tasks only.  The more developed simulators did 
have rudimentary visuals that allowed some out-of-the-window tasks to be 
performed but they were not networked, forcing the pilot to train in an isolated 
environment rather than the 4-ship tactical formation that was the norm on 
combat units.  Recent procurement of Hawk aircraft, however, recognised the 
need for better accompanying simulation. The Hawk T2 used at RAF Valley 
employed the latest technology to provide synthetic training solutions (see 
Figure 1-2 and Figure 1-3). 
 
Figure 1-2.  Hawk Cockpit Trainer. 
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Figure 1-3.  Hawk Full Mission Dome 
The increasing use of visuals in the updated simulation and the provision 
of a networked capability allowed aircraft like the Hawk to train correct positions 
in combat formation and allow the pilot to practice techniques with reference to 
the ground, such as air-to-ground gunnery.  Despite these improvements the 
training syllabus still repeated simulation sorties airborne rather than replacing a 
live flight in toto, i.e. these state-of-the-art devices were seen as a 
reinforcement to airborne learning rather than replacement.  This was supported 
in an interview in September 2011 with Mr Lloyd-Jones of the instructional team 
at RAF Valley who stated that “live flight was perceived and trusted as the only 
method of ensuring a pilot’s knowledge was satisfactory”. 
The Typhoon simulator, known as the Advanced Synthetic Training Aid 
(ASTA), promised a different level of fidelity both in terms of the visuals and the 
models of the enemy combatants.  These models would be run attempting to 
create a synthetic world controlled using comparable real world parameters 
such as decibels-based radar energy, aspect dependant Radar Cross Sections 
and real aircraft software.  The desire was aspirational, the results in 2010 were 
disappointing; years behind schedule and suffering from a lack of robust 
software.  Recognition of these issues had resulted in the procurement of 2 
Emulated Deployable Cockpit Trainers (EDCTs) which used emulated software 
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as opposed to the real aircraft software.  The result was a comparatively cheap 
solution that provided a level of fidelity that provided students with an 
understanding of some of the displays and controls and allowed training in the 
majority of tasks to a basic level.  It was however unable to reproduce 
emergency situations in high fidelity or, owing to its poor GUI, allow control of 
anymore than two enemy entities.  Nevertheless it represented value for money 
even provided a best guess of forthcoming hardware and software such as the 
Lightning III weapon targeting pod and Air to Surface weapon computer coding.  
Use of this equipment was limited to the older style of training; that of replicating 
a sortie prior to repeating all the aspects again airborne. This training was 
limited to certain sorties due to the limiting visuals of 240 degrees in azimuth 
meaning that the leader lost visual with his wingman after the first manoeuvre. 
Additionally the over-optimistic performance of the radar software, ensured an 
overly tenacious lock on the target aircraft. 
The advantages of emulation over simulation were cost and the speed of 
software corrections, however it suffered from a major drawback - realism.  
Emulation copied the desired performance, as laid down in the contract of each 
software load rather than what was actually resident in the aircraft.  As a result 
the early versions of the Emergency Flight Reference Cards, used by the pilots 
to correctly diagnose and remedy aircraft emergencies, were based on these 
emulated solutions and subsequently contained numerous errors that were only 
discovered as the maturity of the simulated software progressed. 
Thus the RAF had seen the delivery of vastly improved simulation 
systems that appeared to offer a leap in capability, their papers (Harper and 
Hillier, 2007; JTES, 2009; Wells et al., 2009; Air Staff, 2010; MoD, 2010b) 
suggested the financial savings that could be realised. In contrast however 
there was no clear direction or strategy to deliver a trusted-results based 
method of altering the years of culturally-entrenched training techniques, 
particularly in light of the varying simulator’s degrees of replication and ability. 
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1.4 POST STRATEGIC DEFENCE AND SECURITY REVIEW 
(OCT 10) 
In October 2010 the new coalition government returned the first Strategic 
Defence and Security Review of the millennium.  The short-term result for the 
RAF was the almost immediate scrapping of the Harrier GR9 and Nimrod fleets 
as well as an announcement of forthcoming redundancies of 7000 personnel, 
approximately 14% of the serving manpower.  This was accompanied by the 
open statements that the RAF would move to a fast-jet fleet consisting of only 2 
types and that the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) would be postponed from 2013 to 
2020.  This was caused by the £36bn deficit in the defence budget accumulated 
in the preceding years. Against this backdrop demand came for increased use 
of synthetics in order to save money, which in turn would set the 50:50 Live 
Synthetic Balance (LSB) strategic aspiration. 
1.5 THE FAST-JET SYNTHETIC PICTURE 2011 
By 2011 the EDCTs had been repositioned at RAF Leuchars to support 
the build up of the 3rd and 4th front-line Typhoon squadrons. Their use was 
limited to the monthly currencies for emergencies and occasional 
demonstrations of tactical concepts. Use of these devices in an instructional 
context was limited.  ASTA's software by contrast was becoming more reliable 
than the past but suffered significant lag in terms of concurrency.   As such 
ASTA was unusable for sorties or instruction using the Defensive Aids Sub 
Suite (DASS) amongst other items.  Progressive attitudes on the use of the 
ASTA to instruct Student Pilots (SPs) had seen the content of the Operational 
Conversion Unit (OCU) syllabus grow to 54 % simulator 46% live flight, however 
this was for only a single phase of the 4 phases of the training, the rest still 
lagging markedly behind.  These figures were in excess of any seen before in 
the RAF but still adhered to the old style of practicing for a sortie that would be 
repeated in live flight.  The front-line training during this period was conducted 
almost entirely in live flight with only the mandatory monthly emergency 
simulator impacting their LSB. 
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1.6 RISK 
The desire, in 2011, for a 1:1 LSB by 2015 was articulated in fleet plan 
31S.  There was, however, a lack of evidence that supported this aim and the 
balance had not been tested, neither had the synthetic devices shown a 
capability that would provide it:  of the research and papers that had been 
produced to support the plan (Harper and Hillier, 2007; JTES, 2009; Wells et al., 
2009; Air Staff, 2010; MoD, 2010b) all highlighted the potential financial rewards 
but rarely mentioned the effect on training or operational capability of the RAF.  
Only one paper mentions practical methods of achieving output, such as the 
need for a Training Needs Analysis (Wells et al., 2009, p. 8). 
The risk facing the RAF, therefore, was that the desired sacrifice of the 
live flying hours in order to pay for the cheaper simulators may yield both a 
synthetic environment that was unable to achieve the required pilot standard 
and a challenging flying budget that was unable to provide the flying hours to 
retrain the sub-standard pilots.  The effect would be to perpetuate the problems 
demonstrated in the OP ELLAMY era: sacrificing the skills, training and 
currency of certain pilots such that others may train to a proficient level. 
1.7 RESEARCH QUESTION 
The overarching research question was intended to seek the extent 
to which simulation could be employed within Typhoon training, in order that the 
RAF might become more efficient with its resources in both fiscal and 
manpower terms. Research, rather than a simplistic immediate employment of 
simulation, was required for 3 reasons.  Firstly, at the strategic level this new 
training medium and emphasis was to be able to assure that defence of the 
realm could be maintained within the constraints of present and future SDSRs.  
Secondly, at the tactical level training within simulation should be able to output 
sufficient numbers of pilots that could reach the required standards.  Thirdly, 
any limitations or areas where simulation was weak were to be understood in 
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order that they could be avoided should heavy simulation syllabi be employed in 
training.   Thus the guiding research question was: 
“ What is the maximum extent to which pilots of the Eurofighter 
Typhoon can incorporate synthetic training? ” 
Unlike some academic research this work was to be undertaken within a 
practical environment.  In order to be considered a success, and due to the 
significant costs of the assets and risks involved, the outcome of the research 
question was visibly to demonstrate employment and associated success and 
failure within the practical context, and most importantly have addressed the 
practical aspects of the problem.  Analysis of the research question in context 
returned a number of barriers to a solution, Figure 1-4 provides a pictorial 
representation of the layered issues opposing the incorporation of increased 
simulation usage.  At the heart of the problem lay pilot performance, should this 
work have been unable to demonstrate a standard at least equal to present 
methodologies then the use of a heavy synthetic syllabus would be immediately 
discounted as ‘sub-standard’.  The middle band focuses on the more holistic 
issues that surround the research question, each having the ability to 
significantly weight any solution to the question. 
 
  
 
 
 12 
 Finally, and most importantly, the outer band considers the issue of risk.  
In order that the research might be incorporated into the Eurofighter’s core 
methodology it would have to be sanctioned by at least the rank of Group 
Captain, although initial work was expected to require agreement from 
significantly higher.  All officers agreeing to the research would need to satisfy 
themselves (and the Military Aviation Authority) that the risks had been 
adequately addressed.  In conjunction with these risks the research’s small 
sample sizes (discussed in section 2.5.3) would find difficulty in proving 
definitively the success or otherwise of elements of the methodology, when 
considering the entire population.  Thus answers to research question required 
triangulation through a number of differing but complementary approaches, and 
in doing so provide a series of independent answers that when viewed 
holistically reduced the level of risk facing senior officers when considering the 
incorporation of a heavily synthetic syllabus.  
Risk to Life 
Risk to 
Image 
Risk to 
Standards 
Cost 
Capability/
Capacity 
Resources 
Political 
Will 
Possible 
Benefits 
Cultural 
Will 
Cultural 
Pilot  
Performance 
Figure 1-4.  Pictorial Representation of Issues 
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Viewing the question in this manner allowed the identification of three 
themes that were consequently used to guide the literature review and provide 
a “handrail” when dissecting the research question in Section 1.8.  The three 
themes are: 
1 Performance. Incorporating the issues of pilot performance, risk to life, risk 
to standards, possible benefits and capability. 
2 Culture. Taken from the issues of cultural will, political will and risk to image. 
3 Resource Use. From the issues of capacity, resources, cost and possible 
benefits. 
1.8 DISSECTING THE RESEARCH QUESTION 
Before undertaking the literature and knowledge review the research 
question and the associated layered issues from Section 1.7 were broken down 
into a series of sub-questions and objectives, shown below.  Each of the 
objectives are considered during the review so as to source answers and 
guidance to inform the methodology.  In this manner the objectives were to 
focus the overall methodology towards a series of smaller answers that, when 
viewed together, would answer the research question fully whilst being informed 
by previous research. 
Thus from the guiding research question, 
“ What is the maximum extent to which pilots of the Eurofighter Typhoon can 
incorporate synthetic training? ” 
the following sub questions (SQs), addressing the layered issues, were 
identified:  
SQ1 “ What limits synthetic training in the instructional environment? ” 
SQ2 “ What is the cultural limit of synthetic use? ” 
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SQ3 “ Do resources limit the employment of synthetics? ”  
1.8.1 SQ1 - WHAT LIMITS SYNTHETIC TRAINING IN THE 
INSTRUCTIONAL ENVIRONMENT? 
This SQ addresses the first theme and primarily the inner layer of issues 
(Figure 1-4) that is concerned with pilot performance when simulation is used 
for their training.  Specifically will a heavily synthetic syllabus reduce the overall 
performance of the pilot?  The hypothesis for this phase being: 
“OCU training can be conducted using simulation alone.”   
The guiding objectives are: 
a.  Objective 1.  Assess the suitability of ASTA to train each phase of the 
OCU syllabus; first solo, 1v1 Combat, Counter Air and Low Slow QRA 
training when compared to the present methodology.  
b.  Objective 2.  Identify any variables that could affect the transfer of 
training. 
c.  Objective 3.  Identify any technical limits prohibiting the employment 
of a highly synthetic syllabus to train students. 
d.  Objective 4.  Determine the level of training transfer between ASTA 
and the live environment. 
e.  Objective 5.  Generation of a risk register to determine the risks  
during the first solo flight, with particular reference to risk to life. 
1.8.2 SQ2 - WHAT IS THE CULTURAL LIMIT OF SYNTHETIC 
USE? 
Sub-Question 2 examines the second theme of the research question, 
that of culture, in particular it looks at aspects of, and barriers to, the 
employment of simulation within day to day training. 
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a.  Objective 1.  Determine the present level of cultural acceptance of 
synthetic training use in front-line Typhoon training and investigate if this 
is common across both Typhoon bases. 
b.  Objective 2.  Identify any factors, such as experience levels, that 
correlate to the level of acceptance. 
c.  Objective 3.  Prove or disprove the two commonly held beliefs that 
were held by senior ranks and witnessed during briefings in 2010 (those 
senior ranks being Air Vice Marshal S. Atha, Air Commodore G. Waterfall 
and Wg Cdr A. Seymour): 
i.  Younger pilots are more accepting of simulation than older 
pilots. 
ii.  Acceptance of simulation is based upon a pilot’s qualifications. 
d.  Objective 4.  Determine the minimum levels of LSB for each of the 
required tasks, as subjectively assessed by the present Typhoon pilots.    
e.  Objective 5.  Investigate the effect of threat complexity on the LSB. 
1.8.3 SQ3 - DO RESURCES LIMIT THE EMPLOYMENT OF 
SYNTHETICS? 
The third theme of the primary research question was focused on the 
ability of the pool of resources to conduct simulation.  This would require the 
construction and proof of concept for the final training area, that of the Combat 
Ready work up (the section of training conducted immediately after joining the 
Front-line from the OCU, usually in the order of 12 months). 
a.   Objective 1.  Construct and demonstrate proof of concept of a CR 
work-up syllabus that minimises the resource input of the front-line 
squadrons. 
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1. Objective 2.  Determine the levels of resources required to 
conduct this syllabus and any resource savings made by its 
methodology. 
2. Objective 3.  Determine if the resources available are sufficient to 
employ this syllabus across all CR work up pilots. 
In summary the research sought to determine the limits of exploitation of 
simulation within the context of the Eurofighter Typhoon which would reduce the 
level of risk facing the RAF, should heavy synthetic syllabi be endorsed.  The 
inability to answer the question categorically through synthetic pilot training 
alone was recognised, given the effect of cost and time on likely sample sizes.  
Thus a triangulation path to a solution was plotted to provide both evidence and 
an in-depth understanding of the capabilities of fast-jet simulation based upon 
assets presently available, in order to inform future fast-jet training strategy.  It 
was envisaged that the research would be used to source cost savings, 
maintaining present capability, or direct the reinvestment of resources to 
increase operational capability without an overall increase in cost. 
1.9 OVERVIEW OF THE THESIS 
In order to address each of the sub-questions that were determined after 
the dissecting of the research question (section 1.8), 3 trials were established to 
target each of the three key themes and were to run in series, taking a total of 
3.25 years to complete.  A parallel employment of the trials was considered and 
discounted as the workload for the primary researcher (a serving officer) would 
have been too high to have been conducted ‘part-time’.  The creation of ‘trial’ 
and ‘project’ status allowed the author to bid for resource outside the norm and 
enabled the agreement of the RAF command chain to the research as a whole.  
The trial / project names and the corresponding sub-questions are provided 
below: 
a.  Trial PANDORAS BUZZARD (Chapter 3. SQ1 – What limits 
synthetic training in the instructional environment?  An examination of 
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the effect on output performance of training pilots entirely in the 
simulator with a single test live flight in each phase.  The aim being to 
determine if simulation alone was a valid way of generating experience 
and highlight any limitations. 
b.  Trial PANDORAS DIAMOND (Chapter 4. SQ2 – What is the cultural 
limit of synthetic use?  A questionnaire based investigation of an 
informed audience, the Combat Ready Typhoon pilots, on the limits of 
day-to-day training in the simulator, with a view to proving the 
Commander with cultural limits of the employment of synthetics. 
c.  Project JENX (Chapter 5. SQ3 – Do resources limit the employment 
of synthetics?  A test of concept: training a pilot through a heavily 
synthetic syllabus to Combat Ready on the front line, based on the 
learning of the previous trials.  The intent to being to determine the 
nature and scale of savings possible. 
  Post a review of the available literature and knowledge, the chapters 
consider each of the trial / projects in turn and, after providing an overview, 
state the design with reasoning, methodology, results and analysis.  A final, 
separate section of analysis viewing the research as a whole is then provided to 
return the focus to the overarching research question. 
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Chapter 2.  LITERATURE AND KNOWLEDGE REVIEW 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
The review is intended to provide the context in which the subsequent 
trials were to take place.  This is done through an exploration of literature and 
commences with an exposé of the RAF’s knowledge in the area at the time both 
at a strategic and lower tactical level, through papers and policy documents.  
Once the context is established other Air Forces and the Civilian stance are 
compared and contrasted to present the RAF’s position from a wider 
perspective.  Having established a more global picture the review returns to 
detail: examining experimentation methods within the field that have informed 
these positions.  Finally the theories devolved and limitations encountered from 
employing the experimental outcomes in practice are identified and made 
explicit. 
2.2 THE RAF 
2.2.1 UNDERSTANDING THE PICTURE – STRATEGIC LEVEL 
The need for more increased use of simulation had been recognised 
within the RAF but the first attempt at a strategy to progress towards viable high 
level training was produced in 2007 (Harper and Hillier, 2007) with the stated 
aim that:  
“All force elements [are] able to train in a realistic, complex and 
hostile joint scenario with real or representative equipment” 
The importance of this document is illustrated by considering that this 
was the first time at this level that the requirement to train collectively was 
articulated for the synthetic environment.  Collective training is defined by the 
United Kingdom Glossary of Joint and Multinational Terms and Definitions as 
‘individuals, units and command formations are collectively prepared for 
operations’ (MoD, 2006). Prior to this point simulation for the RAF’s aircraft was 
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entirely stand-alone.  Tornado F3, GR4 and Harrier GR9 had devices capable 
of training single pilots in elements of mission requirements but lacked the 
ability to train as full combat formations, thus any training above the individual 
level had to be done in the air. Harper & Hiller recognised that as the platforms’ 
capability, security and agility increased this live training would become 
unaffordable.  
The motivation of the paper was therefore financial and, whilst it 
recognised that a well designed collective synthetic environment could reduce 
the gap between training output and competency (Harper and Hillier, 2007, p. 3) 
and thus increase defence capability, it endeavoured to fund this new ability 
through the savings made by reducing live flight by 15% (p5).  The paper went 
on to state that, with respect to the optimal LSB, ‘there was no agreed coherent 
position’ and that to return a solution in ’optimal time’ Subject Matter Experts 
(SMEs) should make ‘subjective judgements’ (p5).  It is argued therefore that 
this future, unknown capability and its abilities, proposed by the paper were to 
be financed by the present day training system; with an unknown effect on the 
near-term output and competency gap and subsequent RAF contribution to UK 
defence capability. 
The unknown nature of this desired capability is further highlighted by a 
paper on simulator strategy produced two years later that stated that the 
underlying technology for networked simulation was ‘still relatively immature 
and not all users were convinced of its value’ (JTES, 2009).  Again the idea of 
altering the live / synthetic balance to fund this simulation was stated without an 
explanation of the present or near future effect. 
Two years after the initial strategy paper was written Air Command 
sought to determine the optimal blend for the Tornado and Typhoon aircraft 
(Wells et al., 2009).  The authors highlight the concern over Crew Flying Task 
(CFT), referred to as the minimum sustainable flying hours in the NAO report 
(Chambers et al., 2011), stating that this is based on ‘limited availability of 
statistical information and significant military judgement’ (Wells et al., 2009, p. 
iii) and suggested that a review of CFT be set up as a matter of flight safety 
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priority.  Their roadmap towards the optimal LSB blend, however, reduces CFT 
below this minimum in 2017 assuming that synthetics will suffice from a flight 
safety viewpoint.  The original strategy paper, however, stated that the increase 
in simulation capability would be bought at the expense of live flight; should this 
reduction below the minimum CFT be recognised as a flight safety hazard, the 
funds to buy back live flight would already have been sunk into simulation 
technology.   This would leave the RAF unable to return to sufficient numbers of 
hours to provide safe live flight and without a synthetic environment to replace 
them.   Aside from the flight safety issue that this would present, the affect of 
insufficient hours on defence capability is adroitly illustrated in a non-theoretical 
context by both AVM Hillier at the Parliamentary Accounts Committee and the 
NAO report discussed in the Section 1.2. 
Unlike any of the preceding reports Wells’ Optimal Blend paper does 
recognise the need for a Training Needs Analysis (TNA) to be carried out (Wells 
et al. 2009, p.8) in order to determine the scope of training activities that are 
required to achieve the operational output. At the heart of the decision-making 
process are the subjective decisions of the Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) over 
what level of simulation fidelity is required to conduct training of the student 
(Wells et al. 2009, p.6). These decisions however, would be unlikely to be 
tested against a student until the simulation prototype stage, by which time 
considerable money would have had to have been found from live flight to fund 
the development of the new technology. 
During the run up to the SDSR the simulation and training workstrand 
produced a Study Report intended to inform this important debate (MoD, 
2010b).  In it training in simulation was quoted as costing ‘5 to 20% less’ than 
Live and suggested that £300-£600m pa could be saved if ‘on average, 25% of 
current Live Training was transferred to Simulation’.  Upon examining where 
these figures were obtained the paper utilises a schematic from an Australian 
Department of Defence report - Reducing the Cost of Ownership through 
Simulation (2008).  This report had examined the worldwide LSB of coalition 
partners and plotted percentage of training conducted in simulation against cost 
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saving.  The weakness of the report was that it lumped together land, sea and 
air synthetic savings despite the fact that the environments and thus 
requirements to be modelled differ greatly between the disciplines.  As an 
example consider solely the air environment and the generic platforms of a 
transport aircraft and a fighter.  The transport aircraft simulation might only 
require detailed models of the aircraft performance, handling characteristics and 
visual databases of the airports it would be likely to land at. The fighter on the 
other hand would require all these plus radar, Forward Looking Infra Red 
(FLIR), Night Vision Goggles (NVG’s), Defensive Aids Sub Suite (DASS), 
Reconnaissance pods and weapons modelling.  To operate in the environment 
it would fight in, the simulation of enemies would require correct Radar Cross 
Sections, enemy weapon modelling, combat doctrines and radar models.  So it 
can be seen that providing a cost-saving figure across all realms of simulation 
would be relevant only to a highly strategic level such as Chief of Defence 
rather than the individual heads of the RAF, Navy or Army.   
To question the inclusion and relevance of the Australian DoD report 
within the SDSR simulation report further, the cost of simulation versus live 
flight is given as 5-20%; exactly the same as the bracket given by another, very 
much earlier, report investigating cost effectiveness of flight simulators in the 
military (Orlansky and String, 1977).  This report was written in 1977 and used 
limited fidelity devices, the majority without visual systems and used for 
procedures and thus of limited use compared with today.   This would infer, 
therefore, that despite almost 40 years of simulation and computer 
development, the percentage cost savings remain constant.  
In order to make the large cost savings desired the amount of training 
undertaken by simulation would have to be increased.  The UK’s percentage of 
defence training conducted in simulation is shown to be in the order of 23% 
whilst the majority of the remaining allied partners are clumped between 40-
50%.  The extra synthetic training requires better simulators and these would 
appear to increase the comparative cost of simulation versus live training by 
10% according to the SDSR study (MoD, 2010b). This still represents 
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considerable savings considering the larger amount of training that can be 
undertaken.  In order to increase savings further the impact needs to be felt 
within the numbers of aircraft procured or maintained within the fleet and the 
manpower required to service them (Harper and Hillier, 2007; MoD, 2010b).  To 
provide the strategic level decision makers of the RAF with the confidence to 
heed the need to ‘embrace this step change’ (MoD 2010) there is need to 
provide greater evidence that the 1:1 balance advised will consistently provide 
the pilot with the abilities that UK defence requires if the live flying hours are to 
be sacrificed for this aim.  
This is supported by the official response of an Air Staff meeting in which 
concerns are expressed that should the targets of 25% simulation by 2015 and 
50% by 2020 not be reached ‘we may create long term (and expensive) 
capability recuperation issues’ (Air Staff, 2010).  Indeed the Air Staff explicitly 
state that there is still little evidence to support the significant savings claimed 
and, just as importantly, there is no guidance as to how to maintain training 
output during the transition.  
A final point to draw out at the strategic level is that in none of the 
literature reviewed was the 1:1 LSB intended for the RAF articulated with 
greater fidelity than a generic figure for an entire aircraft type.  This assumes 
therefore that simulation is of equal relevance, and indeed equally capable, to 
train all squadrons and units within that aircraft type.  The Typhoon Force has 
(as of Sep 2011) three front-line squadrons, one Operational Conversion Unit 
(OCU) and one Trials squadron.  The OCU trains students to Limited Combat 
Ready – QRA standard, the front-line squadron develops the student further to 
a Combat Ready – Multi Role pilot.  The Trials unit, however, works at the very 
edge of the aircraft’s understanding, developing and assessing new technology 
and recommending methods of exploiting the new technology tactically.  Within 
this context it can be seen that each of the elements have overlapping yet 
differing demands on the capabilities of a simulator.  To complicate the picture 
further there are a total of 6 different Typhoon aircraft types used across the 
squadrons, known as Blocks, and this does not include the twin and single seat 
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distinctions.  The 1:1 LSB aspiration is unlikely to be equally successful across 
each element of this vista.  If this is the case then should some of the 
squadrons do very little simulation yet others replace live flying altogether?  So 
if the inference within the LSB desire is live flight replacement rather than 
augmentation; safety implications of live flight replacement need to be 
considered particularly carefully.  The penalty for getting this wrong is at best a 
serious incident, at worst – death of a serviceman and loss of an aircraft. 
2.2.2 UNDERSTANDING THE PICTURE – TACTICAL LEVEL 
In September 2011, at the commencement of this research, the LSB on  
the Typhoon OCU - 29 Sqn, was almost exactly 3:2 with 69.5 hours of live 
Typhoon against 45 spent in the simulator (29 Squadron, 2011b).  This reflects 
the RAF fast jet training pipeline as a whole (Blyth 2015 p113) which utilises 
almost exactly the same proportions. This contrasts with the Typhoon Force as 
a whole, including the front-line, which had an average LSB of 6:1 (Wells et al., 
2009) in FY 08/09.  This comparatively large value of simulation in the 29 Sqn 
OCU syllabus was largely due to an extensive syllabus rewrite 18 months 
earlier, which looked to lever the synthetic advantage as far as was considered 
possible.  This LSB therefore represents the best contribution possible from the 
synthetic environment as assessed by the SMEs at the time.  The savings this 
provided in terms of aircraft flying and man maintenance hours cannot be 
overlooked.  To illustrate this point consider the following: firstly, of the 69.5 live 
flying hours in the present syllabus only 37.75 are flown by the student pilot the 
rest was support flying ie. as wingman or threat aircraft (29 Squadron, 2011b),  
and secondly according to a question to the Officer Commanding Typhoon 
Engineering during March 2011 each live flight hour required 22 man hours of 
maintenance2.  It can be seen, therefore, that for each hour of live flight placed 
in simulation almost another full hour of support flying (eg Typhoon being used 
as a target aircraft or an instructor as wingman in a Typhoon) is saved and thus 
                                            
2 In 2014 the 22 hours had reduced to 13 engineering man hours per live flying hour.  
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the man hours of maintenance saved is in the region of just under 44 hours for 
each hour a student flew.  
In increasing the synthetic proportion struggles much past this figure as a 
number of significant issues are encountered.  ASTA is the label given to the 
Typhoon simulation devices as a whole and whilst they will be discussed in 
more detail in the experiment discussion later it is worth identifying, at an 
overview level, the shortfalls of the equipment and the impact of the tactical 
level view of simulation.  The first significant issue is simulator functionality.  
The lack of any debriefing or usable playback facility prevents reinforcement of 
any lessons learnt and has thus, to date, relegated learning to the practice of 
motor skills or the witnessing of setup parameters of the forthcoming sortie.   
The second issue is currency.  The simulator has traditionally suffered 
from out of date radar software, displays and controls that do not match the 
aircraft and a Defensive Aids Sub Suite (DASS) that did not work. Whilst these 
problems were experienced on previous simulators the lack of a successful 
solution has underlined the unsatisfactory nature of these new generation 
simulators. 
The third issue is reliability.  The ASTA initially had poor serviceability 
rates, which contributed to the reluctance of pilots to drive to the simulator 
building for anything other than their mandated monthly emergency sortie. 
The final issue is that of culture.  Fast-jet pilots measure their experience 
by live flying hours (RAF Form 414, the RAF flying logbook), the coveted 
1000hrs-on-type badge is measured on these live hours. Additionally the 
document called the ‘White Ticket’ (29 Squadron, 2011b) represents the hours 
provided by command for the achievement of the set task.  Squadron 
Commanders are continuously required to demonstrate how many live hours 
they have flown against this measure.  There is no incentive, even from a higher 
level, for a pilot to enter the simulator for anything other than compulsory 
training. 
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These barriers have been the reason for lack of adoption of any of the 
recommendations from the first ASTA training thesis (Lockwood, 2006).  This 
thesis was the first serious effort from within the Typhoon force to improve 
simulation and its contribution to the fighting effort of the fleet.  Whilst the paper 
did examine elements of reliability and identified the lack of a debriefing facility it 
did not contain any practical evidence of the training potential of the simulator.  
Instead it used SME judgment to determine the simulator’s ability to train 
against a set of Mission Essential Competencies (MECs).  Lockwood’s 
recommendation that each pilot conducts 24 tactical sorties per year within the 
simulator (2006, p.36) is based upon a recognition of reduction of opposition 
aircraft to train against (known as red air) rather than a qualitative view of 
synthetic capabilities.   
Section 2.2 has sought to demonstrate that the RAF’s desire to 
investigate simulation stopped short of anything other than an ‘on paper’ 
analysis, which used only generic evidence from other militaries with no 
knowledge of whether this was applicable in the specific environments intended.  
Additionally only select individuals recognised the possible long-term impact of 
a decision to follow a heavy simulation path without any further evaluation.  
Complementing the ‘theory only’ strategic view were the four issues at the 
tactical level that provided an effective deterrent to any increased employment 
of simulation.  The result was an effective barrier to any realistic investigation in 
the ability of ASTA to train pilots. 
2.3 OTHER AIR FORCES – PRESENT-DAY COMPARABLE 
LSB 
This section will examine the closest rivals to the Eurofighter Typhoon in 
terms of role and performance and compare their LSBs with a view to 
measuring the exploitation of simulation by the world’s leading nations.  This will 
allow Tyohoon’s progress to be viewed within a relevant context and give some 
indication if the strategic aim of 1:1 balance is realistic. 
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Within the Typhoon partner nations the UK leads the proportion of 
training conducted within simulation, an outcome largely borne from 
procurement rather than design.  The RAF presently has a single base with two 
full mission simulators and two cockpit trainers all of which link together via a 
local network to allow full mission rehearsal as a four-ship formation and 
provide a quantity of devices that ensures there is the volume to train large 
numbers of pilot synthetically.  In contrast Italy and Germany have procured 
only two devices at each of their main bases, the intent being to link between 
bases via a secure network which, to date, has not been developed.  The result 
is that both front line and their OCUs compete over fewer resources per base, 
restricting the employment of synthetics. 
At the commencement of this research the Saudi Air Force were yet to 
receive their simulators, discussions as to the suitability of the four nation 
product had led to a decision to procure a BAE Systems proprietary solution 
which was delivered in 2012.  All the Saudi pilots trained by the author during 
2009-2012  exhibited a reticence to employ simulation outside the normal 
methods of practicing for emergencies or pre flight preparation similar to those 
that had been used by the RAF for many years.  The attitude was best summed 
up by Colonel Mohammed Al-Shahrani (later Brigadier-General and Base 
Commander of Taif, the first Saudi Typhoon base), who stated during a 
conversation with the author on 22 Jun 2009 “we have different cultures, we 
wish to fly not simulate but we will watch the RAF.”  The result of this reluctance 
has led the Saudi Typhoon training system to have a LSB ratio in in the vicinity 
of 9:1 (stated during a discussion with BAe’s Chief Typhoon pilot, Mr A King on 
21 December 2016). 
Away from the partner nations the closest fighter in terms of performance, 
technology and capability is the French Air Force’s Rafale. Use of this aircraft 
as a comparison is particularly relevant as the Typhoon and Rafale shared their 
initial design phase before the French separated from the other partner nations 
to produce the Rafale independently.  Nevertheless, the intent and much of the 
aircraft design is common.  Their OCU produces pilots to a similar standard to 
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the RAF - LCR (Limited Combat Ready) and does so with an LSB of 63 live 
hours and 37 synthetic (Exchange Officer 2011), proportions virtually identical 
to that of 29 Sqn.  
In the US Air Force a RAND investigation by Ausink quantifies the LSB 
for the US fighter – the F-15, a fighter of the same generation as the Typhoon, 
at 10:1.  Questionnaire respondents, however, had stated a desire to increase 
simulation to an LSB of 2:1 (Ausink et al., 2011, p. 17).  Oddly the F-22, 
presently the world’s only 5th generation fighter in service, which was built 
without a two-seat training variant and had the need to protect much of its 
capabilities from prying eyes in the live environment might have been expected 
to employ simulation for much of its training.  Ausink’s work however (Ausink et 
al., 2011, pp. 13, 23–24) found that pilots were recommended to achieve 10 live 
hours to each simulator hour - the same as the F-15, a generation older.  The 
figures actually achieved per month are much lower at 6 live and 2 synthetic 
although the subjective opinion of the pilots was that this should be much higher 
than the recommended figures – the average desired being 13 live to 9 
synthetic, an approximate ratio of 3:2 (Ausink et al., 2011, p. 13). 
It can be seen from the statistics above that the 2011 Typhoon OCU 
overall LSB ratio of 3:2 can be seen as broadly comparable to its competition.  
Thus there was no external stimulus on the RAF to increase the synthetic 
proportion of training, neither was there an indicator from the peer level that 
simulation held the answer to the low hours, experience and training displayed 
in the NAO report, Figure 1-1. 
2.4 THE CIVILIAN VIEW 
The use of simulators has been widespread in the civilian transport 
context for over a decade and their use has been incorporated into training by 
both the Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) (CAA, 2012) and the Federal Aviation 
Authority (FAA) (FAA, 2012).  Their use and inclusion in training is tightly 
governed and the Authority’s approval for that use is controlled under strict 
guidelines.  The approval governs elements such as visual design and acuity, 
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cockpit equipment, motion and sound replication (JAA, 2012).  Whilst efforts 
have been made to bring military simulation representation in line with their 
civilian counterparts, the efforts have been complicated by the fact that there is 
no unified view on what the critical items are that should be tested, differing as 
they do between each of the combat aircraft based on each’s purpose. The 
relevant UK military Joint Service Publication (MoD 2010, Regulation 
375.105.2) orders that each Aircraft Operating Authority are to approve the use 
of each simulator on an annual basis but how this is done is left to the discretion 
of each authority.  Work by the Frazer-Nash Consultancy Ltd (Frazer-Nash, 
2010, p. 185) guides the RAF on methods of doing this.  The relevant area of 
this document, detailing how each phase is tested, is 11 pages long.  The 
section applicable to the area of combat aviation – Tactical Operations Phase, 
is only 2 lines:  
“Demonstrate the tactical or operational performance of the whole simulator as 
a weapons system.  SMEs are responsible for the content and conduct of this 
phase of this assessment.” 
This demonstrates that there is little comprehensive guidance on how combat 
aircraft simulation should be determined as ‘fit-for-purpose’.  Areas that might 
have a civilian read across are provisioned for but guidance for any true military 
application is lacking. 
It can be seen therefore that Joint Aviation Requirements (JAR), CAA, 
FAA and JAA regulations are specific to the civilian context, a context that is 
only partially relevant to the military application.  This is argued similarly in the 
section 2.2.1 Understanding the Picture: if it was to be deemed necessary to 
model every requirement and system of a combat aircraft to the fidelity level 
required by the civilian sector the cost penalties would begin to outweigh the 
simulators’ financial advantages.  Not all of these expensive representations 
can be authoritatively deemed necessary for training.  As an example consider 
the JAR requirement for simulator motion: a meta analysis for the US Navy 
(Jacobs et al., 1990) found that the “use of motion cueing added little to the 
training environment for jets, and may even have detracted from training for 
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some tasks.”  Whilst this analysis was conducted in 1990 it remains relevant as 
this was the time period during which the ASTA was being conceptually 
designed; ASTA contains no motion capability.  Had money been diverted into 
the design and build of motion replication in order to mirror the JAR regulations 
the meta analysis of the time would have indicated that this would have 
provided little training and financial value.   
This section has argued that whilst civilian requirements for simulators 
provide a useful comparator on how combat simulators should be designed and 
tested they cannot be directly transferred into the military application.  The lack 
of direct guidance on measuring a combat simulator’s fitness for purpose 
highlights the lack of specialism and knowledge in this area.   
2.5 EXPERIMENTATION 
If combat simulation’s relevance and level of contribution to pilot training 
is to be understood then, in the demonstrated absence of any regulations 
governing its use or design, an examination of experimental research should 
provide a clearer picture of its capabilities. This section will initially determine 
the extent to which simulation has been investigated and included within both 
civilian and military flying training, with particular focus on hardware, the issues 
affecting transfer of training and the historical precedence of sample sizes.  
Subsequently a study of the ability of simulators to impart the relevant skillsets 
will be sought, in order to determine better the risk of non-transference of these 
skillsets in the trial phase.  
2.5.1 CIVILIAN 
The civilian market does offer an insight into the capability of simple 
simulators or PC-based simulators to train pilots (Talleur et al. 2003, 
D’Alessandro 2007).  Whilst there are trials that show weak transfer of training 
in the civilian context (Dennis and Harris, 1998) the majority demonstrate strong 
correlations for the transfer (Atkins et al., 2002; Talleur et al., 2003; 
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D’Alessandro, 2008). Whilst this research explores, largely, the more procedural 
nature of flying such as Instrument Flying (IF) or highly specific tasks such as 
landing from a radar approach, as a body of evidence it does examine all 
experience levels of pilots from the beginner through to pilots with over 2000 
flying hours.  Additionally Talleur’s work testing 106 pilots in the skills involved 
with Instrument Flying found Personal Computer Aviation Training Devices 
(PCATDs) to be effective in maintaining currency and enhancing instrument 
proficiency. 
The largest non-airline LSB found being used was 2:3 in a mocked-up 
Cessna 172 aircraft (Macchiarella, Brady and Arban, 2005). This research, 
however, did not propose to test whether the student pilot was ‘to standard’ in 
the air but rather use the simulator training as a stepping stone to shorten the 
follow-on airborne training. 
D’Alessandro found that PC-based simulators did successfully provide 
training for introductory skills and tasks but were less able to transfer training as 
the tasks became more complex.  He believed this to be a function of the fidelity 
of the devices on which the training was being undertaken, underlined by the 
fact that there was a point at which the transfer of training became less effective  
for each task. This matches the conclusions of Salas et al who offer that 
simulation should be considered as a tool for training rather than training itself 
and that development of the tool must concentrate on the learning rather than 
striving for realism (Salas, Bowers and Rhodenizer, 1998).  Salas et al support 
the D’Alessandro findings: showing that low-grade devices are capable of 
providing the level of training required as they are designed to teach to a 
specific task; in this example that is procedural flying and basic skills. 
 The civilian experimental experiences are relevant to the military context 
through their demonstration of training transfer at the foundation level of military 
pilot’s skills.  The analysis by D’Alessandro and Salas et al. infer that the 
limitations of these experiments are the simulators themselves and thus 
increased simulation fidelity contains the possibility of increasing the complexity 
of tasks that can be trained with them.  
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2.5.2 MILITARY 
Military simulators, by virtue of the funding behind them, have tended to 
be more complex than the PC simulators the civilian experiments have used.  
The following section will examine the experimental experiences of the military 
community and determine if the limits are the simulators, as D’Alessandro 
states, or a function of human ability. 
Once simulation became fully established, in early 1980, and possible 
benefits became recognised a plethora of articles and experiments were 
published.  By way of précising history to this point a Jacobs et al produced a 
meta analysis that considered a total of 247 articles, of which only 26 had 
sufficient information for any statistical analysis (Jacobs et al., 1990). Mirroring 
the civilian experience of years later these experiments could be grouped into 
takeoff, approach to landing and landing; the most basic of fighter pilots skills. 
Nevertheless the major finding was that “simulators consistently produced 
improvements in training for jets”.   
The late 1980s and early 1990s saw an increased ability to replicate the 
visual environment and, subsequently, testing of what the US calls Basic 
Fighter Manoeuvres (BFM), the RAF calls ‘Combat’ and the layman calls 
‘dogfighting’ was available. Bell and Waag examined the limited previous 
literature (Bell and Waag, 1998) and offered the major observation that whilst 
opinions of the SMEs are a necessary requirement their opinion is of limited 
validity in a scientific sense.  This observation was particularly relevant to the 
issue of measuring performance as well as having critical relevance to the 
second of the research question’s themes – culture.  Research into 1970s and 
80s trials (Seaman 1999) supports Bell stating that ‘The subjective data 
produced by [SME] evaluations do not provide the quantitative indices of 
…performance improvement or training transfer’ and that they may not be 
‘sufficiently sensitive’ (1999, p.21).  These are critical observations as all 
instruction both in the RAF and all other western air forces the author has 
experienced over 23 years in the RAF assess through the use of SME 
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assessment, the implication being that this method is invalid for assessing a 
transfer of training. Seaman and Bell’s view is true if control of both the training 
and testing environment can be dominated to an extent that all variables remain 
constant between the sample pilots.  The nirvana being the ability to move away 
from SME opinion and make such scientifically acceptable quotations as 
“75.26% more enemy striker kills” and “54.77% fewer F-16 [Fighting Falcon] 
kills” (Portrey, Keck and Schreiber, 2006, p. v). These statistics assume that 
variables such as radar quality, radar attenuation over range, issues with the 
display of information, weather, aircraft energy state, radar cross section of 
target aircraft, formation disposition and target aspect are able to be fixed for 
each sortie.  Some of these may be fixed if a lower fidelity or an emulated 
simulation solution is used, as the radar performance and weather can be pre-
set and each sortie can start from set parameters.  This is not able to be done 
for simulated solutions that utilise rehosted aircraft software.  Rehosted 
software utilises actual aircraft software and as such contact on a target will be 
achieved as a function of the radar’s scan rate, Pulse Repetition Frequency 
(PRF) in use and pilot’s radar settings.  Thus it is possible for two targets at the 
same range to be detected by the radar at differing ranges on two different runs, 
even if all other variables are fixed.  
Thus the opinion that SME assessments do not provide hard figures for 
subsequent analysis is valid for quasi-transfer i.e. testing the new skillsets in a 
different simulator of the same aircraft type, or wholly emulated simulator-based 
trials where variables can be fixed.  In the live environment the problem is 
complicated by the infinite combinations of aircraft positions and energy states 
that a firing solution can exist for, multiple limits on which a solution would 
become invalid and a number of rules of thumb that should be applied before 
and during firing.  The most careful experiment will constrain a large number of 
these variables but an SME, when providing his opinion, will still apply a large 
quantity of tacit knowledge and gestalt observations for each situation, gained 
from experience, which is not able to be gathered by quantitative data metrics.  
It is therefore proposed that in the case of re-hosted simulation or measurement 
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of transfer of training into live flight that the validity of the SME’s opinion is 
increased over and above quantitative measurements. 
Further investigation into the experiments examined show that in some 
instances the Instructor Pilots (IPs) did their assessment from the “enemy” 
aircraft in a linked device (Seaman 1999, p.20).  In this instance the research is 
insensitive, the subjective assessment being negatively affected as 
understanding a pilots intentions, abilities and energy states is difficult when 
separated by (a simulated) 6000’ of distance across the combat circle.  Finally 
the type of students tested ranged from Combat Ready (CR) ie training just 
complete, to highly experienced Qualified Weapons Instructor (QWI) students 
(Seaman 1999, p.21).  In these cases the sensitivity of the results would be 
reduced as adherence to the aircraft type’s Standard Operating Procedures 
(SOPs), which govern missile shot doctrine and aircraft tactical employment, 
would be weaker for the CR pilots than the QWI pilots for whom they would be 
completely ingrained.  Thus the further down the training pipeline the 
experiments tested the more their subjects would act as intelligent clones and 
similar scores become increasingly likely. 
The environment in which the training is tested is also debated.  Many of 
the trials in the meta analysis utilise quasi-transfer testing, whereas a smaller 
number of experiments test the subjects in live flight.  In his 1991 paper ‘The 
Value of Air Combat Simulation, Strong Opinions but Little Evidence’ Waag 
asserts that live flight testing is the only way:  
“In other words [live flight test] evidence is the only sufficient condition for 
establishing the effectiveness of simulation training” (Waag, 1991, p. 4).   
7 years later in 1998 having completed a review evaluating the 
effectiveness of flight simulators for training from all research between 1966 and 
1998, he and Bell highlighted the same point - in order for transfer of training to 
be proven it must be witnessed in the air:   
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“Many training researchers believe that such transfer is the only sufficient 
condition for establishing the effectiveness of simulation training” (Bell and 
Waag, 1998). 
Contemporary meta analysis (de Winter, Dodou and Mulder, 2012) 
contributes to the opinion by demonstrating that testing using quasi-transfer 
from simulator to simulator was more favourable (Cohen’s3 d=0.73) than in true 
transfer to live flight (d=0.10).  The effects being attenuated in true transfer 
versus that of quasi-transfer.  This paper is at first glance contradictory to Bell 
and Waag’s statement above.  However more in depth investigation of de 
Winter et al’s work highlights a lack of the exact type of tasks being undertaken 
(repetitive or highly complex) and more importantly the quasi transfer 
experimentation is, for the large majority undertaken between the years 1995 
and 2010.  In contrast the true transfer experiments all occurred between 1970 
and 1985 yet there is no observation of the effect that improvements in 
simulation technology would have on the training transfer.  
This area of the literature review pertains to the first theme of the 
research question – pilot performance, and specifically its testing and 
measurement.  The above work indicates that if the aim of the simulator is to 
train for live flight then it is favourable for that transfer to be assessed in live 
flight.  As simulation has improved and live flying costs increased quasi-transfer 
testing has appeared to become the natural proving ground.  This is largely built 
on the ability to reproduce consistently the testing environment facilitating the 
natural allies of quantitative metrics and quasi-transfer testing.  However as the 
testing regime intended for the research was to mirror the non-negotiable 
standard used presently, the tests would be not only non-repetitive but dynamic 
and complex, thus it was testing in live flight that was believed to be the only 
method of truly testing training transfer.  The inability to conduct realistic 
scenarios in a quasi-transfer setting was also a supporting factor to this 
decision: in the case of fast-jet training there are no simulators available that 
                                            
3 Cohen’s d is an effect size, indicating a standardized difference between 2 means. 
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would produce an environment capable of the roll rate or the provision of a G 
onset rate of 9G per second as found in the Typhoon. Thus any expectation of 
quasi-transfer results to be the same or directly applicable to true transfer would 
be additionally unfair.  Most importantly however the Eurofighter Typhoon 
fraternity has only one flight simulator type capable of training, thus quasi-
transfer experimentation would be transported to a non-representative cockpit 
which would have an unknown effect on results. Finally, as made clear in the 
dissection of the research question, this research was to take place within the 
practical environment, thus the question’s second theme of culture was 
considered to be particularly important. It was believed the research would have 
a better chance of acceptance from the community if successes and failures 
were exposed within the present testing regime. For these reasons the decision 
was made to side with Bell and Waag and test the pilots in live flight rather than 
use a quasi-transfer methodology.  Having made this decision the use of SME 
opinion rather than quantitative method for measurement was the only available 
option. Whilst the limits of SME subjective opinions have been highlighted 
quantitative metrics for testing in live flight have yet to be agreed upon or 
validated and thus the SMEs assessment, with its reliance on experience, tacit, 
gestalt observations and widespread usage were to be used.  
2.5.3 SAMPLE SIZES 
A common element of all the literature reviewed was the (small) sample 
sizes and limited number of tasks assessed.  Vaden and Hall’s meta analysis of 
the effect of motion on training transfer in the preceding 24 years found only 7 
experiments, of which the sample sizes ranged from 8 to 36 – giving a mean of 
22 (Vaden and Hall, 2005).  If Bell and Waag’s criterion that witnessing true 
transfer to live flight is the only measure of establishing simulation effectiveness 
is applied to these experiments, in effect stripping out the quasi-transfer trials, 
then the sample sizes mean falls further, to 18.  None of the remaining trials 
were conducted post 1979 and all the transfer to live flight tests were conducted 
in a T-37 training aircraft, thus falling within Bell and Waag’s bounds of a less 
complex and resource intensive regime.  As can be seen in Figure 2-1 the T-37 
 37 
was a training aircraft, equivalent to the RAF Tucano, rather than the front-line 
aircraft of the day.  As such trials using this aircraft would have cost less to run, 
allowing the testing of larger numbers of students, but the testing of more basic 
tasks than the research intended here.  Nevertheless the small sample size 
demonstrates, even in basic military pilot training, the historic difficulty of 
collecting the numbers that would be academically acceptable in other fields. 
 
Figure 2-1.  Cessna T-37 Trainer 
De Winter, Joost and Dodou’s work (2012) in the same field used an 
expanded list of previous experimentation including those from Vaden & Hall 
(2005) but added helicopters, transport and civilian training aircraft.  Of the 24 
experiments between 1962 and 2004 examined only 2 were not in Vaden and 
Hall (2005) and fitted the context of live flight testing and military fast jet.  The 
first of these examined BFM instructor ratings for basic fighter tasks on the 
front-line fighter of the day – the F-4 Phantom (Pohlman and Reed, 1978).  The 
experiment used 8 pilots trained in a simulator with motion, 8 without motion 
and a control group of 6 with no simulation.  The second experiment also 
attempted to ascertain the effect of simulator-with-motion, but for air-to-surface 
delivery of weapons in a fast jet trainer - the Northrop F-5.  Again the sample 
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size was comparable, with 8 in the simulator group and 8 in the control (Gray 
and Fuller, 1977).   
The small samples when using front-line aircraft are not limited to motion 
assessment.  Work using the Swedish front-line fighter, the JA-37 Viggen 
(Figure 2-2) looked at the similarity and differences of the psycho-physiological 
reactions between simulated and live sorties (Magnusson, 2002).  The research 
examined a complex sortie, equivalent to that anticipated in this research, but 
used only 6 pilots.  
 
Figure 2-2.  JA-37 Viggen 
Research into small sample sizes found that they could be defensible 
under certain conditions. Bacchetti's (2010) research into the field of clinical 
trials proposed that a pragmatic strategy was to use the maximum sample size 
that was reasonably feasible.   Reasonably feasible was defined as ‘practical 
constraints’, ‘exhausting the pool of easily studied subjects’ or when restricted 
by cost barriers – the value of the information gathered outweighed the cost to 
gain it. In this last case this approximated closely to nmin  - their mathematically-
derived value for minimised total cost per subject studied (Bacchetti, McCulloch 
and Segal, 2008, p. 6).  This in turn produced a better projected value to cost.  
Within the context of the present trial this would equate to increased efficiency 
of costly assets and an increased throughput of student pilots. 
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Bock et al. (2002) offered that small representative samples could 
provide at least four types of valid findings: 
a.  All or none conclusions.  If the entire sample returns the same result 
the conclusion is likely to be true. 
b. ‘Some’ conclusions.  Can be considered a negative case of the all or 
none conclusion.   
c.  Generating ideas.  Small samples may offer an insight into new 
methods or processes to be further explored.  
d.  Support to the status quo.  Allied to substantial a priori evidence a 
finding from a small sample that supports this evidence may justify the 
conclusion that the sample supports the a priori evidence. 
The breakdown of the research question seeks to focus on the first three 
of these possible findings.  The challenge of substantial a priori evidence for 
support of the final finding, status quo, was discounted as previous Front-line 
fast-jet research true transfer training is not believed sufficient in quantity or of a 
contemporary setting to qualify as a sufficient body of evidence.  Nevertheless 
the value of the information that could be gathered from a, b or c above is 
considerable and would inform considerable future expenditure in a field where 
the MoD has a noticeable paucity.   
The intention of this section is to show that of the previous work 
attempted within this field over the last 50 years there is very limited evidence of 
the true transfer (ie testing of the transfer of training in live flight) within a 
military fast-jet context.  The research uses very small sample sizes due to the 
length of time, pilot numbers available and cost involved in front-line training for 
combat pilots.  Like this paper’s research all have been intended to guide policy 
decisions on simulation use and, despite their sample sizes have been 
included, along with experiments using even smaller sample sizes, in meta 
analysis to determine the effect on the validity of training transfer.  As this 
research intends to test over similar parameters it must at least match its 
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predecessor’s sample sizes.  No matter the historical support for small sample 
sizes in this field it was recognised that these alone would not be sufficient to 
answer the research question to the depth required, hence the triangulation 
approach of the intended method. 
2.5.4 METRICS 
In order to understand the value of synthetic training suitable metrics are 
required to provide indications of effects.  Research into the experiments to date 
found a number of higher level common metrics used in the majority of 
experiments. 
Percentage Transfer demonstrates the amount of live flying saved by 
simulation relative to the live environment (Orlansky and String, 1977, p. 26; 
Roscoe and Williges, 1980, p. 183; Alexander et al., 2005, p. 3).  
Percent transfer (PT) = ((Lc –Lx) / Lc) * 100    (1) 
Where  Lc = Learning time of control group in the live environment. 
Lx = Learning time of trial group in the synthetic environment. 
The transfer effectiveness ratio; demonstrating the ratio of time saved in the live 
environment against the time spent training in the simulator. 
Transfer Effectiveness Ratio (TER) = (Lc –Lx) / Sx   (2) 
Where  Sx = Learning time of trial group in the simulator. 
These equations are well used within the literature researched but 
consider time saved from an individual’s viewpoint. As this thesis’ research 
question is situated within the practitioner domain it is possible that limitations of 
simulator employment is likely to face real-world constraints.  To this end the 
metrics will be modified to measure the number of total resources used: 
Support Flying Transferred (SFT) = ((Spc –Spx) / Spc) * 100 (3) 
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Where Spc = Support live flying4 required in the control group syllabus. 
 Spx = Support live flying required in the trial group syllabus. 
Support Flying Hour Efficiency Ratio (SER) = Total Live hours (inc 
support) / Total student live hours required   (4) 
Both efficiency ratios can be broken down into cumulative or incremental 
figures to determine when the efficiency or effectiveness curves drop below an 
acceptable level to the organisation or researcher (Roscoe and Williges, 1980, 
p. 187).  These metrics are robust indicators of efficiency when comparing 
comparable syllabuses however they make the assumption that the student that 
emerges is of suitable standard.  To determine if this is the case comparison 
can either be done using quantitative or subjective measures although, as 
argued in Section 2.5.2 above, the decision on which to use is largely 
determined by the testing location.  Portrey’s (Portrey, Keck and Schreiber, 
2006) work testing teams within in the synthetic domain attempted to capture 
the data shown in Table 2-1. 
Table 2-1.  Synthetic Metrics used by Portrey (2006). 
 
Individual aircraft data 
Range at missile launch 
Mach at missile launch 
Loft angle at missile launch  
Altitude at missile launch 
Percentage maximum at launch 
Escape G at launch 
G-load at missile launch 
Distance of miss 
Clear avenue of fire 
 
High order data 
No. of enemy strikers reaching target 
Closest distance of strikers 
No. of F-16 mortalities 
No of enemy strikers killed before base 
Total no. of enemy threats killed 
‘Top Gun’ summary scoring scheme 
                                            
4 Support flying are the aircraft required to make up the formation and opposition over and 
above that used for the trainee. 
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Portrey’s metrics required 24 months to program into the simulator’s 
software (Portrey, Keck and Schreiber, 2006, p. 11) but undeniably capture the 
most comprehensive list of measurements relevant to front-line training to date 
and provide a ready method to compare teams of peers against each other.  
This is the clear benefit of testing within the synthetic domain where data can be 
captured from databus and used to provide the figures above.  As argued 
previously, however, the relevance and applicability of these results to combat 
assumes that all of the simulator’s models, e.g. missile flyout, impact of weather 
on radar, jamming etc. contain no differences to the live environment and a 
corresponding assumption that a transfer of training to live flight would take 
place. 
In the live-flight environment SME Sortie Report Forms (SRFs) are used 
by all major air forces to ascertain if a pilot meets the minimum standard.  The 
Typhoon SRF, see Figure 2-3 is developed from work by Dstl which defined the 
Mission Essential Competencies (MECs) required to be resident in each pilot 
(Dstl, 2009) and represents a typical example of such a form. Each task is 
graded between 0 and 5 with 3 being assessed as a pass standard. Example 
definitions for each task and the definition of each of the numerical grading can 
be found in Appendix A’.  The SRF’s weakness is that it provides little by the 
way of quantitative measurement, unlike the synthetic environment, however its 
use in the live environment does definitively prove transfer of training against an 
experientially-based standard. 
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Figure 2-3.  Example Sortie Report Form 
The above examples show a number of accepted high-level metrics used 
by previous work.  The method of more detailed data collection is determined by 
the testing environment chosen and varies between quantitative measurement 
and an observed assessment of ability.  As the research question is targeted at 
understanding how much of Eurofighter’s training can be ported into synthetics 
the only way of determining if the transfer of training has occurred is to test in 
the live environment.  In making this decision the use of SME assessment 
through the use of SRFs is the only method that has historical and accepted 
precedence. 
2.6 DEVOLVED THEORIES AND PRACTITIONER USE 
The literature examined so far has almost exclusively concerned itself 
with whether simulators can provide any valuable contribution to the training of 
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the pilot.  This, however, provides only a single perspective on understanding 
how the research question should be tackled.  The challenge of finding the 
‘extent’ to which simulation can be used requires investigation of the limits of 
implementation to date.  Thus an examination of present practical 
implementation was conducted.  The implementation of the field’s research 
within a practical environment to increase the LSB has been pioneered by the 
F-15 and F-16 communities allied to the US Air Force Research Laboratory 
(AFRL).  The present practitioner’s standpoint is represented by Figure 2-4 
below. 
 
Figure 2-4.  Total Current Training Gap.  Reproduced from McGrath (2005). 
The view is that simulation should fill the gap between Continuation 
Training (C-T) i.e. day to day training and a theoretical maximum proficiency 
that combat operations would demand.  The gaps are generated via a lack of 
aircraft, the need to preserve peacetime safety margins, such as preventing 
highly dynamic manoeuvres close to other aircraft, or increasingly the need to 
train pilots to understand latest software or hardware enhancements.  McGrath 
further highlights the effects of future funding cuts with the number of monthly 
sorties available to a pilot to be cut from 12 to 9.  The result is that the available 
peacetime flying hours are spent servicing the training requirements that are 
within these bounds and simulation is targeted to achieve ‘gap’ training. 
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A major tenet of the theoretical maximum proficiency is arrived at by 
application of theories examining knowledge and skills and their links to mission 
competency (Symons, France and Bell, 2006).  Mission Essential 
Competencies (MECs) begin by sourcing the strategic level aims for air power 
and works downwards determining the competencies required to achieve these 
aims, with these competencies further broken down into knowledge and skills 
required by a pilot.  Finally the experiences required to achieve, or at least 
provide an opportunity to achieve, these requirements are determined.   In the 
USAF F-15 community this work led to a reassessment of the training syllabus 
and pushed elements from the ‘live’ environment to the synthetic resulting in a 
LSB ratio of 3:1 for Basic Mission Capable pilots (Baldwin, 2008).  The need for 
this reassessment of the LSB and the desire to increase efficiency of the F-15 
RAP (Ready Aircrew Program) Syllabus was driven by auditor observations of 
over-flying of certain sorties (Baldwin, 2008, p. 3), ‘nebulous allocations of flying 
hours’ (Ibid, p.24) and indiscriminate cuts in the flying budget and training 
programme (Ibid, p.4). The F-15 fleet, facing similar problems to the RAF, have 
recognised the need for increased use of simulation in order to increase the 
value of the live flying hours (Ibid, p.34) and have amended their simulation 
syllabus to do so. The work was mirrored for the Typhoon Fleet (Dstl, 2009) in 
order to highlight possible gaps in training but failed to result in any increase in 
the synthetic proportion of the LSB.  
The F-15 issues illustrate the difficulties of the level of technology 
comparable with that of the Typhoon.  The US’ experiences with the much more 
advanced F-22 provide an understanding of possible vectors of these issues.  
The F-22’s experiences are relevant as, like the Typhoon, the need for 
simulation is focussed by the high cost per flying hour - $68,362 (Thompson, 
2013). Ausink et al. (2011) found that the lower number of training events 
accomplished per month was due, primarily, to having to fly red-air (enemy 
opposition) missions in order to provide training value for those pilots receiving 
missions that did qualify as training events, an issue also recognised in the 
Typhoon and F-15 fleets (Lockwood, 2006, p. 36; Marken et al., 2007, p. 6).  
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Ausink et al’s solutions for reducing the gap and comments of their applicability 
to the Typhoon context are given below. 
a.   Increase both live and simulator hours available.  This 
requires and depends on funds being made permanently available 
increasing in line with the number of pilots that require training as the 
fleet grows. 
 
Figure 2-5.  Dassault DA20 Falcon - 'Red Air'. 
 
Figure 2-6.  BAe Hawk - 'Red Air' 
b.  Increase amount of red air being outsourced to other units.  
The aircraft being used for this role in the RAF are the externally-
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contracted Hawk and DA20 Falcon (Figure 2-5 and Figure 2-6).  Both 
have strengths but neither is capable of replicating the level of 
performance required as they are primarily a training aircraft and 
business jet respectively, consequently Typhoons continue to be used to 
provide a realistic adversary.  Simulation, however, provides the 
opportunity to fight against threats with the correct flight envelope 
replicated with high fidelity. 
c.   Develop simulation capabilities to provide the desired 
threats, or link to other simulators that can.  This requires software to 
provide a limited artificial intelligence to the enemy fighters or additional 
manned simulators that are linked by a network.  Whilst ASTA is unable 
presently to link externally to other non-Typhoon simulators (Wong, 
2010) it does have a basic tactical capability referred to as ‘the doctrines’.  
d.   Develop the Live Virtual Construct (LVC) capability.  The 
ability to have live and simulated aircraft simultaneously broadcasted 
within each other’s environment.  Live pilots will see simulator or 
constructed entities on their sensors whilst the simulator pilots will see 
computer generated images of friend and foe.  Comparative work to 
develop this idea has been conducted in the UK by Dstl (Anderson, Walls 
and Read, 2011).  Practical application has been prevented by the need 
for the pilot to see realistic representation of the fake entity on the 
sensors in order to prevent incorrect decisions and motor skills being 
formed.  This is possible but requires access to a section of the aircraft 
software that would require significant financial investment.  As such 
further development of this area has stalled. 
Of Ausnick et al.’s observations the only option that will reduce the 
wastage of assets used for ‘red air’ and that does not require significant 
financial investment or require a leap over a substantial technical hurdle is the 
provision of a realistic threat environment through simulation.  This provides a 
reasoning for the natural focus on simulation over the last few years as defence 
is made more accountable for its spending through the regular defence reviews.  
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Thus, with reference to the research question, the simulator should be able to 
demonstrate competence in the provision of enemy air replication rather than 
the previously tested tasks of just landing or instrument flying of the historical 
experimentation.  This will ensure the ‘extent’ of simulation use referred to in the 
question carries forward into the postgraduate training of the Combat Ready 
Work Up and will affect the LSB of the Front-line Squadrons and their day-to-
day training. 
2.6.1 LIMITATIONS OF SIMULATION 
All of Ausink et al’s observations of how to reduce the training ‘gap’ have 
an element of simulation within them however employing simulation in these 
areas with no understanding of where the limits of training in simulation lie 
would be counter productive and financially wasteful.  Fortunately work done by 
the F-15 Fighter community sought to make explicit these limits (Seaman, 
1999): 
a.   The Cultural Limit.  Seaman quotes General Richard Hawley, the 
commander of Air Combat Command as saying that their simulators 
were used “to learn some basics about the weapon system, learn to start 
the motor, how to employ the radar […] but [not to] learn the essence of 
the business, which is team combat.” (Seaman, 1999, p. 2).  In 2010 this 
same methodology was still being used by the RAF (29 Squadron, 
2011a). 
b.   Simulator Design Limitations.  Poor image projection, incorrect 
cockpit layout, non credible threats and overly accurate information 
provided by the Fighter Controllers (FCs) all contributed to limit the 
employment of the simulators; as originally found by Houck et al. (1991).  
In contrast to these limits Payne’s work argues that the potential to 
provide negative learning because of these limits can be negated simply 
by highlighting the differences between the real and simulated 
environment to the pilot and results in a valid transfer of training to take 
place (Payne, 1982). 
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c.   Physiological Issues.   Seaman theorises that it is not possible 
to reproduce the same level of physical exertion or stress as the live 
environment (Seaman 1999, p.33).  This is partially contested by 
Magnusson’s (2002) research which examined similarities and 
differences in psychophysical reactions between simulated and real air to 
ground missions and found ‘little difference in the reaction patterns on the 
psycho-physiological variables between simulated and real flight’, 
although there was significant difference in the mean level of each 
variable, such as heart rate (Magnusson, 2002, p. 59).  Magnusson 
hypothesises that the reasons for this are that the pilots either react to 
the mental workload or their bodies react as though the mission is real 
rather than simulated. 
Just as understanding limits will help avoid the positioning of simulation 
within areas it is unlikely to add benefit, an understanding of its strengths will 
facilitate the placement and maximise affect. Houck (1991) questioned 87 F-15 
combat pilots and found the events shown in Table 2-2 were better when 
trained in the simulator. 
Table 2-2.  Simulation Strengths.  Adapted from Houck (1991, p.10). 
Simulation Better than Live Valuable Simulator training but Not 
Better than Live 
1. Multibogey, Four or more enemy 
2. Reaction to SAMs 
3. Dissimilar Air Combat Tactics 
4. All weather employment 
5. ECM employment 
6. Communication Jamming 
7. Low Altitude Tactics 
8. Chaff / Flare Employment  
9. Escort Tactics 
10. Working with FCs 
1. All Aspect Defence 
2. Beyond Visual Range (BVR) 
Employment 
3. Radar Sorting 
4. Missile Employment 
5. Egress Tactics 
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Portrey (2006), however, provides quantifiable evidence of improvement 
of the tasks in the right hand column of Table 2-2 measured in simulated 
scenarios given to 76 teams of F-16 pilots.  This improvement over the 1991 
results could be down to the different aircraft type or, more likely, the 
improvement of simulation technology in the intervening years. 
In sum previous research has identified both strengths and weaknesses 
of simulation when used in a tactical environment.  This guided the present 
methodology of research, allowing efforts to be focussed on areas that had 
been historically poor in simulation. 
2.7 LITERATURE REVIEW SUMMARY 
The literature review has sought to provide an understanding of the 
background to the problem from both a high level (Parliament and Air Ranking 
Officers) and a lower level (tactical) standpoint.  The RAF’s understanding of 
the abilities and intentions of simulation has been found through examination of 
papers and reports leading up to and including the period of the SDSR 2010. 
These have led to an appreciation of the motivation surrounding the desire for 
increased employment of the technology.  At the same time the factors of 
concurrency, functionality, reliability and culture were identified as barriers to 
the increase of the proportion of synthetics in training. 
Study of the extent of simulation use in both the civil and military sector 
has found the maximum proportion of simulation used in the civil world, 
excluding airlines, to be an LSB of 2:3 (Cessna training in Section 2.5.1) within 
the military this reduces to 1.7:1 (Rafale training in Section 2.3).  As a rule these 
simulation sorties have followed the cultural pattern of pre-flight preparation 
rather than being used as an environment where all required training can be 
given. 
All the experiments into the effectiveness of simulation within the military 
sector discussed here have used 8 pilots in each group and using limited 
exposures to specific areas of training, for example instrument flying, landings 
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or BFM.  These exposures have been for short time periods and used less than 
ten simulator sorties during the training or multiple runs of a task of less than 5 
minutes, with the most live sorties used being 6 per student (1975 US Navy 
study quoted in Seaman (Seaman, 1999)).  The purpose of these sorties was to 
train the students in the techniques required for live flight so that the studies 
might search for an improvement in student quality.  None of the research 
viewed simulation as an entire replacement for the live environment, only 
preparation for it; to this end the desire to establish if the output was better than 
live training is understandable.   Sample sizes for the research have varied but 
as the complexity / cost has increased the sample sizes have fallen, with 
research using live testing in Front-Line combat aircraft using a minimum of 6 
(Magnusson 2002) and a figure of 8 for both Pohlman and Reed (1978) and 
Gray and Fuller (1977).  The testing environments, both live and synthetic, have 
also been discussed with advantages and disadvantages found for both.  
Incorporated within this was the method of metric measurements for both 
environments as well more overarching equations to determine the 
effectiveness of the training.  The final section looked at the experience of 
practitioners when employing the research to date: the limiting issues, 
maximum LSBs attained and assessment (by current combat pilots) of areas 
that were better trained in the simulator.  
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Chapter 3.  TRIAL PANDORAS BUZZARD 
3.1 OVERVIEW 
Trial PANDORA’S BUZZARD intended to determine if the utilisation of a 
heavily synthetic syllabus was even feasible when training fighter pilots to fly 
and fight the Eurofighter Typhoon.  Unlike previous research that targeted 
specific skillsets over a few missions this work sought to replace the entirety of 
Operational Conversion Unit training with simulation, thus ensuring the 
simulator was the only location a student would have gained the knowledge 
used in live flight.  Allied to the strengths and weaknesses, the trial intended to 
expose the results were to inform the RAF which areas appeared valid to exploit 
further when increasing their synthetic proportion of the syllabus.  Finally the 
trial hoped to expose second-order effects such as squadron structure and the 
impact on instructor hours that had hitherto been concealed.  
3.2 KEY LITERATURE REVIEW DIRECTION 
Having presented the historical issues within the literature it was clear 
that a number of key decisions needed to be articulated in order to establish 
direction and thus determine the research methodology, the largest of these 
being the testing environment i.e. was the success or failure of the trial to be 
judged by assessment of standards within the simulator (quasi-transfer) or by 
witnessing standards in live flight (true transfer), see section 2.5.2.  After 
consideration the live environment was selected for testing, the major reason 
aligning with Bell and Waag’s 1998 view that live testing was the only true way 
of validating a transfer of training.  Had this research intended to train within the 
cultural norms of live flight preparation, or not wished to determine ‘limits’ then 
quasi-transfer training would have offered clear advantages. The intention to 
train student pilots entirely within the simulator for each phase of an entire 
Operational Conversion Unit of a front-line combat aircraft represented a new 
exploration of limits, and as such validating that training in anything other than 
live flight would not be acceptable to either academic or military peers; 
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particularly if the research was intended to act as a catalyst for a cultural 
change.     
A consequential issue forced by the election to test in the live 
environment was the difficulty of generating a sufficiently large sample size as 
cost and complexity of the skillsets increase and available pilots decrease; 
discussed at length in section 2.5.3.  The literature review highlighted that, 
whilst Magnusson (2002) may have used only 6 pilots, a figure of 8 pilots in the 
trial group was more normal and acceptable to the research field, thus requests 
to Air Command for trial pilots must at least achieve this figure.    
3.3 CONTEXT 
The trial was intended to be multi-disciplinary in nature, incorporating 
empirical data and statistical analysis of existing data, as review of the literature 
had indicated that the effects of practical integration of simulation into training 
was not limited to the simulation devices themselves.  To this end the research 
was to be undertaken with a ‘systems’ mind set, the high-order areas and aims 
of which are shown in Figure 3-1.   
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Figure 3-1.  Systems Approach High Level Intentions 
Multiple interactions between the groupings was anticipated, a logical 
and coherent thread throughout the research was therefore necessary to 
provide initial findings before any further iterative cycles could be considered, 
thus the objectives referred to in Figure 3.1 refer back to those identified during 
the dissection of the research question leading to Sub-Question 1 (section 
1.8.1), to ensure the link to the research question remains explicit.  The flow of 
the research followed the logic arrows in Figure 3-1; an understanding of the 
maximum achievable LSB on the OCU would lead to an appreciation of areas 
where simulation could provide maximum effect, the failures in these areas 
informing the ‘limits’.  Learning aspects and mission setup observations will be 
sourced from the Sortie Report Form narrative and in combination with the 
determined LSB the required capacity of the present simulation devices can be 
found.  This in turn will provide a desired fleet structure and help inform the 
	
OBJECTIVE 1  
OBJECTIVE 2  
OBJECTIVES 3 & 4 
OBJECTIVE 3  
OBJECTIVE 3  
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weaknesses in present simulator design such that they may be addressed in 
future procurement.  
In order to bound the problem and provide a conceptual limit Objective 1 
of Sub-Question 1 identified that the initial research should consider only 
discreet training packages within the training of Typhoon pilots rather than day-
to-day training done by Combat Ready (CR) pilots on the front line.  The use of 
discreet training was intended to take advantage of defined packages with 
stated aims and objectives, extant scoring matrices and an established end-of-
training pass standard.  These features provided a conveniently comparable 
‘end-of-phase’ standard for test subjects to meet and, importantly, a number of 
pre-trained assessors that have been demonstrated to adhere to a standardised 
level of assessment via regular STANEVAL (STANdard and EVALuation Flight) 
assessments of the instructional level and ability of each of the Instructor Pilots 
(IP). 
3.4 AIMS 
The discreet training packages targeted for the research within Trial 
PANDORA’S BUZZARD and the intended aims for each of the packages are 
listed below: 
a. Phase 1.  Day conversion to the aircraft; the training of students 
up to and including first solo.   
i. Determine if results of the Instrument Rating Test (IRT) are 
affected by a fully synthetic training lead in and test when 
compared with results from the standard syllabus, tested in live 
flight. 
ii. Determine the feasibility of achieving a successful first solo 
from a fully-synthetic syllabus.  
b. Phase 2.  Combat – Basic Fighter Manoeuvres (BFM); short 
range fighting within the visual arena. 
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i. Determine if the Combat Trial Syllabus should be 
recommended for inclusion into the core syllabus with particular 
reference to the likelihood of a fully synthetically trained student 
passing the End-of-Phase (EoP) check ride when compared to a 
student trained using the standard method. 
ii. Identify any limiting factors preventing the further 
exploitation of simulation to train within the BFM environment. 
c. Phase 3.  Counter Air (CA); long-range fighting outside visual 
range using longer range missiles. 
i. Determine if the Trial Syllabus should be recommended for 
inclusion into the core syllabus with particular reference to the 
likelihood of a fully-synthetically-trained student passing the End-
of-Phase check ride when compared to a student trained using the 
standard method. 
ii. Identify any limiting factors preventing the further 
exploitation of simulation to train within the Counter Air 
environment. 
d. Phase 4.  Quick Reaction Alert (QRA); the enduring role of the Air 
Defence pilot is to protect the homeland during peacetime and provide 
an airborne “police force”. This ride is conducted against a low slow 
aircraft simulating a civil aircraft lost below cloud. 
i. Establish the probability of a fully-synthetically-trained 
student passing the QRA End-of-Phase check ride when 
compared to a student trained using the standard method.   
ii. Identify any limits or risks associated with the QRA phase. 
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3.5 DETERMINING THE RELEVANT FACTORS  
Before commencing the trial the measures to verify its success, or 
otherwise, and factors that affected that success needed to be determined.  
Having chosen ‘true transfer’ of training using live flight as the test environment 
the measure of success would be determined by SME marking of the sorties as 
argued in section 2.5.4.  As this was the scoring scheme normally used within 
Typhoon training this methodology would allow the historic records to be 
investigated to provide the benchmark that the Trial group would need to meet. 
Access was gained to all the Typhoon training archives which sourced 7 
years of training records, back to 2004.  Investigation of the syllabus and 
training methods found that between 2004 and 2006 the syllabus and 
techniques were not suitably similar to that intended to be used for the trial 
group’s syllabus, thus these years were discounted.  From 2006 onwards the 
archives showed the syllabus to maintain a stable and comparable format to the 
trial. This provided results for all the pilots that had passed through the OCU 
over the preceding 5 years – a population of 57.  Scores for each phase for all 
57 students were recorded, however the first 27 had only completed the first 3 
phases; the 4th phase, QRA Low Slow, being introduced in 2009.  Thus the 
records contained 3 phases with 57 results and 1 phase with 27.  The 
descriptive statistics for each of the phases and the sum of the marks for those 
that conducted 3 and 4 phases respectively can be found at Appendix B. 
 Now that the style of measurement had been decided further 
investigation was required to determine any correlating variables that would 
provide key predictors that drove the resultant marks.  In doing so it was 
intended that this would inform the type of students that would be requested for 
the trial itself.  Having already conducted multiple selection procedures, such as 
officer selection and elementary, basic and advanced flying training, individuals 
meeting the entry requirements to be posted to the Typhoon were a relatively 
homogeneous population.  It was postulated, however, that the predictors likely 
to correlate to the scores were those that affected an individual’s experience 
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and ability: 
a. Total flying hours. A clear measure of experience in aviation.  It 
was expected that more-experienced pilots would perform better than 
less-experienced ones. 
b. Rank.  Promotion being based, in part, on ability in the air meant 
that senior officers such as Squadron Leaders and above were expected 
to achieve higher grades than the Junior Officers of the rank of Flight 
Lieutenant and below. 
c. Age.  At first glance this complements the measure of Total Flying 
Hours above, however it had often been commented that the younger 
pilots known as the ‘Playstation generation’ had an advantage over their 
older colleagues through the similarity of computer gaming to the highly 
computer-driven Typhoon.  Thus this metric was included to incorporate 
a generational observation. 
3.5.1 BINARY LOGISTIC REGRESSION: RANK VERSUS 3 
PHASE SUM  
Binary logistic regression was used to determine if there was a significant 
relationship between the sum of the marks given for the final flight of each of 
the  3 phases of IRT, BFM and Counter Air (to be hereafter known as the 3 
Phase Sum) and the Rank of the pilot: Senior Officer (SO) or Junior Officer 
(JO). 
Link Function: Logit 
 
 
Response Information 
 
Variable  Value  Count 
Rank      SO        12  (Event) 
          JO        42 
          Total     54 
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Logistic Regression Table 
 
                                                Odds     95% CI 
Predictor        Coef   SE Coef      Z      P  Ratio  Lower  Upper 
Constant     -3.62547   3.01349  -1.20  0.229 
3 Phase Sum  0.210940  0.263988   0.80  0.424   1.23   0.74   2.07 
 
 
Log-Likelihood = -28.271 
Test that all slopes are zero: G = 0.667, DF = 1, P-Value = 0.414 
 
 
Goodness-of-Fit Tests 
 
Method           Chi-Square  DF      P 
Pearson             2.58692   4  0.629 
Deviance            3.52163   4  0.475 
Hosmer-Lemeshow     2.22172   3  0.528 
 
 
Table of Observed and Expected Frequencies: 
(See Hosmer-Lemeshow Test for the Pearson Chi-Square Statistic) 
 
                 Group 
Value    1    2     3     4    5  Total 
SO 
  Obs    2    0     4     3    3     12 
  Exp  1.3  0.9   3.4   4.0  2.3 
JO 
  Obs    7    5    12    13    5     42 
  Exp  7.7  4.1  12.6  12.0  5.7 
Total    9    5    16    16    8     54 
 
 
Measures of Association: 
(Between the Response Variable and Predicted Probabilities) 
 
Pairs       Number  Percent  Summary Measures 
Concordant     233     46.2  Somers' D              0.15 
Discordant     157     31.2  Goodman-Kruskal Gamma  0.19 
Ties           114     22.6  Kendall's Tau-a        0.05 
Total          504    100.0 
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The measures of association above are measured between -1 (when all 
pairs of variables disagree) and +1 (when they all agree and therefore are 
associated).  The results show values between 0.05 and 0.19 hence it can be 
said that the poor measures of association are poor.  Similarly the test for a 
relationship between the rank of the pilot and their ‘3 Phase Sum’ did not return 
a statistically significant result (P value = 0.414).  Maximum Likelihood Methods 
however, can be biased towards small samples and as such an Individual Value 
Plot was generated to provide a intuitive visual check of the lack of association 
(Figure 3-2).  Again this plot highlighted no definitive difference in scores 
between the 2 groups, thus the variable of rank was considered not to be a 
factor. 
 
Figure 3-2.  Individual Value plot for Rank vs 3 Phase Sum 
3.5.2 REGRESSION ANALYSIS: 3-PHASE SUM VERSUS TOTAL 
FLYING HOURS AND PRESENT AGE  
After the removal of rank as a factor, Regression analysis was used to 
determine if there was a relationship of age or total flying hours to the 3 Phase 
Sum (sum total of IRT, BFM and Counter Air phases).  Minitab software 
identified 3 unusual observations and examination of  these results found two 
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that were unusual: one had had significant family issues during the course 
whilst the other had left the fleet after the OCU and prior to joining a front-line 
squadron.  Thus both these results were removed and the analysis re-run 
(below), this gave a higher 3 Phase Sum result for a given flying hour and age. 
The regression equation is 
3 Phase Sum = 12.8 + 0.124 Total Flying Hours (00s) - 0.109 Present age 
 
Predictor                     Coef  SE Coef      T      P 
Constant                    12.810    1.948   6.58  0.000 
Total Flying Hours (00s)   0.12370  0.05638   2.19  0.033 
Present age               -0.10858  0.08338  -1.30  0.199 
 
 
S = 1.27178   R-Sq = 11.1%   R-Sq(adj) = 7.6% 
 
 
Analysis of Variance 
 
Source          DF      SS     MS     F      P 
Regression       2  10.326  5.163  3.19  0.049 
Residual Error  51  82.489  1.617 
Total           53  92.815 
 
Source                    DF  Seq SS 
Total Flying Hours (00s)   1   7.583 
Present age                1   2.743 
This new analysis demonstrated a significant correlation with total flying 
hours, suggesting that the value of ‘3 Phase Sum’ increased by 0.124 for every 
100 flying hours the pilot had amassed (P = 0.03, thus statistically significant at 
the alpha level of 0.05).  Age however returned a value of the coefficient that 
was not statistically significant, P = 0.19, and as such the age was removed 
from consideration as a factor.  Thus selection of students for the trial group 
was made with a consideration of the variable of ‘Total Flying Hours’. 
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3.6 3 TESTS TO MEASURE SUCCESS   
As previously highlighted the design of the research was bounded by 
both academic and practical limitations, in addition there were large financial, 
political and risk implications associated with recommending a transfer out of 
live flight into the simulator, therefore the intent throughout the research was to 
favour the status quo of training in live flight.  Thus where any marginal 
decisions on the measure of success were to be made the metric will always be 
adjusted to favour training in live flight, in this way training in the simulator will 
have to provide significant and robust results to show in favour of simulation. 
The resultant regression of the factor of ‘Flying Hours’ returned the linear 
equation shown in Figure 3-3.  Whilst it is evident that this equation does not 
have any reasonable predictive power given the weak R-Sq values the result is 
valuable in that it shows the effect of the only significantly correlated factor on 
the sum of the scores across the 3 phases.  Given that the sample contains 
every pilot on record that passed through the OCU since 2006 this relationship 
has been proven to be acceptable to the Typhoon Instructors when graduating 
students.  Thus, given the small sample size likely to obtained for the trial, the 
trial subjects should not only prove themselves within each phase but be seen 
to match this historic relationship.  Whilst it is possible to pass the course with 
lower marks, if the trial is to be considered successful by peers then the 3-
phase results should be no less than the integer beneath this line (sorties are 
marked in integers, a decimal result thus not being possible). 
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TEST 1:  The total of the Trial pilot’s results across all 3 phases should fall 
no less than the closest integer beneath 10.33 + 0.06* Total Flying 
Hours(00s)  
 
Figure 3-3.  Linear Regression of Total Hours Vs Sum of the Scores of the 3 Phases 
Given that the removal of the unusual results increased the gradient of 
the equation the intent that the research should favour the status quo has been 
met.  However, as previous students have passed the course with lower marks 
the need to satisfactorily meet Test 1 is primarily a cultural requirement that 
would promote acceptance of the Trial.  The stated requirement to pass each 
phase of the course is a score of 3 – satisfactory, in each examination sortie at 
the end-of-phase.   Given the small sample size Test 2 was set such that all trial 
subjects must pass the End-of-phase check ride in order for that phase to be 
considered for recommendation for inclusion in the core syllabus as a synthetic 
phase. 
TEST 2:  Each of the test subjects must pass (score 3 or higher) the 
EoP check ride for the phase to be considered for recommendation 
for inclusion in the core syllabus as a purely synthetic phase.  
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Finally and in keeping with the intent to favour the status quo the mean 
score for the control group should not be shown to be higher than that of the 
trial group.  Given the small sample expected and the supporting evidence from 
Tests 1 and 2 the P-value for Test 3 was set at 0.1. 
TEST 3:   
The hypothesis (H0) - ‘The mean value of the EoP Score for the 
standard course is greater than the Trial course’ should be 
disproved. 
3.7 EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN 
3.7.1 EXPERIMENTAL SUBJECTS - TRIAL SAMPLE 
As identified in the literature review (see section 2.5.3) all comparable 
previous work has used a small sample size, typically of 8 trial and 8 control.  
Although the present work is intended to cover a larger timescale and skillset it 
was felt that any less than an equivalent trial size would not be able to be 
justified.  Larger samples, whilst highly desirable, were unlikely for reasons of 
cost and resource efficiency; as an illustration each pair of pilots took 
approximately 5-6 months to progress through the trial syllabus.  
As the sample size was small the criteria for the pilots intended for the 
simulation syllabus were selected carefully to match those on a standard live 
syllabus.  The method for selection was chosen as a stratified random sample 
(Bryman, 2008, p. 173) with groupings of the only correlated factor – Total 
Flying Hours.  RAF 1 Group (HQ) and Human Resources were requested to 
provide the Trial with the numbers of students required for each flying hour 
grouping (see Table 3-1).  
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Table 3-1.  Sample Groupings 
Hours Groupings Population Sample (n=57) Trial Sample (n=8) 
1-1000 20 3 
1001-2000 26 4 
2001-3000 11 1 
This method was chosen as it addressed a number of pragmatic factors: 
a.   The primary researcher would have control over the requirements 
of the sample but would not be able to select individuals that were known 
to him.  In this way the possibility of selecting individuals with a high 
probability of passing was removed. 
b.   Unlike a laboratory trial the subjects available had already passed 
through 3 years of training that removed all those unsuitable for fast jet 
training, thus the numbers exiting the training pipeline and available for 
Typhoon training during the trial’s period were small.  This sampling 
method allowed the sought-after attributes to be designated without 
unrealistically asking for all 8 trial subjects to come from a single 
grouping or restricting 1 Group’s career plans for individuals.  This 
pragmatic addressing of the politics secured the command chain’s 
support. 
The student pilots (to be known as Trial Subjects) provided by 1 Group 
(HQ) were commensurate with the strata requested; the pilots’ hours matched 
those required by Table 3-1.  Additionally all pilots had been deemed to be of a 
suitable standard for Typhoon Training by the Training Board at HQ 1 Group, 
RAF High Wycombe and, like all their colleagues, all pilots were of a high 
average standard as stated in their F5000 (Flying Appraisal Reports).  Thus 
entry standards matched historic norms. 
Once the conversion phase of the trial was complete for the Trial 
Subjects 1 Group HQ would go on to sanction the use of the synthetic syllabus 
to train, were necessary, standard course students (these would become known 
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as ‘The Augmentees’).  Although this was not planned for at the 
commencement of the trial the small number of Augmentee results are included 
in the Conversion phase results as the exposure up to the test point was exactly 
the same as the Trial Subjects.  In this manner the sample size, for the 
Conversion phase only, was increased. 
Prior to enrolment on the Trial all students (both Trial and Augmentee) 
underwent the same pre-employment training as their standard syllabus 
colleagues.  This consisted of a week at RAF Henlow receiving lectures on 
aviation medicine and undergoing practical hypoxia and G-straining training, in 
the Hypobaric Chamber and the Centrifuge respectively, before experiencing 
high G in modified Hawks at RAF Boscombe Down.  Upon arrival at RAF 
Coningsby the subjects undertook the standard 5 week ground school, learning 
the technical details and systems of the aircraft. Upon completion individuals 
were tested using the standard ground school examination.  Consequently Trial 
Subjects and Augmentees commenced their flying with the same base level 
knowledge as all pilots entering the flying phase of Typhoon training. 
3.8 EQUIPMENT 
3.8.1 DEVICES 
The simulators used were the Aircrew Synthetic Training Aids (ASTA) 
delivered to the RAF in 2006.  The system comprises of four devices: 2 Full-
Mission Simulators (FMS) and 2 Cockpit Trainers (CT).  Figure 3-4 shows an 
external view of the FMS demonstrating the scale required to achieve a realistic 
spherical projection.  Figure 3-5 shows a similar view of the CT – the 230 
degree projected surface can be seen, coloured sky blue behind the 
ironmongery, with the cockpit in the centre.  An example of the cockpits used in 
both the FMS and CT is shown in Figure 3-6.  All four devices are capable of 
operating independently within their own synthetic environment or alternatively 
being linked together in any combination and sharing a single synthetic world.  
All devices contain a high-fidelity cockpit, with respect to the switches contained 
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therein, of the same design as the live aircraft with the single design exception 
of the Head Up Displays (HUD) of the Cockpit Trainers.  Rather than a 
holographic HUD they contain only standard glass, the HUD display being 
projected onto the visual scene. 
  
Figure 3-4.  FMS Dome External View 
 
Figure 3-5.  CT External View 
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Figure 3-6.  FMS and CT Cockpit 
The visual world is taken from the same database but has 2 marked 
differences across the devices.  The FMS visuals are projected on to a 360 
degrees, 8 metre-high dome whilst the CT uses a 240 degrees dome 
approximately 4 metres wide.  In addition, one of the CTs used higher quality 
visuals than the rest of the devices (although the second CT was upgraded to a 
matching visual standard during the period of the research).  This provides a 
noticeable improvement in quality and clarity and allows the software engines to 
display cloud and other environmental issues in a more realistic manner.   
3.8.2 PILOT CLOTHING 
The design of the CTs provides for a lower level of pilot immersion than 
the FMS, with the CT pilot wearing his day-to-day flight suit and a headset 
(Figure 3-7).  Contrast this with the FMS pilot in full summer flight clothing, Life 
Survival Jacket (LSJ), G-suit and helmet (Figure 3-7).  The seat in the FMS is 
the enabler for this difference as it supports the ability to blow air into the G-suit 
and LSJ as well as provide breathing air for the pilot mask and a 
communications interface for the standard helmet.  The FMS set is also capable 
of G-cueing, the ability to provide small movements to indicate either the feeling 
  
70 
of aircraft rumbling along a taxiway or the onset of G.  Combined with G-suit 
inflation the device is capable of indications only of G onset.  Neither the FMS 
or the CT have motion capability and thus the FMS devices represents the limit 
of ASTA’s G-cueing.  
It is for these reasons that the FMS was chosen for the majority of the 
sorties undertaken by the students, the only exception being the first 
instructional sortie teaching the students to defend against hostile missiles 
within visual combat, known as Forward Quarter Missile Defence (FQMD).  In 
this case the CT was used as the better visual representation allowed the pilot 
to see any inbound enemy missiles. 
  
Figure 3-7.  Pilot Clothing CT (left) and FMS (right). 
3.8.3 SOFTWARE 
The ASTA devices of RAF Coningsby use simulation rather than the 
emulation devices present at RAF Leuchars.  Simulation utilises re-hosted 
aircraft software for all the computational and display tasks that are done 
normally within the physical airframe, whilst emulation is software written to 
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provide a shortcut directly to the intended displayed output of the task.  
Emulation has been witnessed to have better stability than simulation, however 
its ‘simplicity’ means that it does not provide the pilot necessarily with what the 
aircraft ‘does do’ only what it is ‘supposed to do’, see Table 3-2 for a list of 
major differences between the two types.  As a result emulation in the present 
Typhoon fleet provides for a lower level of fidelity than the ASTA and it is for this 
reason that the devices at RAF Leuchars were discounted from use within this 
research. 
Table 3-2.  Comparison Major Simulation and Emulation Differences 
Item of Interest ASTA Simulation Devices DCT Emulated Devices 
Cockpit All switches present with 
look and feel of aircraft. 
Number of switches 
missing. Touch screen 
devices replace multi 
functional displays of real 
aircraft. 
Clothing required Helmet radios, inflatable 
jacket and trousers 
supported. 
No flying clothing 
supported, headset only. 
Radar Use of actual aircraft 
software. 
Perfect emulation – no loss 
of tracks or environmental 
deterioration. 
Scenario generation Capable of complex 
scenarios with multiple 
enemy entities acting with 
‘intelligence’.  
Highly simplistic and 
controlled entirely by the 
operator.  This leads to a 
practical limit of 3 
manoeuvring enemy 
entities. 
Both FMS and CTs were loaded with software 3.1.X, which equates to an 
aircraft PSC (Production Software Configuration) of 4.3; concurrent to that used 
on the Typhoon OCU during the trial period.  Upgraded software did become 
available part way through the trial and was installed at a similar time to the 
aircraft program.  All students were trained on a software load that was the 
same as that flown in the live flight.   
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3.8.4 EXTANT LIMITATIONS 
The flight and systems models used in the ASTA give rise to a number of 
limitations recognised prior to the commencement of the trial. Because of these 
limitations neither testing or training would be carried out within these 
disciplines: 
a. Close Formation.  When in close formation the lead aircraft 
jumped in each axis by an estimated 2 metres on a cycle of 
approximately 1Hz.  Thus it was not possible to train close formation in 
simulation or test in live flight.  
b. Low Level.  Representation of the terrain at low level (250’ and 
below) lacked the fidelity to train students for live flight.  Owing to the 
Typhoon’s poor forward visibility at low level from the Instructor Pilot’s 
seat the primary researcher was not willing to risk life testing in this 
regime.  
c. Air-to-Air Refuelling (AAR). The Air-to-air refuelling modelling 
was not complete; the hose was unable to make contact with the basket, 
thus there was no way of demonstrating the correct technique.  Whilst 
software could be written to make this a functional environment it would 
be difficult to model the intricate, interlinked air flow patterns around the 
basket, tanker and receiver.  
d. Night Flying.  In addition to the ASTA limitations the real world 
deployment of aircraft and pilots to OPERATION ELLAMY required 
savings to the training schedule to be found.  Thus the night flying portion 
was removed in toto. 
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3.9 METHOD 
3.9.1 INTRODUCTION 
A total of 8 Trial Pilots were taken into the simulator portion of the trial 
and underwent the training for each phase of the OCU entirely within the 
simulator devices.  The performance of the students would be compared with 
that of students on the standard syllabus that used both simulation and live 
flight.  The training techniques, syllabus taught and training aims of each sortie 
were the same as those for students on the standard syllabus.  Similarly the 
Sortie Report Forms (SRF) and guidance used to ascertain scores for each of 
the teaching points would remain the same between the Live and Trial students.  
At the end of each of the phases the Trial students would be tested with a 
single End-of-phase flight in the live environment. 
3.9.2 PREPARATION 
As it was intended that all instruction received by a student pilot was to 
be given within the simulator there was a need to create a syllabus that 
provided a learning environment that covered all the situations that could be 
encountered on a live sortie but with a particular reference to safety.  Thus, the 
standard live syllabus was used as a template but each mission was crafted to 
train each student on elements that could possibly be encountered in live flight.  
As this was to be the first time, in Europe, that first solo from simulation was to 
be done, and there was no intention to provide a safety chase aircraft as done 
in the US or to restrict the weather limitations any further than the standard live 
syllabus, the elements were closely linked to the risk register generated prior to 
the generation of the syllabus; see Risk Register Example at Appendix C. 
In order to ensure consistency in delivery each sortie of each phase used 
a standard set of briefing slides that ensured each student received the same 
information prior to each sortie (see Appendix D). Within the phases of the 
course that used, as hostile opposition, Computer Generated Forces (CGFs), 
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templates were used for each run of each sortie.  Thus ensuring a uniform level 
of difficulty for each of the students. 
As the trial involved human volunteers the primary researcher sought 
ethical clearance from the MoD Research Ethics Committee (MoDREC), which 
was granted prior to the first live flight by a trial subject.  Approval was also 
sought to utilise 1 Group’s resources; simulators, live aircraft, pilots, engineers 
and financial backing.  This also included approval to fly students without 
instruction on their first ever live sortie.  Each phase was separately requested 
and example paperwork along with ethics approval can be found in Appendix E. 
The ethical discussions raised some important and difficult issues 
peculiar to the military context.  Firstly the perception of a student being ordered 
to enter onto the trial rather than it being an individual’s choice. This was 
countered by provision of a briefing sheet for all students that stated clearly that 
they were not being ordered.  This was accompanied by a consent form 
containing a similar statement that they signed to demonstrate this.  Secondly 
the perceived negative impact of a failed sortie on an individuals career.  Again 
this was addressed in the pre trial briefing and the consent form, the students 
were informed that failure at some point was to be expected but that this could 
be equally to do with simulator limitations as ability.  Re-training would be 
undertaken using the primary instructor and a subsequent failure would only 
result in them being placed on the extant flying syllabus with no detrimental 
effect on their career.   
3.9.3 INSTRUCTIONAL STAFF 
The instructors used to train and assess the students were all Qualified 
Typhoon Instructor Pilots (QPI) assigned to 29 Sqn Operational Conversion 
Unit.  Each QPI was current and thus was assessing student standards daily; to 
this end the assessment of the trial student’s performance would be set within 
the context of current performance levels.  The majority of the simulator 
instruction was provided by a single instructor in order to maintain an 
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instructional constant.  This instructor was the primary researcher who had 12 
years experience as an RAF instructor and 6 years in the Typhoon program and 
was also a qualified Typhoon flying and groundschool instructor.   Any 
conceptual failures in tactics or procedures, with this QPI as the source, should 
therefore have been resident in all students; facilitating identification.  The 
exceptions to the use of this instructor were the live test sortie and the 
preceding simulator ride which ensured that the primary simulator instructor had 
not taught any incorrect techniques and insulated the primary researcher from 
influencing the transition into live flight. This was to ensure the standard was on 
a par with those entering this phase of the live course, such that the resources 
allocated to the live flight would not be wasted. 
To provide training in the Combat and Counter Air phases there was a 
need for the student to act as a part of a formation led by a competent formation 
lead.  In the Counter Air phase this was provided by ex-RAF Simulator 
Instructor Pilots (SIPs) who had been specifically retrained to provide this 
service.  For the Combat phase, however, there was no suitably trained SIPs 
available, thus formation lead was provided by another Trial Subject pilot.  To 
ensure consistency of presentations with these inexperienced formation leaders 
a prebrief and highly procedural directions were given for each sub task along 
with careful monitoring of the leader during the runs themselves. 
Use of this instructional methodology allowed consistent instructional 
levels to be maintained over the 2 years of the trial and ensured that 
assessments of the Trial Subjects was always undertaken by qualified and 
competent staff that were training peers daily in the live environment, thus being 
familiar and current with the application of the assessment standards.   
3.9.4 LIVE TEST SORTIE  
The live flights were independently assessed by OCU IPs of B1 standard 
(experienced) or higher.  To maintain this independence no test flights used 
Sqn Ldr Allsop, the primary researcher, in any airborne role.  The testing pilots 
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were briefed that the Trial Subject should be treated in the same manner as 
‘live’ syllabus students and the course standard to be achieved was not to be 
compromised.  All test sorties used the same profiles and content as the 
corresponding standard syllabus test. 
3.9.5 SAFETY  
Electing to send students solo directly out of simulation is a European 
first and thus contained considerable risk, primarily the students could have 
been over aroused, resulting in forgetting key checks or techniques.  To ensure 
the live flights were conducted within a safe environment the student was 
provided with a ‘Student’s Friend’, an allocated QPI with experience of the Trial.  
This IP accompanied the student at all stages of the live flight up to engine 
start, at which point they would position to the Air Traffic Control (ATC) tower to 
act as Duty Pilot (DP).  The purpose of the position was primarily to offer 
answers to any last minute questions the student might have and to ensure the 
student had not forgotten any element of strapping in due to nerves.  Once in 
the tower the Student’s Friend communicated on an allocated radio frequency, 
making sure the student had: 
a. 4 points into the harness Quick Release Buckle, including 2 arm 
restraints. 
b. Oxygen and Personal Survival Pack connected. 
c. Ejection seat ARMED, 2 maintenance pins stowed. 
d. Completed an Emergency Brief pre take off. 
On the flight itself a ‘ghost’ pilot was positioned in the back seat.  This 
qualified pilot was present in the event of risk to life only and was instructed not 
to assist the student in any way, verbal or physical.  This was ensured by 
switching off the intercom between cockpits and all control ability forwarded to 
the trial pilot’s cockpit.  Interaction with the student was also restricted on the 
ground – with no discussions permitted, even to the extent of the ghost pilot 
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crewing in before the trial pilot had even walked for the aircraft.  In this manner 
safety was maintained without affecting the autonomy of the trial pilot. 
All emergencies during flight were to be actioned by the student initially, 
using the DP in the tower as required.  The ghost pilot would only be used 
should the emergency be immediately life threatening.  Articulation of 
emergency indications across the radio between the student and the DP was 
practiced in the simulated sorties.  Flying instruction provided by the DP was 
limited to the visual circuit and was restricted within this to gross error 
recognition.  To compensate the student was trained to identify and fault find 
errors themselves during the simulated sorties and provide an assessment as to 
the reasons for any errors.  These student assessments were then compared to 
the clues available to the DP, to ascertain if the course of action proposed was 
sensible and safe.  The final actions of the DP was to ensure that upon landing 
the student applied correct braking action to achieve the deceleration required; 
the Typhoon brake system has a short delay between the request from the 
pedal and the application of the brake.  On a first solo the student would have 
very limited experience of this delay and incorrect/insufficient application of 
brakes was identified as a potential risk. 
Finally, upon completion, cockpit recordings were examined to confirm 
that no verbal assistance had been provided from the ghost pilot and due to the 
flight control system of the Typhoon the rear stick is disengaged when the front 
pilot has control, as such no helpful guidance on the controls could be provided. 
These measures were intended to separate the ghost from the trial pilot to 
ensure that they were isolated from any assistance from within the aircraft. 
3.9.6 MEASUREMENTS, METRICS AND FAILURES 
All sorties were marked using the scales and intent used on the standard 
syllabus to ensure parity with all historic records; examples and decodes of 
these are given in Appendix A.  There was no consideration given to the fact 
the Trial Subject had completed less time in the air than his peers.   As stated 
  
78 
previously this trial supports and utilises the SME-opinion metric for a number of 
reasons: academia has yet to agree on a set of quantitative metrics; it is the 
measurement method used in the majority of Air Forces in Europe and the US; 
and finally the SME opinion contains implicit tacit knowledge gained over years 
of flying that is unable, presently, to be articulated explicitly.  
3.9.7 FAILURES 
In the event of a test flight failure the student and QPI would be debriefed 
to determine if the failure originated in the conceptual, simulator representation 
or student ability domains.  In the event of an identified issue in simulator 
representation a period of synthetic retraining would be undertaken before the 
test flight was reflown.  This re-flight would contain substantially different 
profiles to prevent any student from ‘learning’ the test sortie.   
3.9.8 PROCESS 
After ground school all students underwent training in 4 phases 
conducted in a linear fashion.  Each of the phases and their specific training 
aims are described below. 
Conversion Phase.  The conversion phase teaches the student to be 
able to start, taxi, take off and land in all weathers, source information from the 
cockpit displays and ensures they would be able to return the aircraft safely 
even if a malfunction occurred.  The key elements of the phase are Instrument 
Rating Test (IRT), a solo flight and formation training, the standard syllabus for 
which is shown in Table 3-3. 
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Table 3-3.  Standard Syllabus - Conversion Phase 
Sortie Time (h:mm) 
Sim 01: Normal Ops/ Emergs / Instrument Flying (IF) 1:15 
Fly 01: Normal Ops / General Handling 1:15 
Fly 02: Normal Ops / IF 1:15 
Fly 03: High Level Handling 1:15 
Fly 04: Low Level 1:00 
Fly 05: Solo Check 1:15 
Sim 02: Pre IRT Practice 1:30 
Fly 06: IRT 1:15 
Fly 07: Solo - GH / PD  (no instructor required) 1:00 
 
 
It can be seen from Table 3-3 that the control subjects passing through 
the standard syllabus underwent 2 simulation and 7 live sorties.  Comparatively 
the trial syllabus contained 10 simulation missions and a single live sortie.  The 
self-help sorties, whilst always flown in the standard syllabus, were never 
captured, the trial syllabus formalises these events for later analysis of 
resources.  The trial pilot commencing the solo flight was instructed in each 
aspect of the standard syllabus, the critical difference being that all the trial 
student’s knowledge had demonstrably come from simulation, thus any failures 
or safety-critical issues witnessed in live flight would be as a result of a 
deficiency of the simulator environment. 
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Table 3-4.  Trial Syllabus - Conversion Phase 
Combat Phase.  The Combat Phase trained the student to the end-of-
course standard of 1v1 high-aspect BFM combat against a similar type. 
Instruction in this phase used a student pilot in both the lead aircraft and the 
wingman position.  This is not the practice in the standard live syllabus; the 
student would be led by an IP but the profiles to be flown were within the 
capability of the student pilots and the shortage of IPs available made the 
method a necessity.  The advantage was that the student was exposed to 
formation leading and its considerations, as well as gaining experience of the 
BFM environment without the pressure of assessment.  The increased training 
time was nevertheless captured for analysis and comparison to the standard 
live syllabus.  As in the conversion phase the live test flight was flown with a 
ghost pilot in the rear seat who bore the same restrictions as the previous 
phase.   
The Trial syllabus and allocations are provided at Table 3-5.  This 
syllabus was foreshortened after approval from the RAF, the omitted elements 
being shown in Table 3-5. 
 
Sortie Time (h:mm) 
Sim 01: Normal Operating Procedures; TO / land techniques. 1:45 
Sim 02: Airframe / engine handling / Circuits in variable wind 1:45 
Sim 03: Nav system / IF / Practice Diversion(PD) / Circuits 1:45 
Sim 04: Self help – Circuits / nav kit (no instructor required) 1:15 
Sim 05: Heavyweight Single engine / ML handling / PD 1:45 
Sim 06: IRT practice 1:45 
Sim 07: IRT 1:35 
Sim 08: Self help – circuit and nav kit (no instructor required) 1:15 
Sim 09: Emergencies  1:30 
Sim 10: Solo practice 1:30 
Fly 01: Ghost first solo 1:15 
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The reasons for this foreshortening were twofold; firstly Dissimilar Air 
Combat (DACT) against other types such as the F-15 was not included as it 
was recognised that this would trade increased exposure in the live 
environment with little proof of simulator capability over the normal Typhoon v 
Typhoon  test.  Secondly the 2v1 Air Combat Training (ACT) was trained 
entirely in the simulator also with the aim of reducing live flight exposure; it was 
recognised that this element would be tested in the following Counter Air Phase 
and as such the exposure in the live environment would be duplicated. 
 
Table 3-5.  Combat Phase Syllabus 
STANDARD Live Combat 
Syllabus 
TRIAL Combat Syllabus 
Sortie Purpose Time Sortie Purpose Time 
Sim 1 Turn circle 
theory, 
wpns 
handling 
1.15 Sim Cbt1 
(2 x FMS) 
Turn circle 
theory, 
wpns 
handling 
1.15 
Fly 1 
(Dual) 
1v1 
Offensive 
perch 
1.15 Sim Cbt 2 
(2 x FMS) 
1v1 
Offensive 
perch 
1.45 (inc. 
start and 
taxi) 
Fly 2  1v1 
Offensive 
high aspect 
1.00 Sim Cbt 3 
(2 x FMS) 
1v1 
Offensive 
high aspect 
1.30 (inc. 
start and 
taxi) 
Fly 3 
(Dual)  
1v1 
Defensive 
perch 
1.00 Sim Cbt 4 
(2 x FMS) 
1v1 
Defensive 
perch 
1.30 
Fly 4  1v1 
Defensive 
high aspect 
BFM 
1.00 Sim Cbt 5 
(2 x FMS) 
1v1 
Defensive 
high aspect 
BFM 
1.30 
Fly 5 1v1 Neutral 
combat 
1.00 Sim Cbt 6 
(2 x FMS) 
1v1 Neutral 
combat 
1.30 
Fly 6 1v1 Neutral 
combat 
1.00 Cbt Fly 1 
(Ghosted) 
1v1 Neutral 
combat 
1.00 
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Table 3-6.  Omitted Combat Syllabus Sorties approved by Command 
STANDARD Live Combat 
Syllabus 
TRIAL Combat Syllabus 
Sortie Purpose Time Sortie Purpose Time 
Fly 7 1v1 DACT 1.00 Sim Cbt 7 
(2 x FMS, 1 CT) 
2v1 ACT 1.15 
Combat 
SIM 2 
2v1 ACT 1.15 Cbt Fly 2 
(Ghosted) 
2v1 ACT 1.00 
Fly 8 
(Dual) 
2v1 ACT 1.00 Cbt Fly 3 
(Ghosted) 
1v1 DACT 1.00 
Counter Air Phase.  The Counter Air Phase taught long range Air 
Defence through to ACT, the end of course standard being 2 v 2 multigroup 
(multi GP) against a given threat aircraft and missiles.  The syllabus can be 
seen in Table 3-7 and was flown as approved by Command.  As stated above 
the enemy red-air profiles flown against both sets of students were the same 
and as in the previous live flights the trial students were ghosted with an 
experienced pilot in the rear seat.  It can be seen from Table 3-7 that the 
simulator syllabus followed the standard as closely as possible. 
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Table 3-7.  Counter Air Phase Syllabus 
Standard Live Counter Air 
Syllabus 
Trial Counter Air Syllabus 
Sortie Purpose Length Sortie Purpose Length 
Course 
Sim 
Fundamentals  
Geometry 
1.15 Course Sim Fundamentals  
Geometry 
1.15 
Sim 01A 
 
1v1 ID 
Stern Geom 
1.15 Sim 01A 1v1 ID 
Stern Geom 
1.15 
Sim 01B 1v1 QRA  1.15 Sim 1B 1v1 QRA  1.15 
Fly 1 1v1 ID 
Stern 
1.15 Sim 2 1v1 ID 
Stern 
1.15 
QRA Sim 
02 
2v1 ship QRA 
Ops 
1.15 QRA Sim 3 2v1 ship QRA 
Ops 
1.15 
QRA Fly2 2v1 QRA 
ID and Inter 
1.15 QRA Sim 4 2v1 QRA 
ID and Inter 
1.15 
Sim 3 1v1 Skate 
Banzai 
1.15 Sim 5 1v1 Skate 
Banzai 
1.15 
Fly 3 1v1 Skate 
Banzai 
1.15 Sim 6 1v1 Skate 
Banzai 
1.15 
Sim 4A 2v1 Skate 1.15 Sim 7 2v1 Skate 1.15 
Fly 04 2v1 Skate 1.15 Sim 8 2v1 Skate 1.15 
Sim 4B 2v2 Skate 1.15 Sim 9 2v2 Skate 1.15 
Sim 5 2v2 Banzai 1.15 Sim 10 2v2 Banzai 1.15 
Fly 5 2v2 Banzai 1.15 Sim 11 2v2 Banzai 1.15 
Fly 6 2v2 Skate 
Banzai 
1.15 Sim 12 2v2 Skate 
Banzai 
1.15 
Sim 7 PH 4 1v1 
2v1 
1.15 Sim 13 PH 4 1v1 
2v1 
1.15 
Fly 7 1v1 PH 4 
2v1  
1.15 Sim 14 1v1 PH 4 
2v1  
1.15 
Sim 8 HFF 
FQMD 
1.15 Sim 15 HFF 
FQMD 
1.15 
Fly 8 FQMD, ACT 1.15 Sim 16 FQMD, ACT 1.15 
Sim 11A 2vX Multi Gp 1.15 Sim 17 2vX Multi Gp 1.15 
Sim 11B 2vX Multi GP 
Hostile Bogey 
Mix 
1.15 Sim 18 2vX Multi GP 
Hostile Bogey 
Mix 
1.15 
Fly 11 2v2 Multi Gp 1.15 Fly 11 2v2 Multi Gp 1.15 
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Operational Flight Training (OPFLY) Phase.  The OPFLY phase had 
been traditionally used to provide the student with semi scripted but more 
difficult enemy presentations.  Post completion of the phase by the second trial 
student however, Command ordered that elements of this phase of the 
standard live course be cut in order to increase the throughput of student 
numbers.  To this end a corresponding cut, highlighted, was made in the trial 
syllabus (Table 3-8).  The remaining trial students thus only flew one live sortie - 
QRA LOW SLOW.  This sortie entails high levels of manoeuvring against a light 
aircraft, whilst manipulating a radar and flying in formation through cloud down 
to heights of 500’.  As such it was considered the hardest sortie on the course, 
nevertheless the ghost pilot received the same set of restrictions as all previous 
phases.  Thus as both standard and Trial syllabuses contain the same sorties 
the only two differences were the lack of instructor prompts from the rear seat 
and the student’s lack of live flying exposure. 
Table 3-8.  OPFLY Phase Syllabus 
Standard Live Combat Syllabus Trial Combat Syllabus 
Sortie Purpose Length Sortie Purpose Length 
 
OP Sim 
01 
Low/slow 
QRA 
Intercepts 
1.15  
OP Sim 01 
Low/slow 
QRA 
Intercepts 
1.15 
OP Fly 01 Show 
proficiency in 
QRA LOW 
SLOW 
1.15 OP Fly 01 Show 
proficiency 
in QRA LOW 
SLOW 
1.15 
OP Fly 02 High Risk 
Point Def 
1.15 OP Sim 02 High Risk 
Point Def 
1.15 
OP Fly 03 1Multi Gp – 
Pre EoCC 
1.15 OP Sim 03 1Multi Gp – 
Pre EoCC 
1.15 
OP Fly 04 EOCC 1.15 OP Fly 02 EOCC 1.15 
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3.10  RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
3.10.1 CONVERSION PHASE 
 A total of 13 students (8 trial subjects and 5 augmentees) completed the 
Conversion Phase in the simulator and subsequently undertook their first flight 
as a ghosted solo.  No IP reported having to switch their microphone on or take 
control of the aircraft.  A further 3 of the most experienced students (all ex 
Harrier pilots) completed their flight as a true live solo i.e. not ghosted.  The 
tapes of these flights were reviewed and showed a high degree of adherence to 
the technique and no safety points.  All flights contained 2 practice diversions to 
RAF Marham and RAF Wittering, General Handling (GH), area familiarisation 
and a recovery for circuits at RAF Coningsby.  Following the closure of RAF 
Wittering sorties included a supersonic run in the North Sea in order to burn 
down the fuel prior to the RAF Marham diversion. 
During these 16 live events a number of real-time issues were 
encountered, these were normal occurrences of problems that were seen on 
the fleet’s aircraft at the time.  There was a single instance of a double CSG 
(Computer Symbol Generator) failure that restored, an SPS (Secondary Power 
System) Computer failure and loss of SEP (Specific Excess Power) bars.  All of 
these issues were dealt with using the Trial Subject and the DP using the 
methods taught in the simulator.  There was no assistance from any IPs.  Of 
particular note, however, was the instance of unforeseen poor weather; a 1000’ 
cloudbase forecast to improve became 350’ whilst 2 trial subjects were 
airborne.  It was elected to continue making approaches until the base raised to 
400’, the student’s legal minima, at which point they landed safely, their first 
solo sorties being subsequently reflown.  These incidents and problems 
demonstrated that the trials pilots were able to deal with real emergencies 
without on-board assistance using knowledge gained solely within the simulator 
and in doing so further informed the risk register. 
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3.10.2 TESTING THE CONVERSION PHASE  
The lack of IP input and the ability of the trial subjects to deal with 
emergencies showed that solo flight direct from simulation was indeed possible 
and de-risked the use of the methodology should it be taken into the core 
syllabus.  Clearly, however, the nature of a solo flight prevents assessment of a 
student pilot’s abilities other than satisfying the macro items of safe takeoff, 
landing and in-flight navigation. Whilst it was not able to provide a useful 
comparison of performance between control and trial groupings, the Instrument 
Rating Test (IRT), conducted 2 sorties before the solo flight, did provide a 
noteworthy comparison between training and testing methodologies that asked 
questions of the quasi-transfer tests referred to in the literature review. The 
quasi-transfer tests referred to in much of the meta-analysis reviewed used 
SME opinion to provide an overall mark for individual trainees.  This assumed 
that the mark an SME gave in the synthetic environment was directly 
comparable to that given in the live.  More specifically that key events within the 
subtasks, such as a safety or procedural violation, had the effect of reducing the 
overall mark by the same amount in the live and the synthetic environments.  
Trial PANDORA’S BUZZARD sought to compare the IRT results of those 
trained and tested in the live environment with those in the synthetic in order to 
search for any abnormalities in the scoring between the two environments.  This 
was the first test of its type as the reason for quasi-transfer tests had been the 
high cost of live training comparison in the first place; Trial PANDORA’S 
BUZZARD therefore offered the first known ability to search for this affect. 
Significant differences in the grading effects would make the admission of 
Quasi-transfer Trial evidence referred to at section 2.5.2 difficult. 
Thus the results of 23 subjects and augmentees that conducted their IRT 
in the simulator, following the Trial PANDORA’S BUZZARD (PB) syllabus were 
compared to all available historic records (n=53) of pilots that conducted 
training using the standard syllabus and undertaking their IRT airborne.  The 
tasks set in the simulator were exactly the same as those set in the tests 
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completed in live flight and were flown to the same standards as laid down in 
Group Air Staff Orders (GASOs). 
3.10.3 CONVERSION PHASE RESULTS 
The population was initially investigated to determine if there were any 
particular groups that might skew the results.  As the skill set tested was 
common to all pilots regardless of background the only remaining possible 
factor was that of rank. Just as in section 3.5 the population data was filtered to 
determine if rank, an indicator of experience, had an affect on overall scores, 
although in this section only the IRT scores were considered rather than the 
sum of the marks for the 3 phases.  Flight Lieutenants (F) were compared with 
more experienced ranks; Squadron Leaders and above (E – Experienced).  A 
subsequent 2 sample t test demonstrated a difference of 0.46 to a significance 
of P=0.02 (see Figure 3-8).  Thus, the two groups were considered separately 
for the remainder of the conversion phase and, as the focus of the study is 
those pilots of Flight Lieutenant rank it is this sub group that will be investigated 
primarily, with the experienced group commented on by exception. 
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Figure 3-8.  2 Sample-t Results: Experienced (E) v Flight Lieutenant (F) with respect to 
IRT Overall Score on the Standard Syllabus 
 
Figure 3-9.  2 Sample-t: Comparison of Means 2: IRT 
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Figure 3-9 provides a comparison of the means of the Flight Lieutenants 
tested using the Trial PB and the Standard syllabus.  It shows the Trial PB 
syllabus have a significantly higher (P=0.09) mean than the Standard Syllabus.  
This appeared to indicate that training and testing in the simulator therefore 
produced a better performance than training and testing in live flight: supporting 
the same observation from the Quasi-Transfer trial results discussed in the 
literature review.  This result, however, could have been a function of the 
simulator providing a better training environment or that the SME’s subjective 
metric baseline altered whilst within the simulator environment.  
In order to investigate this question the subcategories of SME scoring 
and their relationship with the overall mark given were examined.  Figure 3-10 
shows a broad examination of each of the subtasks relationship with the overall 
mark for both the simulator and the live (standard) syllabus.  The difference 
between the gradients of the ‘sim’ (trial) and ‘live’ (standard) demonstrates the 
difference in the relationship to the Overall Score ie. ‘Is a score of 3 in Mental 
Performance likely to return the same overall score, whether the sortie was 
flown live or in the simulator?’  Of note from Figure 3-10 is the sub-group of 
‘Safety’, which indicates noticeable gradient differences.  These categories 
were then regressed to determine their relationship to the overall mark. 
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Figure 3-10.  Comparison of Sub Category Relationships vs Overall Score, IRT 
The results for Safety returned a linear regression of: 
 IRT Standard Syllabus Overall Mark = 1.01 + (0.7317 x Safety Score) 
 IRT PB Trial Syllabus Overall Mark = 2.215 + (0.4359 x Safety Score)  
All results show statistically-relevant results where p<0.1.  The percentage of 
the results explained by the model are: 
 IRT Std Syllabus v Safety, R-sq (adj) 57.0% 
 IRT PB Trial Syllabus v Safety, R-sq (adj) 17.3%  
These figures indicate that when considering ‘Safety’ a score of 2 for the 
subcategory is likely to return a lower mark for the overall score when the IRT is 
conducted within live flight versus that conducted in the simulator.  Whether this 
is to do with the physical separation of the IP and student pilot in the simulator 
compared to the shared exposure experienced within live flight it is not clear.  
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The result should also be seen within the context of the low R-sq (adj) figure for 
the PB syllabus, nevertheless it is right that this apparent discrepancy is 
highlighted in terms of possible risk should a fully synthetic syllabus be 
considered.   
The number of grades that do not meet the expected standard for the 
individual skill being tested; graded 2 or less can be labelled in statistical terms 
‘defects’.  Thus a comparison of defects per student was made between live 
flight (‘before’) and simulation (‘after’).  The results showed a small rise from 
3.37% to 3.77% with the 95% CI for the after group showing a small increase in 
the upper limit to 7.03% versus the previous 5.10% (see Figure 3-11).  
 
Figure 3-11.  Effect on 'Defects' when IRT is Tested within the Simulator 
3.10.4 CONVERSION PHASE SUMMARY 
The first aim for Phase 1 – Conversion, laid out in Section 3.4, was to 
determine if the results of the IRT were affected by a fully-synthetic training 
package and test versus the standard syllabus and the test in live flight. The 
results above have shown that the trial group performed at least as well as the 
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control.  It should be caveated, however, that whilst this would demonstrate 
simulation to be a suitable location to test in, the RAF should be aware of the 
differing ‘leverage’ of safety issues between live and synthetic testing.  i.e. A 
safety critical error in the simulator would appear to effect the overall mark less 
than if the testing environment was in live flight.  
The second aim was to determine the feasibility of achieving a successful 
first solo from a fully synthetic syllabus. Conversion Phase results have shown 
that it is possible to send student pilots solo directly out of simulation, with all 16 
pilots undertaking the flight successfully and completing their mission without 
intervention, despite some difficult technical and weather-related issues.  
Although the sample size is recognised to be relatively small it is large enough 
to recommend to the RAF a continuation of the methodology to further increase 
the sample size before inclusion into the core syllabus.   
Finally within the first theme of the dissected research question Objective 
5 of Sub-Question 1 required the generation of a risk register to determine the 
risks during the first solo flight. This was completed and is presented in 
Appendix C. 
3.11 COMBAT PHASE 
Within the Conversion Phase (IRT) only the Flight Lieutenant ranks were 
considered, with the higher ranks filtered out, in order to provide a common 
experience level.  This was permitted as instrument flying is a common skill 
across all platforms, barring idiosyncrasies of each particular aircraft type, this is 
due to the much slower speeds, non-dynamic manoeuvring and rigid adherence 
to external, laid down profiles.  Thus, experienced pilots were more likely to 
have an advantage over the inexperienced.  In the Combat phase, however, no 
advantage exists as the Typhoon produces a performance that exceeds all 
previous RAF aircraft by significant margins.  The Typhoon is capable of 9g, 
has a thrust-to-weight ratio exceeding 1:1 and carefree computer-controlled 
handling, in comparison all previous RAF aircraft were capable of no more than 
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5g, had thrust-to-weight ratios of less than 0.5 and pilot-controlled flight 
envelopes.  To this end no pilot could be classed as ‘experienced’ in the 
Typhoon’s combat environment and as such all pilots regardless of rank were 
considered for the statistical analysis. 
The standard syllabus (live training) results, i.e. the control group were 
taken from contemporary records between late 2010 and 2012 as before and 
after these dates the Combat syllabus underwent significant changes with 
respect to tactics and techniques, thus preventing a true comparison to be 
undertaken.  The sample sizes reflect these restrictions with only 22 live 
(control) and 8 trial students passing through the course during these periods; 
using the syllabus provided in Section 3.9.8.  
3.11.1 COMBAT RESULTS   
Figure 3-12 shows that the mean of the Trial group was a significant 0.47 
less than that of the students trained under the standard syllabus.  Primarily this 
was due to a failure of a single trial pilot (who scored an overall mark of 2).  
Thus the combat phase fails both tests 2 and 3. 
 
Figure 3-12.  2 Sample t Test, Standard v Trial Syllabus. 
 
  
94 
The overall results show that transfer of training from simulator to live 
flight was not capable of producing a comparable student to that of the standard 
‘live’ methodology, with the synthetically-trained students producing a mean that 
was lower than that of the live-flight trained.  The underlying reasons for this 
poor transfer were not immediately clear.  In order to determine influencing 
factors the sortie reports were broken down into skillsets and examined against 
the corresponding standard syllabus areas. Table 3-9 details the individual skills 
within each skillset and the reason why that skillset is important.  The mean of 
the skillset was calculated from all available individual skills within the set. 
Figure 3-13 shows the comparison of the standard and trial syllabus for each 
skillset. 
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Table 3-9.  Skillsets and their Relevance. 
SKILLSET INDIVIDUAL SKILLS REMARKS 
Domestics 
(Doms) 
 Preparation (Prep) 
 Startup, Taxi, Take Off (SUTTO) 
 Tactical Domestics (Tac Doms) 
 Weapon System Checks (WSC) 
 Border Crossing Checks (Fence) 
 G Warm up 
Demonstrates the ability 
to safely conduct training 
and fly the aircraft to and 
from the training area. 
Guns 
Exercise 
(GunEx) 
 Resolve Plane of Motion (POM) 
 Resolve Range 
 Resolve Lead 
 Energy Management (NRG) 
 Effective Guns Techniques 
This skillset is concerned 
with close in 
weaponeering (within 
3000ft) and is 
characterised by highly 
dynamic manoeuvring at 
close range. 
Within Visual 
Range 
(WVR)  
 Plan Execution 
 Advantage Recognition 
 Turn Circle Recognition 
 Lag BFM Technique 
 Kill or BFM decision making 
 Maintain the Offensive 
 Defensive BFM 
 Infa Red Decoy Dispensing  
Positioning of the aircraft 
to achieve a missile kill. 
Ranges from 2 miles to 
3000ft.  Influenced by 
the highest g forces and 
students understanding 
and employment of 
counter manoeuvres to 
enemy positioning. 
Max 
Performance 
Handling 
(MPH) 
 Lead Turn Recognition 
 Execution of the Break Turn 
 Lift Vector Placement 
 Energy Management 
Shows the students 
ability to fly the aircraft to 
achieve the max 
performance from the 
airframe. 
Weapon 
System 
Handling 
(WSH) 
 Weapon Engagement Zone 
Recognition (WEZ) 
 Hostile WEZ Recognition 
 Weapon Tree Execution 
 Weapon Employment 
 Gun Combined Error Technique 
(CET) 
 Validity of weapon solutions  
Demonstrates student 
awareness of the 
envelope of both their 
and the enemy weapons.  
Shows the correct 
technique in the 
employment of those 
weapons. 
Resource 
Management 
 Cockpit Resource Management 
 Fuel Management 
 Task Management 
 Situational Awareness (SA) 
 Mid Air Collision Avoidance 
 Adherence to Air Training 
Instructions (ATIs) 
Shows the awareness of 
and demonstrates the 
ability to employ all the 
rules and regulations 
associated with combat 
training. 
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Figure 3-13.  Overview of Combat Skillset Means v Syllabus Type 
Of particular interest were the major skillsets that indicated a substantial 
difference in mean between the 2 syllabi.  From a high-level viewpoint Figure 
3-13 shows that there were two areas in which this may occur: ‘Gun Exercises’ 
and ‘Weapon System Handling’.  However, in order to understand these 
differences at a more meaningful level and understand which skills did not 
transfer into live flight Table 3-10 provides comparison of the skills within the 
sets.  This compares only those skills within the core of the syllabus and 
discounts any skills that had 6 or fewer trial syllabus results.  Given the serious 
risks associated with recommending training within the simulator over that 
proven to be successful in live flight (and the large monetary figures concerned) 
the questions and settings favoured live flight.  Thus, should a particular skill be 
recommended for practice within the simulator it can be done with as much 
reduction in risk as possible, given the small sample sizes.  To this end the 
question asked was “Is the mean of the skill of the standard syllabus greater 
than the mean of skill of the trial syllabus?” rather than ‘equal’.  With the same 
reasoning the level of Significance was set at 0.1 rather than 0.05, 
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demonstrating an increase acceptance of risk in making the ‘greater than’ 
conclusion when it was not true. 
Table 3-10 is highlighted in red for those skills where the data show the 
standard syllabus to have a higher mean than the trial.  For those results that 
did not return a P < 0.1 the power of the sample is provided to allow an 
understanding of the data’s strength; the difference of interest being ¾ of a 
single mark.  This level was set as a balance between the reality of the small 
sample size and the need to find a difference that would mark a clear deficiency 
in the transfer of training.  0.75 is, therefore, a figure that would lead to a 
practically-recognisable lower standard of student. 
Table 3-10.  Key Combat Skills Comparison Data 
SKILLSET TEST: IS MEAN 
OF SKILL (STD) 
GREATER 
THAN SKILL 
(TRIAL)? 
N 
STD 
N 
TRIAL 
MEAN STD 
(80% CI) 
[SD] 
MEAN 
TRIAL 
(80% CI) 
[SD] 
SIGNIFICANCE POWER 
% FOR 
DIFF OF 
INTEREST 
0.75 
Guns 
Exercise 
Resolve 
POM  
19 7 3.79  
(3.57,4.01) 
[0.71] 
3.00 
(2.37,3.63) 
[1.155] 
0.07 59.5 
Resolve 
Range 
19 7 3.47 
(3.20,3.75) 
[0.90] 
2.71 
(1.96,3.47) 
[1.38] 
0.01 49.4 
Resolve Lead 19 7 3.47 
(3.29,3.66) 
[0.61] 
3.14 
(2.77,3.52) 
[0.69] 
0.15 87.3 
Within 
Visual 
Range 
(WVR) 
Advantage 
Recognition 
19 7 3.54 
(3.34,3.73) 
[0.52] 
3.57 
(3.28,3.86) 
[0.53] 
0.55 94.9 
Turn Circle 
Recognition 
22 7 3.82 
(3.71,3.93) 
[0.39] 
3.29 
(3.02,3.55) 
[0.49] 
0.02 98.7 
Lag BFM 20 8 3.65 
(3.51,3.80) 
[0.49] 
3.38 
(3.12,3.63) 
[0.52] 
0.11 98.3 
Kill or BFM 22 8 3.45 
(3.27,3.64) 
[0.67] 
3.25 
(2.90,3.60) 
[0.71] 
0.21 89.1 
Maintain the 
Offensive 
22 8 3.68 
(3.50,3.87) 
[0.65] 
3.38 
(3.12,3.63) 
[0.52] 
0.10 97.1 
Defensive 8 8 3.25 3.13 0.33 90.5 
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BFM (3.02,3.48) 
[0.46] 
(2.80,3.45) 
[0.64] 
Max 
Performance 
Handling 
Handling 8 7 3.63 
(3.37,3.89) 
[0.52] 
3.57 
(3.28,3.86) 
[0.53] 
0.42 91.7 
Lead Turn 
Recognition 
9 8 3.56 
(3.31,3.80) 
[0.53] 
3.25 
(3.02,3.48) 
[0.46] 
0.11 96.0 
Break Turn 
Execution 
21 8 3.2 
(3.33,3.72) 
[0.68] 
3.5 
(3.23,3.77) 
[0.53] 
0.46 96.1 
Lift Vector 
Placement 
21 8 3.52 
(3.38,3.67) 
[0.51] 
3.38 
(3.12,3.63) 
[0.52] 
0.25 98.2 
Weapon 
System 
Handling 
Energy 
Management 
– BFM 
22 8 3.55 
(3.38,3.71) 
[0.60] 
3.13 
(2.80,3.45) 
[0.64] 
0.07 93.3 
WEZ 
Recognition 
20 8 3.70 
(3.56,3.84) 
[0.47] 
3.00 
(2.73,3.27) 
[0.53] 
0.01 98.0 
Hostile WEZ 
Recognition 
12 8 3.42 
(3.21,3.61) 
[0.51] 
3.38 
(3.12,3.63) 
[0.52] 
0.43 96.5 
Weapon Tree 
Execution 
21 8 3.48 
(3.30,3.65) 
[0.60] 
3.38 
(3.12,3.63) 
[0.52] 
0.33 97.5 
Weapon 
Employment 
19 8 3.32 
(3.05,3.59) 
[0.89] 
3.00 
(2.62,3.38) 
[0.76] 
0.18 81.4 
CET Gun 
Technique 
14 8 3.57 
(3.39,3.76) 
[0.51] 
3.00 
(2.62,3.38) 
[0.76] 
0.04 86.8 
3.11.2 COMBAT ANALYSIS 
Table 3-10 shows that, when tested in live flight, the skills of Turn Circle 
Recognition, Maintain the Offensive, Energy Management and WEZ (Weapons 
Engagement Zone) Recognition all returned a better performance when using 
the standard syllabus than the trial. Additionally, despite having a sub-optimal 
power, the skills of Resolve POM (Plane of Motion), Resolve Range and 
CET(Combined Error Technique) Gun Technique also returned a similar 
observation.  
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These observations are notable as, with a single exception – energy 
management, they all contain a single root requirement - the ability to 
distinguish immediately a change in the enemy’s roll or pitch angle and action 
an immediate counter move. Thus, the inability of the trial pilots to transfer their 
training into live flight was hypothesised to have two possible causes within the 
synthetic training.  The first was that the pilot was applying the wrong counter to 
the enemy’s action; this was discounted as the sortie report forms from both the 
primary instructor and the instructors conducting the pre-live flight simulator 
mission displayed no evidence of this, indeed the students’ conceptual 
understanding of BFM had appeared to be a strength.  The second possible 
cause was the student delaying the counter action; a delay of 2 seconds could 
equate to the enemy aircraft gaining well over 30 degrees on the student – a 
position difficult to recover from.  Successful recognition of a change in the 
enemy’s state needed to be recognised and actioned in about 1 second to 
ensure that parity in the fight was retained.  Further examination of Table 3-10 
showed that tasks requiring the student to extrapolate a line of flight, such as 
Resolving Lead when employing guns or Advantage Recognition, were 
conducted satisfactorily.  Thus, it was concluded that the student had been 
unable to detect the immediate roll or pitch change in the simulator and was 
applying the counter when the change became apparent through an established 
change of direction or sight line.  Figure 3-14 provides context through the 
provision of HUD footage taken from live flight.  Rounds from the gun will 
always be fired down the line of the gun Fixed Aim Cross, however the actual 
flight path of the bullets will be along the bullet fall line as a result of the 
aircraft’s flight path and gravity.  The fall line shown in the Figure is being 
continuously updated, resulting in a dynamic problem for the pilot.  In order to 
successfully kill the enemy the fall line must be held over the enemy at exactly 
the range of the enemy fighter.  If the enemy fighter moves the new flight path 
must be assessed, the vector of the friendly fighter altered and the newly 
computed fall line placed over the enemy at the correct range.  The first 
indication that the enemy pilot is changing his flight vector is that the angle of 
bank of the target aircraft will change, and in doing so the lift vector will be re-
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orientated resulting in the change of flight path.  Figure 3-14 shows just how 
difficult spotting the indicators change in bank will be.  In reality this change is 
reduced to a simpler variable – a perceived change in the distance of the two 
wingtips.  If that distance increases the target is rolling towards the friendly, if it 
reduces it is rolling away. What the research has shown is that all the skills that 
require this variable to be recognised quickly are poor.  Thus the inference is 
that this variable has difficulty being recognised in a timely manner. 
 
Figure 3-14.  Example Guns Footage from Head Up Display. Unclassified Source. 
The issue was negated within the simulator as the other pilot was faced 
with the same disadvantages, the ‘motor program’ had then been taken 
airborne into the test flight resulting in the delayed reaction.  The inability to 
recognise the change in pitch or roll of the simulator is due to the fidelity of the 
visual scene within the simulator.  Despite using state-of-the-art projection, 
aircraft at all ranges were too dim to be able to pick out these variables.  The 
inability to increase the contrast of nearby aircraft had resulted in an addition of 
6 Target Projectors that projected an image of the nearest aircraft no matter its 
position to the host aircraft.  With only a single task these projectors boosted the 
 Enemy Fighter 
 Bullet Fall Line 
 Gun Fixed Aim Cross 
Horizon Line 
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contrast to what had been believed to be sufficient levels and had been used to 
their full extent in the trial.  The results of the trial indicated that these had only 
been partially successful in resolving the issue and thus were listed as a 
limitation to the transfer of training into live flight within the regime of Combat. 
The skill that differed in its root cause was that of Energy Management.  
This concerns the physical handling and ‘feel’ of the aircraft.  The inability of this 
skill to transfer to live flight from simulation would infer that the performance 
handling of the simulator differed from that of the live aircraft.  This could be a 
function of the lack of a number of factors: the physiological component, 
airframe buffet, incorrect audio cues or an incorrect performance model within 
the simulator itself.  Operation close to the edges of the performance envelope 
would combine all of these factors and thus isolation of a single factor was not 
possible either in experimental design or in the examination of the results. 
3.11.3 COMBAT PHASE SUMMARY 
The aims set out in section 3.4 require a recommendation as to the 
inclusion of the ‘Phase 2 – Combat’ trial syllabus for inclusion into the core 
syllabus, with particular reference to the likelihood of a fully synthetically trained 
student passing the EoP check ride compared to a student on the standard 
syllabus.  Additionally the trial was asked to identify any limiting factors 
preventing further exploitation of simulation in the BFM environment.  
Whilst the probability of a student passing the trial course was unable to 
be determined categorically with the small sample size, the failure of the Phase 
to pass Tests 2 and 3 (3.6 3 Tests to Measure Success) provided sufficient 
evidence not to recommend this element of the trial syllabus.  This was also in 
line with Bock et al’s (2002) use of small samples to make recommendations 
(see section 2.5.3).  This recommendation was accompanied by two key 
limitations, firstly that the target projectors needed to be switched on for combat 
training but their lack of fidelity when reproducing the movements of enemy 
aircraft increased the likelihood of the student learning to identify incorrect 
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visual cues for their decision making.  Secondly the lack of ‘G’ within the 
simulated environment was unquantifiable but the regular use of 9G per second 
onset rates and sustained 9G fighting increased the likelihood of a black out;  
this increased risk to life would be unable to be mitigated within a true solo 
flight, thus further supporting the recommendation not to include Phase 2 within 
the core syllabus. 
 
Despite this negative recommendation a number of positives were to be 
taken from this phase.  Although skill of weaponeering with guns did not 
transfer to live flight it was taught effectively within the simulator.  Thus all 
dogfighting concepts can be taught synthetically with the latest simulation 
capability, the transfer into live flight however needs restructuring to train the 
guns skills specifically.  This would allow increased proportion of synthetics 
within the syllabus.  Additionally, away from the guns skill, the ability of the 
simulator to train pilots in the other skills was not in question, thus the simulator 
offers a valid location to train students who have failed or are struggling to 
grasp the concepts of BFM in the Typhoon. 
3.12  COUNTER AIR PHASE 
The Counter Air Phase measured the performances of the 8 trial subjects 
in the Beyond Visual Range (BVR) through to the closer-range BFM.   Initially 
the phase taught radar handling and 1v1 operations, moving through differing 
forms of intercepts and culminating in a pair of Typhoons versus 2 enemy 
aircraft. 
The Trial syllabus (Section 3.9.8) is a copy of the standard syllabus with 
live flights replaced by a flight in the simulator covering the same aims and 
objectives as in the air.  Enemy game plans, dictating their heights, speeds, 
formation and shot ranges, were taken from the standard syllabus ‘Red Air’ 
profiles so that Trial Subjects saw the same enemy presentations as their live 
counterparts. 
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It was observed that in live flights of the standard syllabus only 3 runs per 
sortie would be achieved before the students would be out of fuel.  It was found 
that a corresponding sortie in the simulator would achieve 6-7 runs before 
recovery owing to the ability of the simulator freeze and reset to a particular 
start point rather than flying back. This provided increased exposure to 
employment of the techniques and allowed the student to demonstrate some 
consolidation.   
The standard syllabus introduced enemy radar emissions from the 10th 
sortie of the syllabus onwards.  These radar emissions were produced not by 
other Typhoon aircraft, as there were simply not sufficient numbers, but by an 
external contractor flying a Dassault DA20 aircraft.  Use of these aircraft 
consumed a fixed budget and thus for the majority of the live training flights the 
RAF preferred to use the cheaper and more numerous Hawk aircraft which had 
two distinct disadvantages: they were not fitted with radars and thus were 
unable to stimulate the student aircrafts’ Defensive Aids Sub-Suite and 
secondly the flight envelope was significantly inferior to all except the very 
oldest threat aircraft.  Uninhibited by these constraints the simulation used in 
the trial syllabus was able to utilise representative threats from the outset.  Their 
early introduction allowed students to become accustomed to the sounds and 
indications of the threats over a number of sorties, without having to react to 
them until sortie 10 onwards.  Consequently debriefs were able to discuss 
considerations pertaining to these threats much earlier in the syllabus.   
It was recognised that the Trial Subjects would have to perform in live 
flight within the same weather limitations as their standard syllabus peers.  
Whilst this stopped short of fighting in full cloud it did include transits of up to 
5000’ and the ability to fly tactically in the presence of layered cloud.  The 
simulator provided excellent representation of these environmentals but 
stopped short of providing broken cloud due to visual issues.  As cloud was 
able to be built as the sortie progressed the later runs of each sortie were 
fought in the presence of ever increasing cloud layers.  Whilst this could be 
experienced during any live sortie the simulator’s ability to elect to insert cloud 
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ensured all students had been exposed to a minimum level of cloud whilst the 
best students could be pushed further. 
3.12.1 COUNTER AIR RESULTS 
During the first live flight test of the first batch of 2 Trial subjects the 
student pilots failed their sortie (score 2 - low average) for sacrificing tactical 
formation in order to handle the weapon system.  This failure was assessed as 
poor prioritisation with respect to maintaining Visual Mutual Support (VMS) 
leading to an incorrect workcycle.  The second pilot produced a course 
standard performance but it was clear that he had learnt from his colleague; 
maintaining tactical formation at half the standard range in order not to lose 
visual.  In line with the failure process set out in section 3.9.7 all pilots and 
students were debriefed at length in order to determine the root cause.  These 
debriefs determined that both of the students’ visual scans between the internal 
displays and external visual formation position were not quick enough and that 
the resulting positional errors in formation were not being addressed early 
enough.  Cameras were set up within the simulated environment to examine 
head movement and thus the internal/external scan rate (Figure 3-15).  The 
ability to see inside the simulator during instruction made explicit the skewed 
nature of the scan. It was readily apparent that practically no external scan was 
being conducted.  After some experimental adjustment of the visual scene was 
conducted the cause of the issue was found, as with the Combat Phase, to be 
the visual set up of the Target Projectors (TPs).  The images provided by the 
TPs had been set at their maximum brightness, to address the recognised 
Combat Phase issues. However the unintended consequence was that the pilot 
could immediately determine sufficiently the aspect, range and most importantly 
location of the leader without the need to spend time searching the sky.  The 
result was that the student had no need to consider the prioritisation of tactical 
formation because it was particularly easy.  After further experimentation with 
staff pilots a suitable visual setup was determined that necessitated the Target 
Projectors and navigation lighting on all aircraft to be switched off.  Once found 
the students re-flew their final simulator sortie and live test flight using scenarios 
  
105 
that contained no similar enemy presentations to the preceding live test flight.  
In this manner they were unsighted on enemy intentions and could utilise none 
of their knowledge from the previous failed test rides.  The resultant scores 
were 4 - high average and 5 - above average respectively.  In lieu of these 
results the simulator visual setup was fixed for the remainder of the test 
subjects. 
 
Figure 3-15.  CCTV - Monitoring the Student Visual Scan 
A further student failure (graded 1 - below average) was experienced by 
a trial subject in the third batch of students after a performance airborne that 
resulted in the abandonment of the sortie.  The reason given by the IP was the 
real-world environmental conditions (low sun and 100kts of tailwind behind Red 
Air), coupled with chaff remnants in the airspace conspired against the student 
to reduce his tactical effectiveness.  This aligned with the student’s post-sortie 
interview which stated that the sun was directly in front of him making it 
impossible to see any cockpit displays.  The records show the sortie was flown 
within an hour and a half of sunset and with a threat direction of west, which 
would have provided the environmental conditions reported.  Additionally the 
unusually strong wind meant that the chaff laid by the previous users of the 
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airspace gave effects the student should never have been exposed to – either 
under live or synthetic conditions.  To determine if the student’s performance 
was limited by ability or the environmental conditions he did not undergo any 
retraining but was resubmitted for the live test sortie with differing (and harder) 
scenarios with a time and location set to avoid the previous issues.  The result 
was a ‘high average’ indicating that the students’ original score was a 
consequence of the environmentals rather than ability.    
The overall marks for the Trial were compared to historic results, shown 
in Figure 3-16.  It is evident that the Trial average (CA Trial PB: representing the 
subject’s first effort at the test sortie) was lower than that of the historic results 
of the standard syllabus (CA Std Cse), this was accompanied by a large 
confidence interval caused by the sizable spread of marks in the small sample.  
CA PB Post Vul (Vulnerability) Training shows the overall grading of the 
subjects once the issues with the 3 failed students were retrained or removed 
as described above.  The trial average is seen to increase above the historic 
average after retraining but more importantly the confidence interval is 
comparable, implying that synthetic training might return an equal or higher 
mean to the present syllabus. 
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Figure 3-16.  Comparison of Overall Marks for the Counter Air Phase between historical 
data (Std Cse), initial Trial Data (Trial PB) and revised trial data (PB Post Vul Trg).  
3.12.2 COUNTER AIR SUMMARY   
The results above pass tests 2 and 3 of Section 3.6 and thus the Counter 
Air Trial Syllabus is recommended for initial inclusion within the core syllabus to 
further expand the sample size.  Whilst the successful nature of the trial phase 
indicated its suitability for inclusion the limitations found should be incorporated 
within the training process to prevent assets being wasted: 
a. Contrary to the lessons identified in the Combat Phase, TPs and 
navigation lights should be turned off within the simulation environment 
to force a visual scan rate that transfers to live flight. 
b. Environmental conditions, such as sun, that cannot be 
represented within the simulator should be avoided within the live 
environment.  Similarly items that would not normally be expected within 
that part of the live syllabus, such as extremely strong winds or chaff, 
Mean 
95% CI for 
Mean 
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should either be avoided in live test flights or incorporated within 
synthetic training. 
The observation of the effect of environmental conditions on performance 
was included within the risk register as, although identified within the Counter 
Air Phase, it was also likely to impact first solo flights where the risk to life was 
significantly higher (Sub-question 1, Objective 5). 
In line with Objective 2, identifying factors that could affect the transfer of 
training, the Counter Air trial syllabus, unrestricted by the financial boundaries of 
training in live flight, was able to incorporate enemy radar waveforms and their 
impact much earlier.  Subsequently the student’s exposure to these was 
significantly higher than individuals on the standard course.  Similarly, as 
identified above, the number of runs per sortie was more than double that of the 
standard course.  Both these factors have the potential to affect the transfer of 
training by reducing the time and assets required in the simulator or training to a 
higher level in live flight.   
3.13 QRA PHASE 
The QRA phase consisted of a single simulator sortie followed by a live 
sortie, mirroring the standard syllabus, the only difference between the two 
syllabi was that the Trial did not permit any instruction from the rear cockpit 
within the live test.  The simulator was flown as a 2-ship formation against a 
low, slow target (civilian Cessna aircraft) across the same airspace as the live 
flight would normally take place.  The sortie included runs both with and without 
cloud although abilities to simulate the cloud experienced at lower levels were 
hampered by the simulator’s inability to provide anything other than full cloud 
cover with no gaps, cloud normally experienced below 5000 feet being broken 
cumulus.   Further issues were encountered when attempting to represent the 
effect of the ground and earthbound objects on the radar performance within 
the simulator.  Radar performance will normally be degraded within the 
presence of ground clutter but, despite modifications, the simulator’s modelling 
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of this was not apparent, similarly the affects of the numerous wind turbines on 
the radar’s false target rate was also lacking.  The overall effect was to present 
a significantly clearer synthetic radar picture than was present in live flight.  The 
final missing effect was that of traffic: below 10,000 ft overland increased civilian 
traffic clutters the radar picture and significantly increases communications on 
the frequencies the student would be listening to.  Whilst the extra traffic in the 
area could be modelled the faultless performance of the radar allowed these to 
be broken out easily, additionally the increased amount of communication was 
also difficult to provide despite dedicating a single simulator operator to its  
replication. 
3.13.1 QRA LOW SLOW PHASE RESULTS  
Figure 3-17 provides the overall results for the phase.  Even cursory 
analysis of the overall marks between the 2 syllabi shows a spread of grades 
much wider than the syllabus for the standard course.  It can be stated that “the 
mean of the standard course is greater than that of the trial course for the 
sample used” where p>0.1. 
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Figure 3-17.  Comparison of Overall Marks of Standard (Std Cse) and Trial (Trial PB) 
Syllabus in QRA Low Slow Phase 
Of the eight subjects to conduct this portion of the trial 4 failed; two 
scoring low average, one below average and one score of 0 - unsafe. The 
reasons provided by the IPs were closure to within minimum distances within 
cloud, a loss of Situational Awareness (SA) near other traffic and within cloud 
during manoeuvring, incorrect and dangerous formation positioning around 
cloud and poor weapon system handling.  Additionally there was an incorrect 
assessment of a 200ft passing distance on the bogey aircraft, an inability to 
maintain SA within busy airspace and poor radar handling at low level in cloud.  
Mean 
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Unusually one of the failed students also suffered airsickness towards the end 
of this sortie.   
The reasons for failure can be distilled therefore as cloud, spacing 
estimation and SA.  As discussed in the Counter Air phase the simulator was 
not capable of providing realistic cloud formations in anything other than stratus 
layers.  This is more representative of the cloud encountered at height (>5,000 
ft), as in the CA phase, where large cumulus cloud would simply be avoided.  
During QRA sorties at low level scattered and broken cloud is accepted as part 
of the working environment and the student must be able to anticipate its affect 
on the formation and the task.  Thus, it is possible that the training simulation 
was not able to replicate this element to the level required to transfer to live 
flight. 
The second issue of spacing demonstrates, as in the BFM phase, a lack 
of transfer of training with respect to understanding an opposing aircraft’s 
range, aspect or orientation.  Given the sensitivity of the visual setup in the 
previous phases it is likely that the correct setup had not been found for the 
QRA low slow phase.  
The third problem, that of SA, is less tangible.  On initial examination the 
fault may reasonably be levelled at a reduction in capacity through high levels 
of physical stimuli, brought on by heavy manoeuvring of the aircraft under high 
workload, in cloud at low level; the student’s airsickness being a symptom. As 
the failure sample size is too small and the flight paths flown too dissimilar, it is 
not possible to ascertain this as the true cause.  Additionally, however, the 
simulator itself was noted to provide poor training in a number of key areas for 
this phase.  The first was that the target aircraft was able to be acquired on 
radar at a range much greater than to be realistically expected in live flight.  
This reduction in difficulty was compounded by a radar model of the terrain that 
provided no clutter.  Some of these issues can be traced to the terrain database 
but the incorrect radar pick-up range and the tenacity of its lock are within the 
radar software.  This software was an older version of that presently installed in 
  
112 
the aircraft and whilst the ‘switchology’5, handling and displays were the same 
this phase provided the first of the noticeable differences during training.  The 
second issue was that of provision of realistic level of simulated traffic in the 
local area.  Even after eight students had passed through the trial experienced 
simulator operators were unable to consistently provide traffic that tested the 
student at the correct time, nor were they able to give an associated level of 
communications chatter whilst running the other aspects of the lesson.  The 
effect of these deficiencies was to provide the student with a much simpler 
environment to train in. 
3.13.2 QRA LOW SLOW PHASE SUMMARY 
It can be seen from the results that the simpler environment did not train 
half of the sample group to a level that tested their ability to work to a realistic 
timeline.  Thus, in the air the student’s workcycle was altered away from that 
learnt in the training environment, which in turn affected the prioritisation of 
problems allocated by the student.  The result in each case was poor formation 
coordination and a loss of SA culminating in overall poor training transfer.  The 
failure of the phase to pass tests 2 and 3 of section 3.6 resulted in a 
recommendation not to include this phase within the core syllabus to increase 
sample size.   
The technical limits to training (required by Objective 3 of Sub-Question 
1) were: the inability of the simulated radar software to replicate live flight close 
to the ground, synthetic modelling of the ground clutter, poor ability to replicate 
communication chatter and cloud modelling. 
3.14 EFFECT ON RESOURCES 
In order to answer the requirement of Objective 4 of Sub-Question1 – 
determine the level of training transfer between the simulator and live 
environment and provide additional data for the ‘Capacity’ and ‘Fleet Structure’ 
                                            
5 ‘Switchology’ is the colloquialism for the switch selections required to achieve sets of tasks. 
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elements of the Systems approach shown in Figure 3-1 a summary of the 
resources used was made (Table 3-11).  The table shows a comparison of the 
assets used in each phase of the trial when compared to the standard syllabus. 
Table 3-11.  Resources Used 
Phase Standard Syllabus Trial Syllabus 
Simulator 
Hours 
(HH:MM) 
Aircraft 
Hours 
(HH:MM) 
IPs 
Req’d 
External 
Assets 
Simulator 
Hours 
(HH:MM) 
Aircraft 
Hours 
(HH:MM) 
IPs 
Req’d 
External 
Assets 
Conversion 3:45 8:15 8  15:50 1:15 8  
BFM 2:30 12:30 10  15:00 2:00 7  
Counter Air 31:45 20:00 32 10 Hawk 
2 FRA 
40:00 2:30 21 2 Hawk 
QRA Low 
Slow 
2:30 2:30 4 1 Tutor 2:30 2:30 4 1 Tutor 
Totals 40:30 43:15 54 10 Hawk 
2 FRA 
1 Tutor 
73:20 8:15 40 2 Hawk 
1 Tutor 
From Table 3-11’s figures the Transfer Effectiveness Ratio can be 
calculated. Transfer Effectiveness Ratio (TER) is defined as number of hours 
training saved on operational equipment divided by number of extra hours on 
the simulator (see section 2.5.4).  It provides a comparison of the effectiveness 
of an hour spent in the simulator when compared to spending that hour 
airborne.  These results are given in Table 3-12 along with the savings of RAF 
Instructor Pilots and any external assets.  
Table 3-12.  Savings Achieved 
Phase 
Aircraft 
Hours 
Saved 
(HH:MM) 
Extra 
Simulator 
Hours 
(HH:MM) 
TER IP Savings Remarks 
Conversion 
 
7:00 12:05 57% 0% Successful phase. 
Simulator times include 
time taken to start up, taxi 
and shut down. 
Recommended. 
BFM 
 
10:30 12:30 84% 30% Partially successful phase. 
Not Recommended. 
Counter Air 17:30 8:15 212% 34% Successful phase. 
Recommended. 
QRA Low 
Slow 
0 0 0% 0% Unsuccessful phase. Not 
Recommended. 
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Similarly it is possible to calculate the Support Flying Transferred by the 
implementation of the trial syllabus, where support flying are all aircraft not 
containing a student but that take part in each mission: 
Support Flying Transferred (SFT) = ((Spc –Spx) / Spc) * 100 
Where Spc = Support live flying required in the control group syllabus. 
 Spx = Support live flying required in the trial group syllabus. 
Table 3-13.  Support Flying Transferred 
 Phase Standard Syllabus Trial Syllabus SFT 
(%) Total Live 
Hours inc 
Support 
(HH:MM) 
Total 
Live 
Student 
Hours 
Support 
Hours  
only 
(HH:MM) 
Total Live 
Hours inc 
Support 
(HH:MM) 
Total 
Live 
Student 
Hours 
Support 
Hours  only 
(HH:MM) 
BFM 
 
12:30 6:15 6:15 2:00 1:00 1:00 92 
Counter Air 35:00 11:15 23.45 5 1:15 3:45 84 
QRA Low 
Slow 
3:45 1:15 2:30 3:45 1:15 2:30 0 
Table 3-12 and Table 3-13 demonstrate the effect of simulation on 
resource usage for the trial syllabus when compared with the standard.  It can 
be seen that for the successful phases simulation frees significant resource for 
reinvestment elsewhere in the training system or to increase the numbers of 
pilots trained.   
To determine if the Typhoon force has sufficient capacity to train using 
the new methodology an assumption of a new syllabus construct has to be 
made that replaces successful phases of the trial within the standard syllabus.  
Thus, a potential new syllabus could have the construct seen in Table 3-14. 
Given  the simulators have 165 training hours per week and that the 60 IPs will 
require to conduct 1 emergency simulator sortie of 1hr 15mins per month the 
remaining training time available is 156hrs 15mins.  There are only 2 Full 
Mission Simulators available and thus time available to inhabit those FMSs are 
78 hours per week. Even at the surge rate, which assumes 2 x 1hr 30min event 
a day for a course of 4 students, only 60 of the 78 hours would be consumed, 
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thus there is sufficient capacity within the simulation training plan to accept the 
increased demand. 
Table 3-14.  New Construct Syllabus 
Phase New Construct Syllabus 
Simulator 
Hours 
(HH:MM) 
Aircraft 
Hours 
(HH:MM) 
IPs 
Req’d 
External 
Assets 
Conversion 
 
15:50 1:15 8  
BFM 
 
2:30 12:30 10  
Counter Air 40:00 2:30 21 2 Hawk 
QRA Low 
Slow 
2:30 2:30 4 1 Tutor 
Totals 60:50 15:45 43 2 Hawk 
1 Tutor 
Assuming an average of 15 maintenance hours per live flying hour and 8 
students every 4 month cycle, the new construct syllabus has the potential to 
save a total of 3,300 man maintenance hours every 4 months.  This would 
permit a considerable repositioning of engineering manpower to more 
overstretched areas.  Of note, however, is the new Live Synthetic Balance 
(LSB) of 16 hours live and 61 synthetic.  Whilst the focus to this point has been 
on the student this new LSB would be difficult to apply for the instructors without 
dropping below the accepted safe live flight minimum per month of 12 hrs 
30mins. Over a 4 month course the 8 students resident on the OCU will only 
require a total of 126 live hours. Even if every live flight were flown with an IP in 
the rear seat for safety the live flying available for the 20 IPs on the OCU would 
fall as low as 1hr 30mins per month.  Whilst this would infer a reduction in IP 
numbers this route is prevented by the need to instruct within the simulator.  
Thus, it is the LSB and the effect on safe numbers of live hours that is the 
limiting factor within the present Typhoon Force construct. 
3.15 CONCLUSIONS 
Trial PANDORA’S BUZZARD sought to answer, through a series of 
objectives, the first of the research Sub-Questions: “What limits synthetic 
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training in the instructional environment?”  The research was undertaken within 
the structure of Figure 3-1.  Systems Approach High Level Intentions’, which 
intended to ensure that the objectives, whilst answering the first of the research 
themes, also fed towards usable output, namely information on the capacity and 
structure of the Typhoon force.  Thus, each of the objectives’ findings are 
summarised below before addressing the impact on the capacity and structure 
of the force.  
3.15.1 OBJECTIVE 1- ASSESS THE SUITABILITY OF ASTA TO 
TRAIN EACH PHASE OF THE OCU SYLLABUS  
The success of the Conversion and Counter Air phases should be 
tempered with the acknowledgement of the statistical disadvantages associated 
with small samples.  In reality, however, practical considerations such as cost 
and time associated with training front-line pilots prevent large statistically- 
impervious trials from being undertaken.  The aim of this work has been to 
examine the results from a number of different aspects to provide a view on 
whether fully-synthetic training is viable.  In the instances of the successful 
phases, Conversion and Counter Air, the initial indications are that synthetic 
training in these areas should be maximised, allowing the RAF to expand its 
sample size and generate a corporate knowledge of the strengths and 
weaknesses of a student trained in this manner.  The failed phases of Combat 
and QRA Low Slow, demonstrate areas that had substantial weaknesses, even 
given the small sample size, and thus should synthetic training wish to be 
furthered in this area considerable thought and syllabus redesign is required.   
The Trial has recommended the inclusion of both the Conversion and 
Counter Air Trial Syllabus into the OCU’s syllabus.  The Combat phase, whilst 
capable of imparting conceptual understanding of the combat manoeuvring, has 
not been recommended due to issues with the visualisation of the enemy’s 
dynamic manoeuvring caused by the Target Projectors, that were resident 
across a number of close-range skillsets. The QRA Low Slow phase was not 
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recommended for inclusion for reasons of synthetic replication and safety whilst 
flying in formation in close proximity to the ground and other aircraft. 
3.15.2 OBJECTIVE 2 – IDENTIFY ANY VARIABLES THAT COULD 
AFFECT THE TRANSFER OF TRAINING   
The effect of the incorrect setting of the visuals impacted the transfer of 
training, the evidence being seen most clearly in the Counter Air Phase.  The 
incorrect setting established a workcycle that did not correctly prioritise lookout, 
effectively allowing the student extra time to interpret the displays.  Whilst this 
set up was recognised and corrected it infers a sensitivity to the workcycle that 
was not clear prior to the trial.  These effects on workcycle were also observed 
in the QRA low slow sortie with extra time having to be spent interpreting the 
displays as the simulator lacked any effects of the ground on the radar model.  
Allied problems such as poor cloud modelling and incorrect traffic levels that 
threatened the formation are also likely to have skewed the workcycle, 
compounding the effects.   
Environmental conditions such as the effect of sun or strong winds at the 
tropopause provided problems for trial students and hampered any transfer of 
their training into the live environment.  Thus, the conditions of the day should 
be considered carefully by the IP to determine if there are factors the student 
has not witnessed within the simulator.  Similarly syllabus construction should 
aim to provide the student with as many of these experiences as possible in the 
synthetic environment. 
A variable that provided a positive effect on the transfer of training was 
the ability within the counter air phase to be able to increase the number of runs 
conducted per sortie.  Allied with the ability to replicate correct threats, without 
financial considerations, from very early on in the syllabus ensured the student’s 
performance reached course standard early in the phase’s training. 
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3.15.3 OBJECTIVE 3 – IDENTIFY ANY TECHNICAL LIMITS 
PROHIBITING THE EMPLOYMENT OF HIGHLY-SYNTHETIC 
SYLLABUS TO TRAIN STUDENTS  
As stated above correct visual setup was a technical restriction in the 
Counter Air phase and necessitated a particular setup to provide adequate 
training.  In the preceding Combat phase the Target Projectors were particularly 
poor, preventing the correct visual cues from being identified. This issue has 
been addressed to a degree by superior visuals delivered in 2014 however it 
should be noted that a single setup that suits all training phases is still not 
available.   
Great efforts were made to ensure that the software in the simulator 
matched that of the aircraft the Trial Subjects would be tested on e.g. certain 
radar functionality introduced into the aircraft midway through the training was 
not available in the simulator and consequently the students did not utilise the 
features in the air.  The importance of maintaining software commonality follows 
from the observations of the sensitivity of the student’s workcycle in Objective 1.  
As an example a simulator where the fidelity of the radar modelling allowed a 
detection range of the target at 10% greater than the norm would skew the 
student’s workcycle away from the need to rapidly manipulate and interrogate 
radar tracks and instead provide them with plenty of time to lookout and 
maintain correct tactical formation.  In the live environment, however, the 
student would not now have the skillset to conduct these manipulations in the 
time required, forcing them to focus heavily on the displays with a subsequent 
effect on their lookout and formation.  A key point is the normalising effect of live 
flight (validating the decision not to seek a quasi-transfer solution); a lower 
fidelity simulator will be satisfactory if the pilot spends a greater proportion of his 
or her time flying the aircraft where motor skills are corrected to the true 
environment.  If majority synthetic training is to be undertaken then all aspects 
affecting the workcycle need to have a fidelity as close as possible to that of the 
live environment.  
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3.15.4 OBJECTIVE 4 - DETERMINE THE LEVEL OF TRAINING 
TRANSFER BETWEEN THE ASTA AND THE LIVE 
ENVIRONMENT  
The levels of training transfer and effectiveness in Table 3-11 and Table 
3-12 show that for the approved phases there are considerable savings in terms 
of flying hours and IP time that could be saved.  The most successful of the 
phases, Counter Air, returning a Transfer Effectiveness figure of 212%, 84% of 
the support flying transfered and a reduction in the numbers of IPs used by 
34%. The LSB on the new construct syllabus that incorporated the successful 
phases was also increased to 80% synthetic and 20% live. 
3.15.5 OBJECTIVE 5 - GENERATION OF A RISK REGISTER TO 
DETERMINE THE RISKS  DURING THE FIRST SOLO 
FLIGHT, WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO RISK TO 
LIFE  
The risk register for first solo flight was generated and held at Typhoon 
force HQ and an example is repeated at Appendix C. 
3.15.6 CAPACITY AND STRUCTURE  
Figure 3-1 provided the flow of understanding for Trial PANDORA’S 
BUZZARD culminated in a requirement to comment on the capacity of the 
Typhoon force, and determine any possible impact on the structure should a 
syllabus using a high proportion of synthetics be incorporated.  Section 3.14 
found that limit of using a new construct syllabus would be the new LSB of 16 
hours live and 61 hours in synthetics which, if employed in the current structure, 
risked placing the IPs below the minimum safe hours to be able to conduct QRA 
- 12.5 hrs (CINC-Air, 2009). By way of validation of these calculations in 2012, 
against advice, 29 Squadron, the OCU, incorporated an immediate inclusion of 
both the Conversion and Combat phases of Trial PANDORA’S BUZZARD.  
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Early observations of the Officer Commanding 29 Sqn were that IPs, now 
conducting proportionally more synthetic events, quickly dropped below the 
minimum safe live flying hours and the trial was abandoned.  This validation 
demonstrated that whilst the trial moved the Live Synthetic Balance ratio from 
approximately 1:1 to 1:5 the inclusion of all-synthetic elements is not possible 
without other considerations: 
a. An awareness of the live flying minima. 
b. The possibility of saturating the number of simulator slots should 
the number of students be increased. 
c. The recognition that the simulator is a critical asset and prioritise 
its concurrency with the aircraft software accordingly. 
d. Consideration to increase the number of simulator sorties 
instructed by BAE staff (who presently only operate the simulator).  This 
would require recognition, approval and standardisation of their skillset 
but would decrease the number of IPs required on the Squadron as a 
whole, thus increasing the number of live hours available per pilot. 
e. Awareness of the impact on engineering manpower and structure 
with a much reduced task: a saving of approximately 9,900 man hours 
per year. 
An alternative solution to the manipulation of the manpower structure for 
the OCU is to saturate the simulator usage by employing simulation evenly 
across the whole of the Typhoon Force and in doing so reduce the proportion of 
simulation undertaken on the OCU.  This would necessitate a further trial to 
determine the applicability of simulation to front-line training, this trial was 
termed Trial PANDORA’S DIAMOND and is discussed in Chapter 4.  
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Chapter 4.  Trial PANDORAS DIAMOND 
4.1 OVERVIEW 
This work was intended to provide insight and evidence into the blend of 
synthetic and live training acceptable to the Typhoon front line through the lens 
of a gathered sample opinion of RAF Coningsby and RAF Lossiemouth 
Typhoon pilots.  Trial PANDORA’S DIAMOND is complementary to Trial 
PANDORA’S BUZZARD in that it seeks to extend the understanding of 
simulation, albeit using differing methodology, into the realms of front-line 
training.  The trial explored cultural acceptance as well as specific event-based 
use, the intended end result being to provide the Typhoon Force Commander 
with an indication of the current optimal synthetic blend, whilst also asserting 
the accepted limit of that blend.  In the process, proof was sought on emerging 
opinions as to the level of acceptance of simulation and the impact of the level 
of complexity. 
4.2 KEY LITERATURE REVIEW DIRECTION 
The literature review chapter provides an indication of the perceived 
importance of the Live Synthetic Balance with many articles arguing that the 
primary reason for determining this balance is financial (Schank et al., 2002; 
Harper and Hillier, 2007; Kruzins, 2008; Wells et al., 2009).  This focus on the 
monetary aspect appeared to display little consideration for the actual tactical 
training it was to replace, however from late 2009 onwards an understanding of 
just how much simulation the new Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) would use began to 
make its way into open press (Schank et al., 2009).  By 2012 this was to 
become an accepted Live Synthetic Blend (LSB) ratio of 1:1.  Nevertheless the 
RAF altered little with respect to the employment of simulation until the success 
of Trial PANDORAS BUZZARD indicated that simulation may have reached a 
turning point.  A demonstration of the RAF’s realisation was that the trial and its 
research were awarded the Central Flying School’s award for Instruction 
Excellence, the 1 Group award for Operational Innovation and 22 Group and 
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the Guild of Educator’s award for Educator of the Year, demonstrating the 
RAF’s willingness to embrace the topic of simulation.  Having seen the potential 
for simulation at the tactical level Air Officer Commanding 1Gp approved a new 
trial to determine how the LSB was to be determined with respect to training 
and tactical capability, the results from the trial were to inform the creation of a 
new training syllabus.  From this point onwards rhetoric within the RAF 
surrounding simulation began to develop from financial argument to one of 
tactical and operational capability.  This was publicly witnessed during a briefing 
to XI Squadron personnel during the Advance Training and Leadership Course 
at the Al Dhafra Airbase in the UAE by Air Vice Marshall Waterfall, on 12 
November 2014. 
The review tracked the increasing importance of understanding the 
amount of training that could be conducted via simulation in order to balance 
the competing requirements of finance and training value.  This showed a 
demand for information but failed to provide a clear picture of the possible.  Trial 
PANDORA’S BUZZARD had demonstrated that employment of simulation 
lagged behind its capability.  Thus there was a need to gain an understanding 
of the level of possible employment of simulation that would necessitate 
ensuring the sample of pilots questioned were au fait with all of its capabilities.  
As the research would not include a fully-synthetic training syllabus, simulation 
employment would be limited by cultural influences and beliefs rather than any 
exposure of practical or technical limitations. 
4.3 AIM 
The aim of Trial PANDORA’S DIAMOND was to discover cultural limits 
of, and subjective opinion on, the use of synthetics on UK front-line Typhoon 
pilot training using an informed audience.  The Trial was split into 2 phases, the 
first intended to provide an assessment of the cultural environment and the RAF 
Typhoon pilots’ views on the utilisation of synthetics within their day-to-day 
training.  The second phase concerned additional, more academic 
considerations and provided ‘fill-in data’ that gave a more rounded and 
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complete set of results to assist both with the research question and 
subsequent simulation procurement. Phase 1 of the Trial took place between  
1st October  2013 and 1st March 2014 and used simulation assets within the 
Typhoon ASTA (Aircrew Synthetic Training Aid) at the Typhoon Training Facility 
(TTF) and a total of 48 pilots from 3(F), XI and 29 Squadron. Phase 2 extended 
the initial cultural questionnaire to the Scottish base of RAF Lossiemouth.  This 
report amalgamates both phases. 
4.4 OBJECTIVES 
Leading on from Sub- Question 2 - ‘ What is the cultural limit of synthetic 
use?’ the objectives of Trial PANDORA’S DIAMOND were as follows: 
a. Objective 1.  Determine the present level of cultural acceptance 
of synthetic use in front-line Typhoon training and investigate if this is 
common across both Typhoon bases. 
b.  Objective 2.  Identify any factors, such as experience levels, that 
correlate to the level of acceptance. 
c. Objective 3.  Prove or disprove some commonly-held beliefs that 
had started to form since the initial Trial PANDORA’S BUZZARD had 
increased synthetic use, namely: 
i. Younger pilots are more accepting of simulation than elder 
pilots. 
ii. Acceptance of simulation is based upon a pilot’s 
qualifications. 
d. Objective 4.  Determine the subjectively-assessed LSB for each 
of the required tasks.    
e. Objective 5.  Investigate the affect of threat complexity on the 
LSB. 
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4.5 DESIGN 
4.5.1 QUESTIONNAIRES  
All pilots conducted an Entry Questionnaire (Appendix F), the purpose of 
which was to collect background data and determine the respondent’s opinion 
of simulation across 3 themes using aggregated results from Likert scale 
responses (Likert scales require the respondent to specify their level of 
agreement to a series of statements on a symmetrical positive/negative scale).  
Thus, spread across the 18 questions were 6 questions on each of the 3 
themes; those being: 
a. Cultural Lean.  The acceptance level of the amount of simulation 
presently used in day-to-day training. 
b. Near Future.  The acceptance level of the proposed near future 
developments of simulation that were intended to be applied to Typhoon 
training. 
c. Simulation can provide an Experience.  Einstein is attributed to 
have said ‘Only experience is knowledge.  Everything else is just 
information’.  This theme asked the pilots if they believed that the 
simulator could generate knowledge through the provision of a valid 
experience, when compared to that gained in live flight.  
To ensure all of the audience shared the same level of awareness with 
respect to the capabilities of simulation each pilot underwent a series of three 
synthetic sorties, of increasing complexity levels, each with a Post Sortie 
Questionnaire (example in Appendix F). Each of the Post-Sortie questionnaires 
asked the respondent to provide the optimum LSB for each of the skill sets that 
the Tactical Air Command Task (TACT) syllabus stated were required at that 
level of complexity.  This was achieved by the respondent providing the 
minimum number of times a skillset should be undertaken in live and in 
synthetic training each year.  Finally a random sample were given an Exit 
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Questionnaire (Appendix H) to determine if their initial view of simulation had 
changed over the period. 
Reliability Measures.  The importance of reliability and validity of the 
questionnaires is highlighted in Bryman (2008, p.149); reliability being the 
‘consistency of a measure of concept’.  Reliability is made up of two areas: 
stability and internal reliability. In order to demonstrate the stability of the trial 
the Exit Questionnaires asked the same questions of the respondents once 
they had completed all simulation sorties.  The ‘Cultural Lean’ results were 
matched to the answers given in the Entry Questionnaire and assessed to see if 
the opinion of the respondent had been altered by participation in the trial itself, 
or whether their view had remained constant; indicating that all their post-sortie 
questionnaires would have been conducted with a ‘stable’ view of simulation.  
Internal reliability is concerned with the relationships between the indicators 
remaining coherent between respondents, as such a test of correlation was 
carried out to determine the level of coherence.  In order to seek the best result 
for internal validity the questions were refined over a four month period May – 
August 2013 whilst the author was posted to Mount Pleasant in the Falkland 
Islands, using a total of 16 pilots that were cycled through the Flight during this 
time.  The remote nature of this location allowed the subjects to contribute freely 
to the forming of the questionnaire without of any oversight of a command 
chain. 
Validity. Bryman (2008, p.151) states that validity of a questionnaire is 
concerned with ‘whether a measure of a concept really [does] measure the 
concept’.  The methods of determining validity and the trial’s method of testing 
them are as follows. 
a. Face Validity.  The measure is sensible and acceptable to 
experts in the field, in this case Typhoon Force Headquarters was shown 
the draft questionnaires, the measures intended and was invited to 
comment.  After an interview that discussed the measures with the 
Typhoon Force Commander the trial was commissioned in his name. 
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a. Concurrent Validity.  Introduction of a criterion that is known to 
differ and is relevant to the concept.  Within Trial PANDORA’S 
DIAMOND this was met by the use of the RAF Lossiemouth personnel in 
Phase 2.  These pilots fly the same aircraft but do not have access to the 
same level of simulation, thus the cultural acceptance of synthetics and 
the reliability of the questionnaires is expected to differ compared with 
the RAF Coningsby pilots. 
b. Predictive Validity.  The correlations between the level of cultural 
acceptance and variables determined in the RAF Coningsby pilots would 
be used to predict the level of cultural acceptance of the RAF 
Lossiemouth sample. 
4.6 SORTIE COMPLEXITY 
Each level of complexity (labelled 1-3) matched the classified threat 
levels that the Typhoon was expected to face, 3 being the highest.  An 
unclassified illustration of threat levels being: 
a. Level 1.  Flown as a pair using Quick Reaction Alert profiles, 
basic geometrical intercepts and Air Defence up to 2v2. 
b. Level 2.  Flown as a four ship in an 8 v 16, working in a coalition  
air package testing air-to-air tactics and self-escorted weapons release in 
a hostile Electronic Attack (EA) environment and using GPS and / or 
Laser Designation Pods. High Value Asset Defence Surface-to-Air 
missile threats, the majority non-networked. 
c. Level 3.  Flown as a four ship at night in a 16 v 16, using F-22, F-
15 and GR4s  against the ‘most threatening’ and ‘most likely’ threats.  Air 
threats armed with long range missiles and expert tactics combined with 
knowledge of their own networked Surface-to-Air Order Of BATtle 
(ORBAT). 
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4.7 SORTIE DESIGN AND CONSISTENCY 
Each of the sortie scenarios were provided with Air Tasking Orders 
(ATOs) and SPecial INstructionS (SPINS).  In order to provide a realistic yet 
unfamiliar training area the missions were set over the Exercise RED FLAG 
ranges at the USAF Airbase of Nellis near Las Vegas and to ensure 
consistency of the threat, enemy assets were assigned doctrines to provide 
them with governing behaviours, awareness and abilities.  ASTA instructors 
were issued with a ‘run sheet’ providing a timeline of the intended problems to 
be solved by the formation, again providing consistency between the formations 
experiencing each level.  The operators were also required to act as formation 
leaders and controllers of the allied aircraft.  All operators participated in a test 
mission prior to instructing a trainee in order to ensure misunderstandings in 
presentations were solved and all subjects would receive a sortie as near 
identical to their colleagues as was possible. 
4.8 EQUIPMENT UNDER TEST  
Both Full Mission Simulators (FMS) and Cockpit Trainers (CTs) were 
used for all sorties, with software load 3.1.X, which equates to an aircraft PSC 
(Production Software Configuration) of 4.3 with Drop 1 upgrade.  Whilst 
concurrent to some of the aircraft in the live fleet, the majority now have a Drop 
2 upgrade to the displays and controls and a new issue of radar software – 
R2Q.   During the trial period one of the simulators, FMS 1, was taken down for 
long term maintenance, this loss of 25% of the synthetic assets was to impact 
the throughput of pilots and necessitated an alteration to the trial design as 
detailed in section 4.10 below. 
Whilst not used directly it is important to note that the simulation devices 
used by RAF Lossiemouth have considerably lower fidelity than those at 
Coningsby.  Whilst this lower fidelity did include the visual domain it also 
extended to items such as the aircraft systems and the ability to replicate true 
enemy tactics, additionally there were only 2 linked devices at Lossiemouth 
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compared to Coningsby’s 4.  These limitations mean that the Lossiemouth 
simulators were used almost exclusively for emergency training only, the more 
tactical training being left to the live domain. 
4.9 TRIAL SUBJECTS   
Only qualified Typhoon pilots were used from the RAF Coningsby 
squadrons for phase 1 of the Trial. ‘Qualified’ being defined as successful 
completion of the Typhoon Operational Conversion Unit (OCU).  A total of 36 
pilots undertook the trial from the front-line squadrons, representing 100% of 
their manpower.  29 Sqn provided a further 12 of their 25 pilots, these were 
selected at random by the programmer as leave and operational constraints 
were taken into account. 
4.10 TRIAL CONSTRAINTS 
As stated above phase one of the trial was intended to provide immediate 
advice for the intended introduction of the new Typhoon training syllabus thus, 
in order to receive political approval for the remainder of the trial the scope was 
reduced. 29 Sqn would complete only the second simulation sortie as well as 
the entry and exit questionnaires.  The decision not to include level 1 was taken 
because of the Squadron’s high synthetic exposure at level 1, a function of their 
specific training role.  It was decided, therefore, that there was nothing to be 
gained from testing at a level the instructors taught synthetically day to day. 
4.11 TRIAL RESULTS 
In total 77 pilots participated in the trial; 48 from RAF Coningsby and 29 
from the smaller northern main operating base of RAF Lossiemouth, 
representing over 85% of the Combat-Ready pilots of Typhoon. All completed 
the Entry Questionnaire, however the actual simulation sorties were open to 
RAF Coningsby pilots only as the intent to move pilots from Lossiemouth to 
Coningsby to participate was deemed too costly by the HQ and funding was 
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unable to be secured.  Of the 48 Coningsby pilots 47 completed the level 1 
simulator and questionnaire, 36 the level 2 and 20 the level 3.   
4.12 ENTRY QUESTIONNAIRE 
The Entry Questionnaire was designed to examine the respondents’ 
opinion of simulation across 3 themes: the acceptance of the present use of 
simulation in training, to be referred to as ‘Cultural Lean’; ‘Near Future’; and the 
use of simulation to provide an ‘Experience’.  Before assessing the results the 
questionnaire was examined for internal reliability and stability in order to prove 
its validity. 
Cronbach’s Alpha test (Laerd, 2015b) is a statistical method to measure 
to what degree the items on a scale ( in this case a Likert scale) are measuring 
the same dimension. It was used to assess the internal reliability by calculating 
the average of all the split half reliability coefficients across the 6 questions for 
each of the 3 themes.  An acceptable level of reliability was set at 0.7, 1.0 
demonstrating perfect consistency between all the questions and 0 being no 
consistency, the level of 0.7 being deemed acceptable in common practice 
(Wikipedia, no date b; Kline, 2000, p. 13).  The results for each of the themes 
were as listed below. 
a. Cultural Lean.  The analysis for the questionnaire taken at RAF 
Coningsby showed a satisfactory alpha level of 0.74.  As such all of the 
associated questions can be said to be reliably measuring the same 
concept.  At RAF Lossiemouth, however, Cronbach’s Alpha was 
measured at 0.68%.  Omission of statement 1, ‘The amount of simulation 
in day to day training COULD be increased’, raised the value to 0.76.  
Whilst it was possible to raise the Alpha of Coningsby’s results this could 
not be done by omission of the corresponding questions for 
Lossiemouth, as a consequence the results from the two bases could not 
be directly compared as the understanding of the theme ‘Cultural Lean’ is 
subtly different between the two. 
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b. Near Future.  RAF Coningsby returned a Cronbach’s Alpha of 
0.75 whilst RAF Lossiemouth’s result was below the acceptable limit at 
0.59.  Examination of the results showed that it was not possible to omit 
a single question and raise the percentage above the designated 
acceptable level. Thus the Near Future theme could not be used for RAF 
Lossiemouth. 
c. Simulation as an Experience.  Although this theme had proved 
consistent during the initial investigation the results of the scaled up 
responses across both Coningsby and Lossiemouth proved to be much 
lower than expected and well beneath the acceptable level at 0.24 and 
0.33 respectively. Unlike the Cultural Lean theme, however, there was no 
single question responsible for the low figure.  As a result this theme was 
discarded from use. 
There were 6 questions per theme, the Likert scale scores were 
measured between 1 and 5 (5 being the most positive of simulation), 3 being 
the null point of opinion.  Thus a neutral opinion would be centred on a score of 
18 for each of the themes tested at Coningsby.  At Lossiemouth, however, 
having had a question removed to increase internal validity, the null point would 
be at 15. 
The level of stability of the answers given in the trial can be assessed by 
the level of difference between the answers given in the entry and exit 
questionnaires for the theme of ‘Cultural Lean’.   Analysis of the results showed 
that there was no significant difference (at a 5% significance level) between the 
opinions of the respondents as they entered and exited the trial and thus the 
trial results for phase 1 can be described as stable, and thus valid.  
4.13 PERCEPTION VERSUS INDIVIDUAL OPINION 
The respondent’s Entry Questionnaires required answers from both their 
own point of view and their perceived position of the Fleet as a whole.  The 
intent was to determine if they considered their opinion to be in line with that of 
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the Fleet en masse or if they saw themselves as occupying a more positive or 
negative position.  This would allow an understanding of how opinion differed 
when the pilots were questioned as a collective versus an individual’s actual 
stance. This was intended to inform the process of how the RAF and the sub-
contractors went about their information gathering in this new field. 
A paired-t test (Figure 4-1) was carried out to determine if there was a 
statistical mean difference between the answers given for the individual (IND) 
and their perception (PER) for the ‘Cultural Lean (LEAN)’ category at Coningsby 
and Lossiemouth and the ‘Near Future’ category at Coningsby only.  The paired 
t-test uses the same individuals tested at two different points in time on the 
same dependant variable and in doing so has an increased ’power’ to look for 
the differences between the means.  The null hypothesis for the test (H0) was 
as follows: 
H0 = The pilots’ INDividual opinion is the same as their PERception of the 
Force’s opinion. 
Thus, it follows that the alternate hypothesis (H0) was: 
HA = The pilots’ INDividual opinion differs from their PERception of the 
Force’s opinion.  
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Figure 4-1.  Summary of Paired-t  Test at RAF Coningsby for Cultural Lean 
Figure 4-1 shows the results for cultural lean at RAF Coningsby.  There 
were no unusual points detected and the assumption of normality was not 
violated as assessed by a Ryan-Joiners test (p=.995) which examines normality 
of data by looking at the correlation between the test data and normal scores of 
the data.  A correlation co-efficient close to 1 infers that the population is likely 
to be normal (Minitab, 2012c).  
 Pilots believed themselves to be more positive about simulation 
(?̅?=20.563, σx=3.90) than their perception of the Force as a whole (?̅?=18.438 
σx=3.38), a value greater than 18 being a positive view of simulation.  Thus, a 
statistically significant difference of 2.125 was demonstrated (95% CI, 1.237 to 
3.013), t(47) = 4.82, p<0.001, d = 0.70.  This presentation of results is used 
throughout the remainder of the thesis and has therefore been broken down at 
Appendix I. 
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Figure 4-2.  Summary of Paired-t Test at RAF Lossiemouth for Cultural Lean 
The issue of Cultural Lean returned a subtle difference at RAF 
Lossiemouth (Figure 4-2).  As with the test for Coningsby there were no unusual 
points detected and the Ryan-Joiner test returned a value of p=0.985.  There 
was, however, no statistically-significant difference between the pilots’ individual 
opinions of simulation (?̅?=16.0 σx=3.61) and their perception of the whole 
Force’s opinion (?̅?=15.379 σx=3.21).  The difference found being 0.62 (95% CI, -
0.156 to 1.400), t(28) = 1.64, p = 0.113, d = 0.30.  It should be noted that the 
Cultural Lean results for RAF Lossiemouth do not include Statement 1 of the 
questionnaire which was found to be inconsistent with the theme when applying 
Cronenbach’s Alpha, as discussed above, thus a neutral opinion is found at the 
value of 15 rather than the 18 of Coningsby.  Re-running the test however, with 
the statement included returned an even less-statistically-significant figure, thus 
the result would have remained unchanged. 
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Figure 4-3.  Summary of Paired-t Test at RAF Coningsby for 'Near Future' 
The paired-t test for the theme of ‘Near Future’ was run for RAF 
Coningsby only, the theme having been found to be inconsistent at RAF 
Lossiemouth.  There were two pairs with unusual differences, however 
inspection of their values did not reveal them to be extreme and they were kept 
in the analysis.  As with the tests above the assumption of normality was not 
violated (Ryan-Joiner, p = 0.98).  The individual opinion of the pilots was more 
positive (?̅?=22.896 σx=3.57) than the corresponding opinion of the Force 
(?̅?=20.750 σx=3.60), there was a statistically significant difference of 2.146 (95% 
CI, 1.356 to 2.936), t(47) = 5.46, p<0.001, d = 0.79. 
The results show that for a value of alpha=0.05 both the categories of 
‘Cultural Lean’ and ‘Near Future’ have a significant difference between an 
individual at RAF Coningsby and their perception of the rest of the Typhoon 
fleet’s opinion.  In both cases the individuals considered themselves to be more 
positive about each than their colleagues collectively.  At RAF Lossiemouth, 
however, the individuals considered themselves to be no different to the Force’s 
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opinion in the topic of ‘Cultural lean’– no significant difference having been 
found.  Reasons for this difference have not been definitively determined and 
could be due to the differing simulator types, methodology of use, simulator staff 
or a combination of these.  What the research does show however is that when 
asking for feedback on the abilities of simulation in the past the answer has 
likely been affected by the airbase at which it has been asked and whether it 
has been asked of an individual or a group.   
4.14 THE EFFECT OF QUALIFICATION  
As pilots progress through their tour they gain qualifications that illustrate 
the areas in which they have a particular depth of knowledge.  It was 
hypothesised that the qualification level of a pilot would have an affect on their 
answers to the themed questions based on what they needed simulation to 
provide for their particular area of expertise (Sub-Question 2, Objective 2). 
Respondents had been asked to indicate their qualification level in three ways. 
Firstly Combat Ready (CR) qualification level, the most basic being level 1 and 
the most advanced level 3.  Secondly to state if they held the Electronic Warfare 
Instructor (EWI) qualification which is given, via a 3-week course, to promising 
pilots towards the end of their first tour.  Finally Type of Pilot – Line (L), 
Qualified Pilot Instructor (P) or Qualified Weapons Instructor (W); Line pilot 
being the standard pilot, Pilot Instructor being typically a second tourist with 2-5 
years experience on the aircraft and has completed the Central Flying School’s 
Pilot Instructor course, and finally Weapons Instructor who represent the top 5% 
of pilots in terms of ability, the qualification being awarded after a year-long 
challenging course. 
A one-way ANOVA (see Appendix I) was used for the CR qualification 
and Type of Pilot variables and a 2-sample t-test for the EWI qualification (as it 
was a dichotomous variable) against the themes of ‘Cultural Lean’ and ‘Near 
Future’ in order to determine if there was an effect due to experience, based on 
qualification level.  As a positive result in this area was likely to be immediately 
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exploited by the RAF the alpha level was set at 0.05.  The hypotheses being 
tested were: 
H0: all group population means are equal. 
HA: at least one group population mean is different. 
4.14.1 QUALIFICATION VS ‘CULTURAL LEAN’ AT RAF 
CONINGSBY 
Examination of the ‘CR Qual’ variable found there to be no outliers, as 
assessed by a boxplot (see Appendix I).  The data were also normally 
distributed for each group, as assessed by a Ryan-Joiner test (p>0.10) and 
there was a homogeneity of variances, as assessed by Levene’s test (Appendix 
I) for quality of variances (p = 0.786).  The effect of the Combat Ready 
Qualification on the theme of ‘Cultural Lean’ was not statistically different, F(2, 
45) = 2.80, p = 0.07.  The theme’s score for each CR Qual being; Level One 
19.86 +/- 3.27, Level Two 22.23 +/- 3.67 and Level Three 19.57 +/- 4.36, where 
the data are presented as mean +/- standard deviation. 
Testing the required assumptions for the variable ‘Type of Pilot’ returned 
no outliers (boxplot), a normal distribution (Ryan-Joiner p > 0.1) and a 
homogeneity of variances  (Levene’s test p = 0.52) across the categories.  The 
‘Type of Pilot’ variable was not found to have a statistically-significant effect on 
the theme of ‘Cultural Lean’, F(2, 45) = 0.73, p = .49.  The return for each 
qualification being Line Pilot 21.15 +/-4.34, Qualified Pilot Instructor 20.00 +/-
3.67 and Qualified Weapons Instructor 19.50 +/- 2.45. 
Determination of whether the EWI qualification was a variable that 
affected the ‘Cultural Lean’ theme was investigated through the use of a 2-
sample t-test.  The initial search for outliers highlighted a single data point of 
concern in the grouping without the qualification (Figure 4-4).  Upon 
investigation it was found that the point was neither a data entry or 
measurement error but a genuinely unusual value.  Consideration was given to 
  
137 
removal of the data point, however it was elected to modify the data by 
replacing it with 1 less than the next largest value (Laerd, 2015b). Both Yes and 
No groupings were found to be normally distributed, p > 0.1.  Levene’s test with 
the modified outlier returned a p-value of 0.73.   
 
Figure 4-4.  Outlier Determination for EWI Qualification 
The result was not statistically significant with those with an EWI 
qualification scoring a ‘Cultural Lean’  mean value of 19.17 +/- 3.66 and those 
without 21.11 +/- 3.70.  The difference being 1.94 (95% CI, -0.62 to 4.51), t (19) 
= 1.59, p = 0.13. 
4.14.2 QUALIFICATION VS ‘NEAR FUTURE’ AT RAF CONINGSBY 
The affect of qualification on Near Future was then sought, using the 
same methodology as that described above for each of the three experience 
variables, the results being tabulated in Table 4-1. 
.   
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Table 4-1.  Results of Experience on the Theme of ' Near Future' 
Variable Outliers 
Y/N 
(Boxplot) 
Normality 
(Ryan-
Joiner) 
Levene’s 
Test 
Test 
conducted 
Results 1 Results 2 
(Mean +/- Std Dev) 
Remarks Hypothesis 
Upheld 
CR Qual N P > 0.1 P = 0.157 One Way 
ANOVA 
F(2,45) = 
2.28  
p = 0.115 
Level 1: 22.31 +/- 3.11 
Level 2: 24.28 +/- 2.89 
Level 3: 21.93 +/- 4.27 
 H0 
Type of 
Pilot 
Y P > 0.1 P = 0.208 One Way 
ANOVA 
F(2,45) = 
2.78  
p = 0.073  
Line Pilot: 23.70 +/-2.84 
Qualified Pilot 
Instructor: 22.85 +/-3.7  
Qualified Weapons 
Instructor: 20.50 +/- 
4.472 
Outlier 
modified 
H0 
EWI 
Qual 
N P > 0.1 P = 0.01 
FAIL 
   Non equal 
variances 
Non 
determined 
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4.14.3 THE QUALIFICATION VARIABLE AT RAF LOSSIEMOUTH 
It was expected that comparison of qualification levels against themes at 
RAF Lossiemouth would be complicated by the homogeneous nature of the 
qualification sets present at the base.  For example, of the 29 pilots questioned 
22 were of the Line Pilot type and of the remainder there was only one QPI.  
This was expected as figures on the exact breakdown had not been collected 
before and the base is pure front-line rather than a mix of training and 
operations.   
Only the CR qualification provided the barest minimum numbers of each 
grouping to be tested: Level 1, n = 7; level 2, n = 8; and level 3, n = 14.   The 
boxplot returned no outliers, normality, using the Ryan – Joiner test, was found 
to be p > 0.1 in each case and Levene’s test showed the variances to be 
homogeneous.  However, no statistically-significant differences between the CR 
levels was found:  F(2, 28) = 0.28, p = 0.76.  The theme’s score for each CR 
Qual was; Level 1 15.29 +/- 4.11; Level 2 15.75 +/- 2.77; and Level 3 16.5 +/- 
3.94. 
4.14.4 SUMMARY 
Despite the general theory that acceptance of simulation may be related 
to the qualification level of the pilot no evidence to support this proposition was 
found at RAF Coningsby or at RAF Lossiemouth.   
4.15 THE EFFECT OF THE SQUADRON 
Whilst the Squadron was recorded on the questionnaire this was 
originally done for collation of records rather than a method of grouping results.  
No consideration of the Squadron as a group was originally considered as the 
perceived wisdom was that it was qualification that was the driver of acceptance 
of simulation training.  This was logical at first glance; all pilots had received 
identical training prior to arrival on their squadron that contained a constant 
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level of exposure to synthetic training, the squadrons had a near-identical-make 
up of qualifications and lastly they underwent a common, mandatory number of 
synthetic hours of training per month. During the course of investigating the 
results a pattern began to emerge that suggested that the squadron a pilot was 
assigned to did indeed have an effect on their perception of simulation.  To 
ascertain the validity of this assertion the effects on the themes ‘Cultural Lean’ 
and ‘Near Future’ were sought with respect to each of the squadrons at RAF 
Coningsby: 3(F) Squadron (n=19), XI Squadron (n=17) and 29(R) Squadron 
(n=12). 
A boxplot for each of the squadrons found a single outlier on 3(F), see 
Figure 4-5.  In common with the outlier found when testing against the variable 
of qualification (see section 4.14) the outlier value was reduced to 1 less than 
the next data point.  All groups passed the Ryan-Joiner normality check and 
Levene’s test returned a value of p = 0.88. 
 
Figure 4-5.  Boxplot of Squadron v Cultural Lean 
A statistically-significant difference between the squadrons was found, 
F(2, 45) = 4.71, p = 0.01.  The theme’s score for each squadron being: 3(F) 
Squadron 22.47 +/- 3.42; XI Squadron 18.89 +/- 3.92; and 29 (R) Squadron 
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20.08 +/- 3.26.  Thus, it can be said that the acceptance of simulation varied by 
the squadron, with 3(F) being the most positive. 
The analysis was continued for the theme of ‘Near Future’ with the 
boxplot again finding a single outlier (Figure 4-6), which was modified in the 
same manner as above.  Normality was found in all groups and variances were 
homogeneous (Levene’s p = 0.56).  Again the result was found to be 
statistically-significant;  F(2,45) = 6.85, p = 0.003; 3(F) Squadron 24.68 +/- 2.52; 
XI Squadron 20.88 +/- 3.43; and 29 (R) Squadron 23.25 +/- 3.42. 
 
Figure 4-6.  Boxplot of Squadron v Near Future 
In order to determine if this was common at both bases the RAF 
Lossiemouth Squadrons were also examined, against the theme of ‘Cultural 
Lean’ only.  Figure 4-7 shows the boxplot for 6 Squadron (n = 13) and 1 
Squadron (n= 16), two outliers being present in the 1 Sqn results.  Both outliers 
were modified in the manner previously identified, whilst this may be 
controversial for both outliers the 2-sample t-test would be rerun without a 
change in the overall result.  Normality and variance homogeneity were 
satisfied.  The result, however, was not statistically significant: 1 Squadron 
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scoring 17 +/- 2.71 and 6 Squadron 15.15 +/- 3.83.  The difference being 1.85 
(95% CI, -0.78 to 4.47), t (19) = 1.47, p = 0.16. 
 
Figure 4-7.  Boxplot of Lossiemouth Squadrons v Cultural Lean 
4.15.1 SUMMARY 
The effect of Squadron on the acceptance of simulation at RAF 
Coningsby was unexpected and thus the results were rerun leaving the outlier 
in position (as this would product the most unfavourable result).  The overall 
results remained un-altered, however, and thus it can be said that the 
acceptance of simulation differs depending on which front-line squadron the 
pilots occupied. This result is unexpected as of all the squadrons at RAF 
Coningsby it is the two front-line squadrons (3(F) and XI) that at first glance 
would be considered the most similar, undergoing very similar training and 
numbers of hours in the simulator.  In contrast 29(R) Squadron pilots, who 
spend longer periods training at a lower level of complexity were found to sit 
between the front-line squadrons in terms of results.   
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4.16 REGRESSION OF THE THEMES 
Regression was used to determine if there were any factors, such as age 
or experience, that correlated to the level of acceptance (Objective 2). Given the 
discovery that the results for the themes were grouped by squadron meant that 
the regression of the themes would also be grouped by this variable. The 
continuous variables explored were: 
a. Age. 
b. Number of Typhoon hours. 
c. Total flying hours (differs from Typhoon flying hours in that it 
includes all aircraft types an individual has flown). 
d. Average number of 2-ship simulators flown in a 2-month period. 
e. Average number of 4-ship simulators flown in a 4-month period.  
During this section Objective 3i will also be investigated to determine if 
the commonly held belief that younger pilots are more accepting of simulation is 
in fact true.  As this belief has come to the fore within 2014 the evidence for its 
genesis must be present in the personnel presently on the fleet during that 
period.  As 100% on the front-line squadrons responded to the initial 
questionnaire the validity of this belief must be found within their responses.  As 
such, to answer Objective 3i, comparison to a wider population is not required. 
Pearson’s product moment correlation (see Appendix I) was used to 
assess the relationship between the theme of ‘Cultural Lean’ and ‘Near Future’ 
and each of the chosen variables, the hypotheses tested are shown below.  
Given the exploratory nature of the work, the lack of historical precedence and 
the non-flight-safety nature of the results a significance level () was set at 
10%. 
H0 : =0; the population coefficient of the chosen variable is equal to zero. 
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HA : 0; the population coefficient of the chosen variable is not equal to 
zero. 
4.16.1 AGE AND ‘CULTURAL LEAN’ AT RAF CONINGSBY 
Upon examination of the scatterplot for 29 Squadron (Figure 4-8) a single 
point stood out as an outlier, this being the single 53-year-old Typhoon pilot, the 
next nearest age being 39.  After deliberation this point was removed from the 
analysis as, although it was a valid data point, there was not the density of data 
around this point to provide a weight of evidence for the age or that surrounding 
it.  There were no outliers for XI and 3(F) squadrons. 
 
Figure 4-8.  Scatterplot of Cultural Lean vs Age for 29(R) Squadron 
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Figure 4-9.  Summary of Cultural Lean v Age for 29(R) Squadron 
 
Figure 4-10.  Summary of Cultural Lean v Age for XI Squadron 
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Figure 4-11.  Summary of Cultural Lean v Age for 3(F) Squadron 
The results for the squadrons can be seen in Figure 4-9, Figure 4-10 and 
Figure 4-11 and show positive values of correlation for 29(R) and 3(F) squadron 
of 0.33 and 0.37 respectively, although these values were not shown to be 
statistically significant. XI Squadron did have a single data point with a high 
residual but no reason could be found to remove it from the analysis, 
additionally a re-run of the data with this point missing did not yield a significant 
result. None of the squadrons returned a statistically significant result, thus the 
hypothesis upheld is Ho.  However, it can be seen that the correlations for these 
particular samples is not the expected negative one if the belief that younger 
pilots were more accepting of simulation (Objective 3i) was to be supported. 
4.16.2 TOTAL TYPHOON HOURS AND ‘CULTURAL LEAN’ AT 
RAF CONINGSBY 
Both 29(R) and XI Squadron’s scatterplots each contained a single outlier 
that had flown a total of 1600 and 1100 hours respectively on the Typhoon 
(Figure 4-12 and Figure 4-13).  These data points were removed as there was 
not a sufficient density of points around these numbers of hours to allow 
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realistic regression to these values.  This logic mirrors that used for the age 
variable regression on 29(R) Squadron.  
 
Figure 4-12.  Scatterplot of Cultural Lean vs Typhoon Hours for 29(R) Squadron 
 
Figure 4-13.  Scatterplot of Cultural Lean vs Typhoon Hours for XI Squadron 
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Figure 4-14.  Summary Report for Regression of Cultural Lean vs Typhoon Hours for 
29(R) Squadron 
 
Figure 4-15.  Summary Report for Regression of Cultural Lean vs Typhoon Hours for XI 
Squadron 
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Figure 4-16.  Summary Report for Regression of Cultural Lean vs Typhoon Hours for 3(F) 
Squadron 
An inconsistent picture of the correlation coefficient was presented across 
the squadrons, both front-line squadrons returning a positive correlation 
coefficient whilst the training unit, 29(R), was negative.  Only 3(F) produced a 
statistically-significant result allowing the alternative hypothesis HA to be upheld 
for this squadron alone.   
4.16.3 TOTAL FLYING HOURS AND ‘CULTURAL LEAN’ AT RAF 
CONINGSBY 
A single outlier was found on 29(R) Squadron (see Figure 4-17).  This 
individual with 6000 hours was a particular anomaly in the fleet and as such had 
no peers.  His result was removed in line with the outlier argument advanced 
previously.  
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Figure 4-17.  Scatterplot for Cultural Lean vs Total Hours for 29(R) Squadron 
 
Figure 4-18.  Summary Report for Regression of Cultural Lean vs Total Hours for 29(R) 
Squadron 
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Figure 4-19.  Summary Report for Regression of Cultural Lean vs Total Hours for XI 
Squadron 
 
Figure 4-20.  Summary Report for Regression of Cultural Lean vs Total Hours for 3(F) 
Squadron 
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Both 29(R) and 3(F) squadrons gave statistically-significant results with 
correlations of medium strength, thus supporting the alternate hypothesis.  In 
contrast XI squadron showed virtually no correlation at all. 
4.16.4 NUMBER OF 2-SHIP SIMULATORS FLOWN AND 
‘CULTURAL LEAN’ AT RAF CONINGSBY 
Outliers were discovered in both 29(R) and 3(F)’s data and were linked to 
a scarcity of individuals who had conducted a large number of 2-ship 
simulators. Thus in order not to over-extrapolate, the single data point at 10 
simulator sorties for 29(R) (Figure 4-21) and the data points at 3, 4 and 6 
simulator sorties for 3(F) (Figure 4-22) were removed, consistent with the 
previous outlier methodology. 
 
Figure 4-21.  Scatterplot for Cultural Lean vs 2 Ship Sims for 29(R) Squadron 
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Figure 4-22.  Scatterplot of Cultural Lean vs 2 Ship Sims for 3(F) Squadron 
 
Figure 4-23.  Summary Report for Cultural Lean vs 2 Ship Sims for 29(R) Squadron 
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Figure 4-24.  Summary Report for Cultural Lean vs 2 Ship Sims for XI Squadron 
 
Figure 4-25.  Summary of Cultural Lean vs 2 Ship Sims for 3(F) Squadron 
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Analysis of both front-line squadrons found that increasing 2-ship 
simulator sorties had a negative effect on the theme of ‘Cultural Lean’ with XI 
returning a result significant enough to reject the null hypothesis.  Of more 
interest is that the XI Squadron results would be better fitted by a square law; 
up to two 2-ship simulators per 2-month period having a positive effect on 
‘Cultural Lean’, in contrast to their sister squadron 3(F) Squadron.  This is 
particularly important as it may hint to why XI Squadron’s overall ‘Cultural Lean’ 
figures are below those of their peers.  Also highlighted was that XI Squadron 
would appear to conduct more work in simulation than the other squadrons at 
RAF Coningsby, their 17 pilots believing they had conducted 46 simulator 
sorties in the last 2 months, an average of 2.7 per pilot.  3(F)’s 19 pilots by 
comparison had conducted 32 sorties, an average of 1.7 each. 
4.16.5 NUMBER OF 4-SHIP SIMULATORS AND ‘CULTURAL 
LEAN’ AT RAF CONINGSBY 
Inspection of the scatterplots found 3 points for removal on the XI 
Squadron data.  The data points of 2, 4 and 6 four-ship simulator sorties per 2 
month period (Figure 4-26) were removed to ensure a better data density.  
Correspondingly the data for XI Squadron will only be valid up to a total of 1 
four-ship simulator per 2 months. 
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Figure 4-26.  Scatterplot of Cultural Lean vs 4 Ship Sims for XI Squadron 
 
Figure 4-27.  Summary Report for Cultural Lean vs 4 Ship Sims for 29(R) Squadron 
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Figure 4-28.  Summary Report for Cultural Lean vs 4 Ship Sims for XI Squadron 
 
Figure 4-29.  Summary Report for Cultural Lean vs 4 Ship Sims for 3(F) Squadron 
Again both front-line squadrons agreed with each other, demonstrating a 
very weak positive correlation, albeit over differing data ranges, although neither 
was statistically significant enough to reject the null hypothesis.  In common 
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with the two-ship data it appeared that the squadrons conducted remarkably 
differing numbers of 4-ship sorties. XI squadron a total of 20; an average of 1.2 
per pilot whilst 3(F) conducted a total of 51, equating to 2.7 per pilot.   
Thus, it would appear that both front-line squadrons agree broadly with 
each other in terms of the correlation for 2 and 4-ship simulator sorties flown.  It 
can also be seen that the squadrons are using the simulator in distinctly 
differing ways in order to get their mandated hours.  3(F) Squadron preferring to 
place their pilots in four-ship simulators whilst XI Sqn electing for more 2-ship 
simulator missions. 
4.16.6 RAF CONINGSBY AND THE THEME OF ‘NEAR FUTURE’ 
The same variables were used to regress the theme of ‘Near Future’ for 
the RAF Coningsby responses, the results being held in Table 4-2.  All variables 
conformed to the assumption of normality and where outliers were found they 
were removed in accordance with the reasons articulated above. 
Table 4-2.  RAF Coningsby, 'Near Future' Pearson's Coefficient 
Variable Degrees of 
Freedom 
(dF) 
Pearson’s 
Correlation 
(r) 
Statistical 
Probability 
(%) 
r-sq 
(%) 
Hypothesis 
upheld 
Age 45 (1 x 
Outlier) 
0.03 0.866 0.0 H0 
Typhoon 
Hours 
46 0.09 0.553 0.0 H0 
Total Hours 45 (1 x 
Outlier) 
0.08 0.611 0.0 H0 
2 Ship 
Simulators 
45 (1 x 
Outlier) 
0.02 0.888 0.0 H0 
4 Ship 
Simulators 
45 (1 x 
Outlier) 
0.24 0.099 3.8 HA 
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4.16.7 RAF LOSSIEMOUTH AND THE THEME OF ‘CULTURAL 
LEAN’ 
The data gathered by the RAF Lossiemouth returns were also treated in 
the same manner against ‘Cultural Lean’, correlations against the above 
variables being sought.  The results are given in Table 4-3. 
Table 4-3.  RAF Lossiemouth. 'Cultural Lean' Pearson's Coefficient 
Variable Degrees 
of 
Freedom 
(dF) 
Pearson’s 
Correlation 
(r) 
Statistical 
Probability 
(%) 
r-sq 
(%) 
Hypothesis 
Upheld 
Age 27 0.37 0.046 10.8 HA 
Typhoon 
Hours 
27 0.41 0.026 13.8 HA 
Total Hours 27 0.48 0.008 20.2 HA 
2 Ship 
Simulators 
26 (1 x 
outlier) 
-0.18 0.361 0.0 H0 
It should be restated that the ‘Cultural Lean’ variable at RAF Lossiemouth 
differed from that used at RAF Coningsby in that it was altered by the removal 
of a single question such that the theme was found to be consistent.  The 
results for the variables are presented in Table 4-3; unless stated otherwise 
there were no outliers and all variables were normally distributed as tested by a 
Ryan-Joiner test.  As an error check the tests on the variables above were re-
run with the errant question being included (the Cronbach’s alpha dropping to 
0.68, 0.02 beneath the stated acceptable consistency level).  The results were 
similar to those in Table 4-3, retaining both the statistical significance and the 
level of correlation.  
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4.16.8 MULTIPLE REGRESSION 
Running a ‘best subsets’ regression for all the variables in Table 4-2 
found that the themes of ‘Cultural Lean’ and ‘Near Future’ at RAF Coningsby 
were best explained using the following variables, shown in Table 4-4. 
Table 4-4.  Best Subset Regression, RAF Coningsby 
Theme R-Sq (adj) Mallows Cp S Variables 
Cultural Lean 9.3 2.0 3.7 Total Hours 
4-Ship Sims 
Near Future 3.3 2.2 3.4 Age 
Total Hours 
4-Ship Sims 
These results demonstrated an extremely low R-Sq (adj) (see Appendix I) 
showing that the model has virtually no predictive power; it did, however, 
provide a general indicator of trend when these variables are applied.  In 
summary there appears to be no silver bullet to increase the acceptance of 
simulation or to increase favourable opinion on ‘Near Future’ capabilities. 
4.16.9 SUMMARY OF WORK ON THEMES 
This exploration has searched for evidence to support the traditional and 
emerging beliefs of the Typhoon Force, however the Cronbach Alpha results for 
the Entry Questionnaire’s internal validity makes it clear that the two main 
operating bases differ subtly in their views of what makes up cultural 
acceptance and also how simulation is viewed as a whole.  There is, however, a 
notable similarity between both bases that cultural acceptance is related to age 
irrespective of their differing understanding of the theme. Whilst only the RAF 
Lossiemouth results are statistically significant the broadly positive correlation 
across both bases demonstrates no supporting evidence to suggest that the 
statement ‘younger pilots are more accepting of simulation’ is indeed true. 
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With respect to the effect of the number of Typhoon hours each pilot had 
flown Lossiemouth returned a statistically-significant positive correlation for their 
understanding of the theme.  At Coningsby both front-line squadrons had 
positive correlations but with only 3(F)’s being statistically significant.  Thus, of 
those questioned at both bases it can be stated that as a pilot’s hours on the 
Typhoon increases he or she is likely to have a more positive attitude towards 
simulation (causality not inferred). The number of total hours a pilot has flown 
also returned a statistically-significant positive correlation at both bases with the 
exception of XI Squadron (non-significant neutral correlation).  Thus, it can be 
said that in general the variable of Total Hours is positively correlated to a 
positive acceptance of simulation.    
Across both bases there was a negative correlation between the number 
of 2-ship simulators flown and cultural lean for those asked, although this was 
only statistically significant at XI Squadron at Coningsby.  In contrast the 
favourable opinion of those questioned at the front-line squadrons at Coningsby 
increased with the number of 4-ship simulators flown.  This latter variable was 
the only one also to return a positive correlation in the theme of ‘Near Future’.   
Whilst similarities have been highlighted above it remains that there are 
observed differences between the two bases in the homogeneity of their 
viewpoint.  Coningsby  returned a negligible r-sq for the majority of the variables 
tested (0-5%), Lossiemouth by way of comparison was generally higher (10-
20%).  This is supported by the result of the Lossiemouth pilots believing that 
their perception of the Force’s opinion matched their own, whilst at Coningsby 
they believed themselves to be individually more positive than the Force as a 
whole.   
4.17 DETERMINING THE LIVE: SYNTHETIC BALANCES 
Having examined the LSB for other air forces in the literature review 
(Section 2.3) and investigated the limits of the balance for the Operational 
Conversion Unit in Trial PANDORA’S BUZZARD, this section used the opinion 
of the current pilots to search for an answer to the question ‘What is the correct 
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LSB for the Typhoon Force’, with reference to day-to-day training.  The intent 
was to determine if this is a broadly similar figure for all disciplines or if it was 
affected by the type of training and complexity the simulator was trying to 
replicate.  The specific objectives to be examined in the section were: 
a. Objective 4.  Determine the subjectively-assessed LSB for each of 
the required tasks.    
b. Objective 5.  Investigate the effect of threat complexity on the LSB. 
Each complexity level was examined in turn to source a LSB for 
individual skill sets, and for the complexity level as a whole.  Each level had a 
number of tasks that were relevant to that level, each task being required to be 
trained a certain number of times per year as laid down by the Typhoon Force 
HQ, these were known as events.  The questionnaire asked the pilots to give 
their opinion of the minimum number of events for each task that should be 
done in the Live and the Synthetic environments.  In doing so there is a number 
of events left over that by definition could be done in either environment.  This 
will be termed ‘The Option’ as it will provide the commanders with the option to 
vary the synthetic blend from heavily synthetic to heavily live flying without 
exceeding the perceived minimums.  This would be used in times of conflict, 
such as Operation ELLAMY in Libya, when many of the Force’s aircraft were 
deployed overseas yet pilot training had to continue back in the UK. Thus, 
rather than the LSB terminology that has become commonplace in the RAF this 
paper utilises the term Live – Option – Synthetic Blend (LOSB) as a method of 
providing greater fidelity to the issue.  The term LSB will be reserved for a 
specific target within the LOSB, such as the 1:1 set by the RAF. 
4.17.1 FINDING THE LIVE OPTION SYNTHETIC BLEND FOR 
LEVEL 1 
Level 1 represented the lowest threat level and as such all pilots within 
the Trial had had experience operating and training at this level (n=48).  The 
Force HQ requirements for level 1 were broken down into sections: major tasks, 
  
163 
some of which had specific sub-tasks associated with them, and common skills 
that were required for all major tasks.  The pilot questionnaire asked for the 
minimum events for each of the major and sub-tasks and common skills. 
Table 4-5. Task Breakdown by Group for Level 1 
GROUP 
MAJOR 
TASK 
SPECIFIC SUB-
TASK 
COMMON 
SKILLS 
QRA LRA 
Intervene 
  
  
High level 
Intercepts 
Low Fast 
Intercepts 
Helo Intercepts 
Low Slow 
Intercepts 
Scramble 
VID P1 
VID P2 
Intervene 
Shadow 
Pairs Take off 
Pairs Landing 
DA ECM 
DA Flares 
DA DASS 
DA Chaff 
NME Chaff 
NME Flare 
NME Jam 
VID P4 
CAP 
Low level 
Datalink 
Counter Air (CA) 
  
  
  
  
  
  
Engage 
Day 
  
  
ACT 
A2A Gunnery 
DACT 
CA Day   
HVAD Day  
Engage 
Night 
Night Tactical 
Formation 
Night Landing CA Night  
HVAD Night 
 
To determine the LOSB the average number of minimum events for each 
discipline was found, see , however when testing for normality, even after outlier 
modification, very few of the tasks or skills were found to display a normal 
distribution, as recorded in the Ryan-Joiner test p-value column.  Thus, the 
median was used for the majority of the remaining tasks.  Additional 
complications were caused by the number of events per year for each task and 
skill, as laid down by the Force HQ, varying from 1 to 112; the HVAD Day and 
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Night tasking having only 4 and 1 events required per year respectively. For 
these tasks the mode was believed to provide a better indicator of the average 
for these tasks and skills.  In sum, determination of the particular type of 
average was made after outlier modification (using the methodology previously 
detailed), normality testing and histogram inspection before recording the type 
of average in the ‘Type’ column of Table 4-6.  It can be seen that tasks and 
skills with few events required per year, such as HVAD Day and Night provide 
little fidelity of pilot opinion, as such the final column of Table 4-6 provides an 
indication of the sensitivity of each event - a task requiring 10 events per year 
returning a sensitivity value of 10%.  This column is colour coded to provide 
(subjective levels) of indication quality: red 100-25%, yellow 24-11% and green 
=<10%, the lower number the better as this indicates greater sensitivity e.g. 
HVAD night requires only 1 event a year thus, a single event alters the LOSB by 
100%, not a sensitive measure. 
 
  
 
1
6
5
 
 
Table 4-6.  LOS Blend for Level 1 
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Figure 4-30 provide a graphical breakdown of the LOSB for the major 
tasks at Level 1.  The graph shows the average of the minimum events of each 
event for each realm; Live, Synthetic or the amount of ‘The Option’ that is 
available, the figures within the bars show the numerical quantity of 
corresponding events. 
Figure 4-30.  LOSB for Major Tasks – Level 1 
Discounting the tasks that have poor sensitivity (HVAD Night, HVAD day 
and CA Night), it can be seen that the remaining Major Tasks have sufficient 
events per task per year to gain an understanding of the numbers the pilots 
would accept as a minimum in each environment.   
Some of the Major Tasks have specific Sub-Tasks associated with them, 
see Table 4-5. Task Breakdown by Group for Level 1. These subtasks are not 
exclusive to a task per se but a pilot could be reasonably expected to utilise this 
skill when predominately operating or training this Major Task.  The LOSB for 
these Sub-Tasks is presented at Figure 4-31.  Finally the LOS Blend for the 
Common Skills used by all the Tasks is found at Figure 4-32. 
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Figure 4-31.  LOSB Sub-Task – Level 1 
Figure 4-32.  LOS Blend for Common Skills - Level 1 
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The results for the common skills showed, in broad terms, a minimum live 
proportion of approximately 50%.  The exceptions to this figure were logical 
skills that required large amounts of hand-eye coordination with little reference 
to internal instrumentation; pairs take off and landing and low-level flying.  DA 
ECM (Defensive Aids Counter Measures), the ability to jam the enemy’s radar, 
also produces a logical result as once the switch is made at the beginning of the 
sortie there is no indication in flight of its success against the enemy.  The 
remaining skills show a minimum synthetic proportion of approximately one 
third.  Broadly the Common Skills LOSB is 50-20-30 with the exceptions 
mentioned above.   
The Sub-Tasks were more difficult to interpret with a number of the tasks 
having poor sensitivity.  However, tasks requiring large quantities of hand-eye 
coordination - ACT (dogfighting) and DACT (dogfighting with a dissimilar 
aircraft) - again have a high requirement for live flight.   Shadow, a Sub-Task of 
LRA Intervene, had a large proportion of Option available indicating that this 
task is served equally well in both domains.  
Of the major tasks with sufficient sensitivity CA Day, Engage Day, 
Engage Night all appear to favour a LOSB(%) of approximately 50-25-25.  LRA 
Intervene is the practice of intercepting Russian Long Range Aviation in all 
weathers over the North Sea, such as regularly reported in the media.  This 
skill, however, had a much larger Synthetic and Option proportion than the 
others which is commonsensical given its strong reliance on procedural working 
of the aircraft sensors, actions that occur entirely inside the cockpit with little 
reference to the outside world. 
Finally the LOSB for level 1 as a whole was calculated by totalling the 
number of events and Live and Synthetic averages, this produced a LOSB(%) 
of 49-27-24.  Given that 201 events per year were required at level 1 and the 
standard planning figure of 2 events per sortie could be achieved this equated 
to a total of 100 sorties per year for each level 1 pilot, of which 49 would be in 
the live environment and 24 in the simulator, the remaining 27 being placed in 
either domain. 
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4.17.2 LOS BLEND FOR LEVELS 2 AND 3 
The same tables and figures were created for level 2 (see Appendix J) 
which created a similar picture. Level 2 having an overall LOSB(%) of 52-23-25 
and for Level 3; 50-24-26.  With the addition of the same treatment for Common 
Skills and Sub Tasks this represented the first time the culturally-accepted 
minimums for the combination of live and synthetic training had been mapped.  
If the same assumption of events achieved per sortie are made for levels 2 and 
3 it can be shown that the Force HQ can calculate the Live and synthetic 
minimum requirement to be: 
100*P1 + 68*P2 + 65*P3 = Minimum No. of Live Sorties Required Per Year 
24*P1 + *32P2 + 35*P3 = Minimum No. of Synthetic Sorties Required Per Year 
where P1,2 and 3 =No of pilots at Qualification Level 1,2 and 3 
In addition to these minimum figures further sorties will have to be 
undertaken to ensure the correct number of events are achieved for each level.  
This is ‘The Option’ and can be undertaken in either synthetic or live flight.  The 
formula is: 
27*P1 + *31P2 + 32*P3 = Additional Sorties Per Year to satisfy ‘The Option’. 
 These figures allow the RAF to forecast fuel costs and technical spares 
to a greater degree of accuracy in the long term.  For the short term the use of 
‘the option’ to increase the synthetic proportion will allow the planning forecast 
to be better met such that the Typhoon Force does not over run its budget yet 
still maintains valid tactical training.  In addition any Combat or Contingency 
Operation would result in a reduction of aircraft at home and thus increasing the 
synthetic proportion of training into ‘the option’ will ensure pilots are trained for 
Operations without increased flying, and servicing of, the aircraft remaining in 
the UK. 
 170 
Proportions.  Figure 4-33 and Figure 4-34 show the (statistically- 
significant) relationship between the synthetics and live flight for the 2 major 
tasks of CA Day and Engage to be a quadratic. function  Each curve peaks at 
an LSB of 67:33, showing this to be the maximum LSB presently acceptable to 
the sample at Level 1.  This value is indicative only as the model is not strong 
enough to make it predictive in nature.  Figure 4-35 is the only other statistically-
significant relationship observed within the sample, but unlike the previous two 
this is linear in character.  The equation for the relationship being Y = 6.3 + 0.4 
X, where Y is ASTA and X is Live training events; as with the other relationships 
the model is not strong enough to be used as a predictive tool. 
 
Figure 4-33.  CA Day, ASTA v Live Proportion.  
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Figure 4-34.  Engage, Day ASTA v Live Proportion.  
 
Figure 4-35.  Shadow, ASTA v Live Proportion.  
4.17.3 THE EFFECT OF CONCURRENCY 
The lack of concurrency of the ASTA devices was often quoted as the 
reason why pilots do not want to train synthetically, this in turn affecting the 
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LSB.  Concurrency primarily concerns aircraft software that drives elements of 
the displays and controls as well as the Defensive Aids Sub Suite (DASS) and 
Radar; poor concurrency affects motor programmes and display interpretation. 
However, achieving a fully-concurrent simulator with software that matches the 
aircraft within 30 days of its release has a significant cost, thus the intent of this 
section is to provide the procurement teams with information to assist their 
cost/benefit analysis calculations.  A reduction in the number of events rto be 
conducted in the live environment would save both fuel (approximately £1050 
per flying hour) and technical spares (~£1020 per hour).  Should these savings, 
aggregated across the Force’s pilots, be greater than the cost of securing the 
contract for concurrency then savings could be made with no loss of training.  
Question 2 of the post-sortie questionnaires therefore sought to examine 
what effect, if any, fully-concurrent software in the simulator would have made 
on the LSB.  The questions were centred on 3 topics: CA Day, Engage Day and 
Enemy (NME) Jamming techniques.  The first 2 being the major tasks that form 
the bedrock of Typhoon training, the last being a subtask that had yet to be 
exploited fully in the synthetic environment and promised the largest mid-term 
change in capability.  
Thus, to determine if the inclusion of concurrent software altered the 
LOSB averages for the 3 tasks the hypotheses below were used.  As money 
would have to be found to fund the concurrent software this would have to be 
found by reducing live flight, thus the hypotheses look for both an increase in 
the synthetic proportion and a reduction of the live.  
For the Live environment: 
  H0: The amount of Live training remains the same or increases if the 
simulators were to have concurrent software. 
HA: The amount of Live training reduces if the simulators were to 
have concurrent software.  
For the Synthetic environment: 
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  H0: The amount of Synthetic training stays the same or reduces if the 
simulators were to have concurrent software. 
HA: The amount of Synthetic training increases if the simulators were to 
have concurrent software. 
To determine if there was a statistically-significant difference between the 
number of live and synthetic sorties recommended should the software be 
upgraded to a fully-concurrent one a paired-sample t-test was attempted.  This 
found only the subject of ‘NME Jam_Synthetic’ to satisfy the assumption of no 
outliers and a normality of the differences.  The other comparisons violated this 
assumption but did demonstrate symmetry in the distribution of the differences. 
Consequently the non-parametric Wilcoxon signed rank test (see Appendix I) 
was conducted for the variables of ‘NME Jam_Live’, ‘Engage_Live’ and 
‘CA_Live’.  The final two variables of ‘CA_Synthetic’ and ‘Engage_Synthetic’ 
failed the requirement for symmetrical distribution of the differences and thus, 
despite its lower power, a paired sign test was conducted.  Given the need to 
demonstrate a robust argument for change in the allocation of funding an alpha 
level of 0.05 was chosen.  The results of these tests are given in Table 4-7.  
Effect of Concurrency on Recommended Sorties - Level 1 
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 Table 4-7.  Effect of Concurrency on Recommended Sorties - Level 1 
Variable Test 
Used 
N N for 
test 
Statistic p Median 
delta 
Hypothesis 
Upheld 
CA_Live Wilcoxon 40 20 W=68.5 0.089 -1.5 H0 
Engage_Live Wilcoxon 40 13 W=28.5 0.124 0 H0 
NME 
Jam_Live 
Wilcoxon 29 31 W=26.5 0.000 -1.85 HA 
CA_Synth Sign 40 2 below 
23  
above 
- 0.000 5.5 HA 
Engage_Synth Sign 40 1 below  
20  
above 
- 0.000 1.0 HA 
NME 
Jam_Synth 
Paired - t 39 - T=0.97 0.170 0.24 
(mean) 
H0 
Table 4-7.  Effect of Concurrency on Recommended Sorties - Level 1 
shows that for level 1 concurrent software would increase the number of sorties 
recommended in the synthetic environment for the tasks of Counter Air and 
Engage.  In order to fund the software to achieve this recommended increase 
the only Live flying reduction could come from NME Jam.  This financial saving 
would be equivalent to the fuel and spares costs associated with 1.85 sorties 
per pilot per year. 
The process was repeated for Levels 2 and 3 which found multiple 
outliers in all the variables, which were unable to be modified or deleted without 
substantial changes to the overall results.  As such Wilcoxon sign tests were 
carried out, see Table 4-8 and Table 4-9. 
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Table 4-8.  Effect of Concurrency on Recommended Sorties - Level 2 
Variable Test 
Used 
N N for 
test 
Statistic p Median 
delta 
Hypothesis 
Upheld 
 
CA_Live Wilcoxon 36 13 W=40.0 0.363 0.0 H0 
 
Engage_Live Wilcoxon 36 18 W=117.5 0.922 0.0 H0 
 
NME 
Jam_Live 
 
Sign  22 below 
1 above 
- 0.000 -1.0 HA 
 
CA_Synth Sign 36 0 below 
17 
above 
 
- 0.000 0.0 H0 
Engage_Synth Sign 36 3 below 
19 
above 
 
- 0.000 4.0 HA 
NME 
Jam_Synth 
 
Sign 36  - 0.000 0.8 HA 
 
 
Table 4-9.  Effect of Concurrency on Recommended Sorties - Level 3 
Variable Test 
Used 
N N for test Statistic p Median 
delta 
Hypothesis 
Upheld 
 
CA_Live Wilcoxon 20 7 W=17 0.723 0.0 H0 
 
Engage_Live Sign 20 4 below 
4 above 
5  
- 0.637 0.0 H0 
NME 
Jam_Live 
Sign 21 13 below 
1 above 
 
- 0.001 -1.0 HA 
CA_Synth Sign 20 1 below 
11 above 
 
- 0.003 8.0 HA 
Engage_Synth Sign 20 2 below 
10 above 
 
- 0.019 2.0 HA 
NME 
Jam_Synth 
Sign 20 4 below 
8 above 
 
- 0.194 0.0 H0 
The results for Level 2 and 3 show a willingness on behalf of the pilots to 
reduce the minimum level of task ‘NME Jam’ that is conducted in the Live 
environment as well as increasing the proportion of the task ‘Engage’ in the 
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synthetic.  Level 3 also shows a significant rise in the number of minimum 
sorties recommended to be undertaken in the synthetic environment for ‘CA’.   
4.17.4 SUMMARY 
The intent of the investigation into the effect of concurrent software in the 
LOSB levels recommended by the pilots was to determine if, firstly, there was a 
desire to increase the amount of synthetic training if the software matched that 
of the most up-to-date aircraft.  Secondly, and more pragmatically, if the funding 
for that concurrency could be found by the savings made through 
recommendations of a reduction in live flight. 
The results found that there was a greater demand for synthetic training 
with the up to date software; an increase of 6.5, 4.8 and 10 sorties per pilot per 
year for levels 1,2 and 3 respectively.  However, only the Live task of ‘NME 
Jam’ was offered to be traded to achieve this extra synthetic training.  This was 
at the rate of 1.85, 1 and 1 sorties per pilot per year for each of the levels 
respectively.  Thus in order to fund a contract for concurrency the contract 
should cost no more than: 
Sortie saving x cost of saving (£2070) x number of pilots 
Thus for levels 1, 2 and 3 respectively and assuming 20 pilots on each 
level: 
(1.85*2070*20) + (1*2070*20) + (1*2070*20) =  £159,390 per annum 
In procurement terms this is an extremely low figure to generate a 
standing army of software coders to ensure the concurrency of the synthetic 
aircraft.  Therefore whilst up-to-date software has been shown to have a 
positive effect on the number of synthetic sorties recommended there is no 
evidence to suggest that the Typhoon pilots are willing to trade live flying to fund 
that increase.  It is recommended on a simple value for money basis therefore, 
that concurrent software is not procured. 
 177 
4.17.5 COMPLEXITY 
Sub Question 2, Objective 5 was to ‘ Investigate the effect of threat 
complexity on the LSB’.  To this end it had been anticipated that a repeated 
measures ANOVA would be run to detect differences between each of the three 
levels of complexity and the number of events recommended for each Task, 
Sub-Task and Skill.  In the event, however, there were 36 pilots who completed 
the simulator and questionnaires for levels 1 and 2, and only 20 for levels 2 and 
3.  Thus, whilst slower and more laborious, a paired t-test was elected to be 
used for comparison of the complexity levels, this was further complicated by 
outliers and a lack of symmetry on a number of the variables.  Thus Wilcoxon 
and Signed Tests were used where appropriate to determine if there had been 
a change in the recommended events to be undertaken for each of the 
variables. 
Selection of which tasks to compare was complicated by the issue that 
not all Tasks, Sub-tasks or Skills were used at each level and that in some 
cases the number of events required to be undertaken was not sensitive 
enough to be used for analysis.  By discounting the Tasks with poor sensitivity 
(as stated in section 4.17.1 and shown in red in Table 4-6) and mapping for 
Tasks and Skills that could be compared across the levels a comparison table 
was constructed, see Appendix J.  The comparison was then made between 
level 1 and 2, 2 and 3, and 1 and 3.  
The hypothesis for the tests is set out below.  Given the exploratory 
nature of the tests and the assumption that the outcome was to be informative 
only and would not be used for a re-write of the syllabus α was set at 0.1. 
H0 : the mean difference between the paired values was equal to, or 
greater than zero, or specifically there was no increase in the minimum 
number of events recommended as the complexity level increased.  
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HA = the mean difference between the paired values was less than zero, or  
specifically there was an increase in the minimum number of events 
recommended as the complexity level increased. 
The methodology described led to a total of 112 comparisons of the 
variables across the various levels, consequently the full results are given in 
Appendix J but a summary table is provided below containing only those results 
that gave the statistically- significant outcome for the alternate hypothesis. 
Table 4-10.  Summary of Recommended Sortie Increase Per Complexity Level 
Levels 
Compared 
Variable Variable 
Type 
 
Environment p-
value 
Increase 
Recommended 
% 
increase 
1 v 2 
DA 
ECM 
Common 
Skill 
Live 0.09 1.5 6 
DA 
Flares 
Common 
Skill 
Live 0.02 1 7 
DA 
Chaff 
Common 
Skill 
Live 0.09 0.5 3 
NME 
Flare 
Common 
Skill 
Live 0.08 0.5 4 
Datalink Common 
Skill 
Synthetic 0.09 0.5 1 
2 v 3 Nil Nil Nil Nil Nil - 
1 v 3 
CA Day Major 
Task 
Synthetic 0.01 9.2 8 
Engage 
Day 
Major 
Task 
Synthetic 0.02 3.9 8 
Engage 
Night 
Major 
Task 
Synthetic 0.03 2 8 
DA 
DASS 
Common 
Skills 
Synthetic 0.03 8.3 9 
DA 
Chaff 
Common 
Skills 
Live 0.05 1 6 
NME 
Flare 
 Live 0.09 1 8 
NME 
Jam 
 Synthetic 0.04 0.5 8 
Table 4-10 shows that of the 112 tests conducted only 12 recommended 
an increase in the minimum number of events that was statistically significant.  
This low number is likely to be a function of the low power of the statistical tests 
used given the need to utilise non-parametric methods due to the sample sizes 
and distribution.  Of note however is that the comparison between level 1 and 2 
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only returned results for the lowest level requirements – Common Skills, 
additionally these observations were made in the live environment for 4 of the 5 
results.  Despite small increases recommended for the number of events this 
did not filter up to the Major Task level.  In contrast the comparison between the 
highest level of complexity and the lowest found an increase across all the 
Major Tasks and only within the synthetic environment.   
4.17.6 SUMMARY 
For the sample tested the minimum number of events recommended for 
all Major Tasks increased by approximately 8% of the annual requirement, for 
the synthetic environment only, when comparing training at the highest 
complexity level versus the lowest.  In plain language this equates to 15 sorties 
per year moved into synthetics when training at the highest threat levels i.e. 
near-peer threats.   
4.17.7 THE EFFECT OF COMPLEXITY ON THE MAJOR 
FACTORS 
This section will initially determine if any of the ‘major factors’ are 
correlated to the minimum amount of simulation recommended by the front-line 
pilots.  These results will be contrasted to those found at each level to search 
for similarities.  The ‘major factors’ are defined as: age, flying hours (Typhoon), 
flying hours (total), average numbers of 2 and 4-ship simulator missions flown in 
a 2-month period.   The intent is to determine if there is some experiential factor 
that is linked to the number of simulator sorties considered necessary at each 
level.  This investigation is necessary as the number of simulator devices are 
limited, thus targeting the right pilots would increase efficiency of resource.  As 
this section’s major intent is to source efficiency of resource only the Major Task 
requiring the largest number of events per year will be considered – Counter Air 
(CA) Day.  As this is intended to affect front-line pilots only, 29 Squadron (the 
OCU) will be discounted from the analysis. 
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A Pearson’s product moment correlation was run to assess the 
relationship between Flying Hours (Typhoon) and the minimum number of 
simulator sorties recommended for the Counter Air Day Task.  Initial analysis 
showed the relationship to be linear with both variables normally distributed 
(Ryan-Joiner test P >0.1), and there were no outliers.  At level 1 the correlation 
between amount of simulation recommended and Flying Hours (Typhoon) was 
found to be moderately negative r(40) = -0.38, p< 0.01with Flying Hours 
(Typhoon) explaining 12.5% of the variation.  
The only other major factor that proved to be statistically-significant was 
the number of 2 Ship sims undertaken in a 2 month period.  The correlation was 
weak - r(40) = 0.37 with P=0.03 and R-Sq (adj) =11%.  
At level 2 the same factors were found to be significant: 
a. Flying Hours (Typhoon) r(33) = -0.47, P=0.01, R-sq (adj) = 20%.  
The correlation being in the same sense and slightly stronger than the 
level 1 results. 
b. Number of 2-Ship Sims r(33) = 0.42, P = 0.01, R-Sq (adj) = 
14.7%.  The correlation being of similar sense and strength to level 1. 
At level 3 only the major factor of 2-Ship simulator missions was found to 
be statistically significant r(31) = 0.52, P = 0.02, R-Sq(adj) = 22.4%.  Again the 
correlation coefficient increased when compared to the previous level. 
Thus, it may be considered that the number of synthetic sorties 
recommended for each level has proved to have an experiential factor 
associated to it.  Before this can be stated with confidence there is a need to 
determine if the results were being confused by a hidden correlation between 
the number of 2-ship simulator missions undertaken and Flying Hours 
(Typhoon) ie. the more experienced pilots were undertaking fewer simulator 
missions.  This would determine if the factors of 2-Ship Sims and Flying Hours 
(Typhoon) were independent.  Investigation into the association between these 
to variables found no statistically-significant correlation at any of the levels.  
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Thus, it can be said that the minimum number of Counter Air (Day) events 
recommended to be undertaken in the simulator was linked to the number of 2-
Ship simulator missions undertaken by the pilots in a two-month period (for all 
three levels) and the number of Flying Hours (Typhoon) for the first two levels of 
complexity.  
In order to contrast the tests above they were rerun to determine if any of 
the factors could be correlated to the minimum number of live flying events.  
However, no statistically-significant correlations were found at any of the levels. 
4.18 ANALYSIS 
The lack of effect, across all levels, of the major factors on the 
recommendations for events undertaken in live flight indicates a consensus of 
the front-line pilots on the value of live flight within their preparation for combat.  
The reduction below these levels (approximately 50%) is likely to face strong 
cultural challenges and should therefore be approached with caution or avoided 
unless necessary. 
When examining the results for the recommendations for minimum 
numbers of events in simulation the correlations show that the experiential 
factor of flying hours is moderately negatively correlated. This shows that the 
newer members of the squadrons recommended a higher number of simulator 
missions than their more experienced colleagues.  These figures may be 
influenced by the fact that these individuals have recently exited the Operational 
Conversion Unit, which has a higher proportion of simulation, and are thus 
accepting of the regime.  This line of thought was supported by the positively 
correlated relationship between the number of simulator events recommended 
in the Counter Air task and the increasing number of 2-ship simulator missions 
flown in the last 2 months.  Although causation is not determined from these 
results (there being longitudinal retesting over a period of years required to 
determine this) any increase in simulation required in the Typhoon Force front-
line, due to events such as high-tempo operations or fiscal restrictions, should 
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initially be targeted at the less experienced members of the squadrons in order 
to bring their LOSB into line with their recommendations. 
Although the LOSB remained approximately the same for all levels of 
complexity there was a statistically-significant increase in the minimum number 
of synthetic Major Tasks recommended at the highest level of complexity when 
compared to the lowest.  Thus, should increased simulation be required 
targeting this at the higher levels of complexity first is likely to meet less cultural 
resistance than those at the lowest. 
4.19 CONCLUSIONS 
Objective 1.  Determine the present level of cultural acceptance of synthetic 
use in front-line Typhoon training and investigate if this is common across both 
Typhoon bases. 
Trial PANDORA’S DIAMOND has shown that the two Main Operating 
Bases of Coningsby and Lossiemouth differ in terms of their character – the 
themed questions returning differing internal validity.  The implication of this is 
that the questions had differing meanings to the two bases. It is postulated that 
these differing viewpoints on simulation may be related to the types of 
simulators available at the bases and the manner in which they are used.  RAF 
Coningsby having four high quality and fidelity devices used for all levels of 
training, by comparison with Lossiemouth has two much lower fidelity devices 
that are used primarily as emergency trainers.   
Because of the differing internal validity the two bases cannot be 
compared directly, however it can be stated that, unlike RAF Lossiemouth, 
Coningsby had a statistically significant difference between the individual’s 
cultural acceptance of simulation and their perception of the Force’s opinion, the 
individual being the more positive.  The implication being that questioning the 
Force’s pilots as a collective, such as has been done recently (Holden 2015), 
may return a more negative view of simulation than interviewing the individual 
operators themselves. 
 183 
The overall level of cultural acceptance was similar at both bases.  The 
Cultural Lean theme returned a mean slightly more positive than the average: 
RAF Coningsby 20.5 (neutral point being 18) and RAF Lossiemouth 18.4 
(neutral point being 15) although the standard deviation for both was of the 
order of 3.5, indicating that approximately 15% of those questioned sat below 
the neutral point.  The acceptance level of the proposed Near Future uses of 
simulation was only able to be tested at RAF Coningsby and was positive, 22.9 
σx=3.6 against a neutral point of 18. 
Objective 2.  Identify any factors such as age or experience that correlate to 
the level of acceptance. 
The discovery that the Squadron a pilot was assigned to had an influence 
on the level of acceptance was unexpected and as such requires further 
investigation.  Whilst it may be postulated that leadership or work environment 
may be the cause this research can only state that it differed and as such 
squadrons should be considered separately.  Examining the variable of age 
within this context found no supporting evidence to suggest that younger pilots 
were more accepting of simulation than older ones.  Indeed the sample itself 
suggested that the opposite was true i.e. an unexpected marginally positive 
sense, defying conventional understanding that the younger generations were 
more accepting of technology and gaming and thus would be more accepting of 
simulation within their training.   
Consideration of the experience variables found that the number of Total 
Flying Hours was statistically significant on both 3(F) and 29(R) Squadrons 
which resonates with the sample’s returns on age: the older pilots having 
attained more total hours than the younger.  Thus there is evidence to suggest 
pilots with higher total hours will be more accepting of simulation.  In the case of 
number of simulator sorties undertaken, both front-line squadrons showed a 
decline in cultural acceptance with increasing numbers of 2-ship simulator 
missions flown, however this trend was reversed when considering 4 ship 
simulators, a relationship further underlined in the theme of ‘Near Future’ with 4-
ship simulator missions returning the only statistically significant correlation.  As 
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the relationship was not seen when considering 2-ship simulator missions it 
suggests that it is the larger-scale tactical missions that nurture a positive 
opinion of simulation.  Whilst causality has not been proven there is little effort 
required to alter the manner in which simulation is programmed.  Thus it is 
recommended that where constraints allow simulator hours are programmed for 
4-ship missions rather than 2. 
RAF Lossiemouth’s results returned an altogether different picture. Age, 
Typhoon Hours and Total Hours all returned a statistically-significant, positively 
correlated result.  These results were accompanied by r-sq values of circa 15% 
and whilst very low they were still a factor of 10 greater than those of RAF 
Coningsby.  This would further support the suggestion of considering the two 
bases as stand-alone when collecting evidence in the future rather than 
collating the evidence in a single pool.  
Objective 3.  Prove or disprove some commonly-held beliefs that had started to 
form since the initial trial (PANDORA’S BUZZARD) had increased synthetic 
use, namely: 
1. Younger pilots are more accepting of simulation than older pilots. 
2. Acceptance of simulation is based upon a pilots qualifications. 
The answer to Objective 3a has already been found above: that, at RAF 
Coningsby, there is no evidence to suggest age plays a factor in acceptance of 
simulation.  Similarly there was no evidence to suggest that levels of 
qualification at either base were related to the acceptance of simulation.  
Therefore it can be stated that at both RAF Coningsby and Lossiemouth there 
was no evidence to support either of the newly forming beliefs stated in 
Objective 3.  
Objective 4.  Determine the minimum levels of LSB for each of the required 
tasks, as subjectively assessed by the present Typhoon pilots.    
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 This work proposed the use of the term Live Option Synthetic Blend 
(LOSB) to articulate the limit of exploitation of the live and synthetic domains, 
LSB being now proposed as a term for the commander’s guidance on the 
particular balance he or she wishes to achieve within those limits, depending on 
the stresses and strains the Force is experiencing in the short term.  For the first 
time a graphical representation of the LOSB for all tasks and skillsets at all of 
the levels of training has been made (Figure 4-30-Figure 4-32 and Figure Apx 
J-1 - Figure Apx J-6) in order to provide the commander with a detailed and 
flexible method of using the two environments that will withstand the stresses of 
deployment and exercise cycles.  As an overview the LOSB percentage 
average for the level 1 Major Tasks was 49-27-24, for level 2 52-23-25 and for 
level 3 50-24-26, thus the ratio of minimum live events to synthetic was a 
consistent 2:1. If this is allied to the results found at Objective 2 it would suggest 
that the best way to increase a pilot’s opinion of the acceptable LSB would be to 
employ the Major Tasks within a linked 4-ship tactical scenario. Combination of 
these figures allowed an equation that sought to express the planning 
requirement for the forthcoming year in order that the Force HQ might be able 
to plan better their fuel and technical spares requirements. 
Finally the effect on the LOSB of purchasing immediate concurrency was 
investigated. In the major tasks of CA Day and Engage live flight training was 
not reduced but the minimum number of events that should be done in the 
synthetic environment did increase.  The data shows that only in the subtask of 
‘Jamming’ did concurrency produce a reduction of live flight required for 
training.  This shows a perception of the worth of simulation but does not 
provide a sufficient reduction in live flight with which to fund it.  Thus simulation 
would provide a qualitative increase that must be funded externally.  
Objective 5.  Investigate the effect of threat complexity on the LSB. 
 As the complexity increased from level 1 to 2 there were small increases 
in the minimum numbers of live events recommended, however these were only 
in 4 of the 8 Common Skills, none were seen in the Major Tasks or Sub Tasks.  
In contrast comparisons between the most difficult threat level and the lowest 
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found an increase of 8% in the number of sorties recommended for all 3 of the 
Major Tasks, the recommendation for live sorties remained unchanged.  The 
indication being that the sample believed that training for the highest threat 
levels was served effectively by an increase in the synthetic proportions.  Thus 
complexity does affect the LOSB. 
4.20 TRIAL PANDORA’S DIAMOND SUMMARY 
Trial PANDORA’S DIAMOND has sought to provide evidence for the 
immediate exploitation of synthetics within the training mix based on opinion 
from an informed audience.  The correlation between variables and the themes 
could be used to target simulation towards pilots of particular experience (age 
or flying hours) or alternatively alter the manner in which the simulators are 
used (using 4-ship simulation sorties rather than 2-ship).   The trial has gone 
further and determined the Force’s subjective view on the Live-Option-Synthetic 
Balance that exists for the present simulation systems at each of the Combat 
Ready levels.  Finally the trial has determined the effect of concurrency on the 
utilisation of the simulator in a number of key areas at different CR levels in 
order to provide evidence as to the cost effectiveness of purchasing 
concurrency contracts in these areas. 
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Chapter 5.  Project JENX 
5.1 OVERVIEW 
The time taken to train a pilot to Multi Role Combat Ready (MR CR) in 
2014 was of the order of 11 months.  Given this starting point it can be shown 
(see section 5.4) that the entirety of a squadron’s effort is focused on training 
their replacements.  There cannot be any ‘excursionary skillset’ training (training 
to threats not included in MRCR) because the regular opportunity cannot 
mathematically exist.  The associated effect is to depress CR pilot numbers.  
Project JENX was a feasibility study that sought to determine if an OCU pilot 
could be trained to MR CR using lessons from the PANDORA’S series of trials, 
with particular interest in understanding the resource savings and effect on 
training time for the Combat Ready syllabus should a targeted synthetic training 
syllabus be introduced.  As a secondary objective the project was intended to 
understand any deficiencies in the ability to replicate Combat Ready Training.  
Unlike the trials, however, the focus was not on the individual being trained but 
the feasibility of the syllabus and the ability of the squadron to support this 
training regime. From the outset it was intended that JENX would utilise only a 
single pilot but by completion of the trial a total of 3 personnel had been 
assigned to, and completed, the syllabus. 
5.2 KEY LITERATURE REVIEW DIRECTION 
In 1991 Houck (Houck et al. 1991) provided the initial assessment of 
areas where simulation provided better training than live flying, this was further 
expanded in 2006 by Portrey’s work (Portrey et al. 2006).  Trials PANDORA’S 
BUZZARD and DIAMOND led on to demonstrate the application of this work in 
the context of Typhoon training, highlighting the sizable contribution simulation 
can make to training of the combat pilot.  In contrast, however, there has been 
little work on the benefits of simulation with respect to resources employed.  
This is largely due to the nature of the experimentation carried out to date; part-
task assessments, use of non-front-line aircraft and prohibitive costs.  This work 
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is particularly relevant given the amount of research focusing on financial 
implications (Schank et al., 2002; Harper and Hillier, 2007; Kruzins, 2008; Wells 
et al., 2009), the project therefore blends the tactical pilot and operation 
commander’s interests on capability with the financial need to provide savings 
and, through a determining of resources employed, allows an understanding of 
capacity when employing this capability.  
5.3 AIMS 
The third theme of the primary research question was focused on the 
ability to pool resources in order to conduct simulation for CR training (the 
section of training conducted immediately after joining the front-line from the 
OCU).  The objectives were: 
a. Objective 1.  Construct and demonstrate proof of concept of a CR 
work-up syllabus that minimises the resource input of the front-line 
squadrons.  Any trainees used must pass their CR test sortie.    
b. Objective 2.  Determine the levels of resources required to 
conduct this syllabus and any resource savings made by its 
methodology. 
c. Objective 3.  Determine if the resources available are sufficient to 
employ this syllabus across all CR work-up pilots. 
5.4 ISSUE 
Given that tour lengths are 2.5 years and a front-line squadron has 18 
pilots, an average of 7 pilots will be replaced per year.  Assuming the 
replacement pilots will be delivered for training at equally spaced intervals there 
will be 5 of the 18 pilots on CR work-up at any one time.  Of the 13 CR pilots 
that remain to train them 6 will be on diversions (1 in the Falklands Islands, 2 on 
leave, 1 course, 1 QRA, 1 QRA stand down).  Thus the 5 CR work-up pilots 
have a total of 7 qualified pilots available to instruct them. The ratio of instructor 
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to student is 1:1 leaving 2 qualified pilots to run the positions of Authorisers 
Desk and Duty Executive. 
Accepting that the most complex sortie is the graduation Tactical Check, 
conducted once every 6-8 weeks, it follows that a squadron must be operating 
at or below this level whilst training their replacements.  Thus a squadron’s 
capability is limited by the time to achieve CR for its new pilots. 
Investigation of the logbooks for all the Multi-Role Combat Ready pilots 
(n=24) at RAF Coningsby found the time taken to achieve the qualification after 
arrival on the front line ranged between 220 and 459 days (95% CI) with a 
median of 328 days.  
 
Figure 5-1.  Time to Achieve Multi Role Combat Ready (Days).  
Given this starting point it has been shown that the entirety of a 
squadron’s effort is focused on training their replacements.  There cannot be 
any ‘excursionary skillset’ (high level and complex threat) training because the 
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regular opportunity cannot mathematically exist.  The associated affect is to 
depress Combat Ready pilot numbers.  
Project JENX intended to reduce the CR time to a maximum of 12 weeks, 
allowing the training time and assets returned to be used to increase Typhoon 
Force capability, capacity and efficiency. 
5.5 PROJECT METHOD 
Reduction in the JENX syllabus’ CR timeline was to be achieved not 
through truncating the present syllabus but by porting those sorties that the 
simulator was capable of replicating into the synthetic domain6.  The targeted 
use of simulation was intended to increase throughput by harnessing the 
following synthetic advantages:   
a. Configurable.  Numbers, replication and availability of radar 
equipped red air and Surface to Air Missiles (SAMs).  Ensuring the 
trainees are always met with realistic enemy numbers of aircraft with 
correct numbers of Self Protection Jamming Pods and flight envelopes 
that are similar to the real aircraft.  Additionally, environmental control of 
weather and light levels was possible in the simulator, with night sorties 
intended to be conducted without altering shift patterns or working days; 
sortie completion rates would also be unaffected by poor weather or 
weather could be artificially made worse to allow mandatory instrument 
approaches to be flown. 
b. Availability.  Consistent, forecast-able availability of devices.  In 
contrast to the live flying that utilises 6 aircraft to generate 18 hours of 
training per day the simulators utilise 4 devices to achieve 35 hours.  
This allows reliable planning out to a realistic 4 week horizon which, 
allied to the present squadron manning tools, allows the correct 
allocation of trainee and student at least 2 weeks in advance.   
                                            
6 Identified through Trials PANDORA’S BUZZARD and PANDORA’S DIAMOND. 
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c. Serviceability.  The simulator devices in use produce a 
consistent 10% failure rate, allowing mitigation to be built into the plan. 
The aircraft rate, however, was never consistent and was affected by 
issues of weather and spares availability.  The effect of poor 
serviceability in the live environment is also greater with both the trainee 
and instructor’s aircraft required to be serviceable as a minimum, with 
the other two formation members being a desirable requirement.  In the 
simulator, however, it is possible to substitute a failed device with a 
computer generated entity, driven from the operating station.  In such a 
manner the trainee is much less affected by any serviceability issues 
within their formation. 
d. Location. Simulation gives the ability to determine fighting 
location and train tofor forthcoming exercises.  Thus increasing the 
student’s exposure to different areas of the UK and overseas. This 
allows the CR pilot to have a working knowledge, as they graduate, of 
Areas of Operation (AOs) the rest of their sqn will have experienced. 
Compared to the standard syllabus LSB ratio of 66:34 the Project JENX 
Syllabus sought to utilise a LSB ratio of 30:70 which equates to approximately 
21 live hours, although opportunity existed to fly outside the syllabus sorties. 
The syllabus was written to utilise no more than 4 of the 6 simulator slots 
allocated to each front-line squadron per day.  For the initial trainee the 
supporting qualified pilot acting as instructor was intended to be the same for 
every sortie, so as to maximise feedback.  They were programmed to achieve 
approximately 15 simulator sorties per month and these were intended to be 
aligned to the supporting pilot’s annual task requirements (see Trial 
PANDORA’S DIAMOND)  and the need to achieve 3 non-emergency based 
simulators per month. 
The syllabus, included in Appendix K, provides the laydown of the sorties 
and briefs by day.  Given the serviceability of the simulator this permitted 
programmers to bid for simulation assets 2 weeks or more in advance.  It 
should be noted that provision was made for a catch-up simulator each Friday 
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afternoon, which if not used was recycled for squadron emergency simulators.  
A fundamental difference between the two methods of training was that, within 
the day-to-day programming, Project JENX was deliberately prevented from the 
cultural norm of ‘sucking’ pilots out of the simulator into live flight in the case of 
sickness or manpower shortages. These short-notice changes had been 
witnessed in the past to lead to poor training value in the live environment and 
the loss of a completed syllabus sortie in the synthetic.  In contrast Project 
JENX intended to maximise on the simulator’s availability and serviceability and 
by the inclusion of ‘catch-up ‘ sorties at the end of every week for the mitigation 
of any broken simulation devices the trainee would maintain the projected 
output date.  
The test week at the end of the syllabus was intended to provide 
confidence to both the command chain and the subject that the CR MR  
standard was able to be met.  As stated above, the sample size was too small 
to guarantee that all following subjects would pass, instead the project was 
intended to provide an understanding of resource usage with the result being 
indicative only. 
5.6 RESULTS 
The project commenced on 24 Oct 14 and used a single individual that 
exited the OCU during that same week.  His training was conducted in the UK 
with 3(F) Squadron owing to his assigned squadron XI(F) participating in an 
exercise in Turkey.  Access to large numbers of live assets was restricted by 
3(F)’s training needs, nevertheless by week 4 he had completed the Air 
Defence Qualification, which from the logbook evidence took a median average 
of 202 days for his predecessors, and was commencing the Multi Role portion 
of instruction.  The CR MR check ride was assessed completed with the Officer 
Commanding XI Squadron on 16 Jan 15 (Layden, 2015a), which was 12 
calendar weeks after commencement of the trial.  Allowing for the 2 week 
Christmas break this demonstrated that it was possible to complete the Project 
JENX syllabus in 10 weeks, to the Multi Role CR standard; in comparison the 
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same standard was being achieved by the standard methodology in 328 days 
(σ=196). 
The student pilot concerned passed his live MRCR sortie on his first 
attempt but it should be noted that despite all the Electronic Attack techniques 
being used by the red air only the techniques similar to the simulator made it to 
his side of the battlespace, thus not all techniques can be ratified as trained.  
Additionally the student had still to fly his live night test and night Air-to-Air 
Refuelling qualification (required for QRA) this is due to no live night phase 
being conducted during the time period and the simulator being unable to 
replicate air-to-air tanking of any sort. 
5.7 ANALYSIS 
Analysis of this project will take place in two parts firstly from the aspect 
of resource utilisation; and secondly the feedback from the single student will be 
considered in light of his performance and experience.  The necessary data for 
these comparisons are held within Project JENX Supporting Information 
(Appendix K) that details the resource calculator for Project JENX, with the 
standard course for comparison.  Additionally there is the comparison of 
resources saved.   
5.7.1 LIVE SYNTHETIC BALANCE   
Examination of Appendix K shows that Project JENX altered the Live Synthetic 
Balance (LSB) from 70:30 to 21:79.  This is important with respect to the RAF’s 
intended vision of an LSB of 50:50 as it demonstrates that the CR portion of 
Typhoon training can be completed ‘synthetically heavy’ and in doing so 
provides an opportunity to offset elements of training for which synthetics are 
not suitable or capacity in the simulator does not exist. 
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5.7.2 SAVINGS 
The Project JENX syllabus saves a total of between 68 and 131 Typhoon 
flying hours per student pilot (the range of values being the difference between 
completing the standard syllabus using the stated resources or the minimum 
permitted).  Using a nominal figure of 100 hours saved per pilot this can be 
represented in terms of marginal costs at £205,000 or the full cost capitalisation 
rate of £9,200,000 per pilot7. 
Financial representation has little immediate meaning at the tactical level, 
instead it may be more beneficial to represent this as engineering man hours 
saved.  Present engineering man hours per flight hour stand at 13 and thus 
(assuming the nominal course saving of 100 hours) the Project JENX syllabus 
represents a reduction of 1300 engineering man hours.  This saving can be 
reinvested back into either higher level training of front-line pilots or into ‘softer’ 
considerations such as leave, Adventurous Training or Force Development, all 
of which may go forward to tackling the increasing numbers of personnel 
seeking to leave the service prior to the end of their contract (MOD, 2016). 
The number of DA20 and Hawk hours saved (up to 28 and 41 
respectively) offers the opportunity for the savings to be repositioned to provide 
increased numbers of red air available to MRCR qualified pilots; allowing a 
numerically superior and more complex threat to be replicated. 
5.7.3 SIMULATION ASSETS REQUIRED  
An increase of 70 simulator hours was required to train under Project 
Jenx, bringing the total to 102 hours, equating to an extra 54 simulator slots that 
constructed an extra 24 missions.  These slots were incorporated within the 
normal 4-6 slots allocated to front-line squadrons per day.  No further simulator 
slots were used over and above the normal allocation and the Squadron still 
managed to maintain the 75:25 LSB directed, CR pilots being placed within 
                                            
7 Air Command HQ, RAF Typhoon Capitation Rates (High Wycombe: Royal Air Force 2012). 
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these missions as supporting crews.  This demonstrates that capacity to train 2 
pilots simultaneously, 1 on each of the front-line squadrons, exists at RAF 
Coningsby within existing resources.  However, as the OCU currently trains 24 
pilots a year, of which half are assigned to Coningsby squadrons, there would 
be a need to train 3 pilots per quarter.  This is in excess of current capability 
and whilst it would be possible to make efficiency savings within the syllabus, 
e.g. training 2 trainee within the same mission, there would still be a required 
uptake in simulation capacity or a corresponding decrease in the demand from 
the OCU.  Finally any increase above the recommended 2 pilots per quarter 
would affect the present 75:25 LSB on the front-line as more support pilots 
would be required to fly alongside the trainees in their synthetic sorties.  
5.7.4 STUDENT FEEDBACK AND QUALITATIVE ASSESSMENT  
Unedited feedback from the student pilot is held at Appendix K.  Overall 
the student believed the course to be well planned and left him thoroughly 
prepared at the end of each phase.  The tactical transition was easier than 
expected and the speed of the course had left him firmly ahead of his peers.  
Nevertheless there were areas of improvement: 
 The long days at the beginning of the course where the subject was 
being asked to fly and simulated missions over and above the syllabus 
requirement.  This detracted from the learning environment and made the 
student poorly prepared for the next event.  These additional sorties were 
external to the syllabus. 
 
 The reduction in priority during the Christmas run-up due to QRA 
currency considerations removed his available live-flight sorties, this was 
to affect g-tolerance when restarting post the Christmas break.  However, 
this lack of priority reduced the sorties being conducted and indicates that 
in normal periods the training may be conducted more quickly.  
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 The Electronic Attack (EA) capabilities in the simulator are limited to a 
couple of techniques with the more advanced having to be intensively 
manipulated by the operators.  EA exposure is therefore skewed towards 
certain techniques. 
 
 The Laser Designation Pod differs from the aircraft, although the airborne 
re-familiarisation took only a couple of minutes.  This may be longer for 
ab-initio pilots but is unlikely to be anything longer than a single sortie.  
 
 An additional live sortie could have been included for ab-initio pilots 
during weeks 5 and 6 to ensure they remain current in the live 
environment. 
5.8 CONCLUSIONS 
Project JENX sought a new way of achieving CR in a shorter timescale 
and initial indications show the syllabus to be feasible although greater numbers 
are required to increase sample size.  Nevertheless the savings attributable to 
the new methodology are considerable: ~100 flying hours per trainee, a 
consequent reduction in the engineering burden of 1300 hours per trainee, 
increase in front-line capability and capacity and allow CR work ups to continue 
during times of high fleet stress such as war or during deployment and recovery 
to exercises.  Finally, the new syllabus will ensure a pilot spends approximately 
9 months more of their tour being productive. 
Objective 1.  Construct and demonstrate proof of concept of a CR work-up 
syllabus that minimises the resource input of the front-line squadrons.  Any 
trainees used must pass their CR test sortie. 
 Proof of concept completed and tested with trainee passing the relevant 
tests.  Syllabus held in Appendix K. 
Objective 2.  Determine the levels of resources required to conduct this 
syllabus and any resource savings made by its methodology. 
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 Resource requirements per syllabus trainee held at Appendix K.  Savings 
of live flying hours are between 131 and 68  hours per trainee undergoing the 
course, flying hours saved from the DA20 (Red Air) contractor are between 3 
and 28.  The increase in simulation hours required is between 75 and 66.  
Objective 3.  Determine if the resources available are sufficient to 
employ this syllabus across all CR work-up pilots. 
Resource exists to train 8 of the 12 pilots output by the OCU and 
assigned to RAF Coningsby.  Increasing this number requires both an 
acceptance of a different LSB allocation to the front line, and an increase in 
synthetic capacity or a reduction in the OCU synthetic demand.  Given that this 
present LSB (75:25) mirrors the minimum recommended by Trial PANDORA’S 
DIAMOND there is evidence to suggest that temporary synthetic increases 
would be accepted from a cultural viewpoint. 
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Chapter 6.  DISCUSSION 
 This thesis began by breaking down the research question through a 
lens of 3 themes; culture, risk and performance, correspondingly those themes 
were broken down into objectives that underpinned each of the 3 research 
avenues.  This approach was taken for two key reasons.  Firstly, it was 
important that this research should be undertaken within a practical context, 
siding with Waag (1991, p4) rather than the quasi-transfer methodology 
preferred by others, this would allow access to the rare resources but more 
importantly ensure the standards on the trial were identical to those the RAF 
demanded of their current students rather than roughly translated 
approximations that were taken into a sterile experiment that would have been 
easy to dismiss by the user community.  The method allowed peers a credible 
assessment of risk to life, risk to standards and risk to image (through failure). 
Secondly, the themed approach was taken to complement the strengths and 
weaknesses of each of the other trials.  As an example, the small sample size 
of Trial PANDORA’S BUZZARD, whilst equal to the largest sample size of any 
contemporary trial and despite being more comprehensive in terms of tasks, 
skillsets and length, did still use only 8 trainee pilots.  This, in turn, limited the 
fidelity of the answers that could be extracted from the results; the use of an all 
or nothing approach to recommendations in terms of trainee test ride results led 
to a lack of recommendation for the Combat phase.  The inclusion of collective 
informed opinion from Trial PANDORAS DIAMOND allowed this finding to be 
reinforced together, the confidence in the recommendation is increased.  This 
logic also reinforces the recommendation for the inclusion of the Counter Air 
phase as well as supporting the work on resources throughout all three trials. 
 The work has contributed to new knowledge in a number of areas.  The 
trial to train OCU pilots in the simulator and test in live flight provided a 
European first: first solo from simulation for a front-line combat aircraft. Whilst 
this is supported in concept by the zero-flight-time airline training identified 
within the literature review it had not been thought transferable due to 
performance capabilities of modern fighter aircraft.  This practical demonstration 
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that knowledge acquired solely in the simulator could be translated into a valid 
performance in live flight challenges the RAF’s standard methodology of using 
simulation simply to rehearse the next airborne sortie.  This was reinforced in 
the successful Counter Air phase and to a lesser degree in the trial to train an 
OCU graduate to Multi Role Combat Ready and has already led to a wholesale 
rewrite of the OCU syllabus.  An independent impression of the overall effect of 
the trial on the Typhoon Operational Conversion Unit is given by the Officer 
Commanding 29 Squadron in Appendix L. 
 The examination of synthetic balance within the front-line training based 
on collective opinion and the Force headquarters tasks requirement derived 
from the Mission Essential Competencies (Symons, France and Bell, 2006; 
Dstl, 2009) led to the LOSB (Live, Option, Synthetic Balance) method of 
representation and the first ever mapping of the pilot’s annual task by training 
environment and complexity level.  This offers the commander freedom to 
balance the Force’s training, when resources are stressed, by altering the 
proportion undertaken in the simulator, all within culturally-accepted norms – 
that norm being approximately 50% conducted in a live environment, 25% in a 
synthetic and 25% available to be done in either.  In this light it can be seen that 
the RAF’s oft quoted 50:50 LSB ambition is achievable in the opinion of the 
Typhoon force at RAF Coningsby but it would be at the very limit of their 
recommendations and thus would be unlikely to be accepted on a permanent 
basis unless there was a cultural shift towards more acceptance of simulation. 
The trials also produced the first attempt within the UK at understanding 
the fighter community’s acceptance levels of simulation which, for both 
operating bases (Coningsby and Lossiemouth), was assessed as being only 
marginally positive.  This piece of work is linked to the other trials through the 
theme of culture as it attempts to identify factors and areas of the pilot 
population that would accept more simulation in order that the synthetic assets 
may be targeted more efficiently.  Producing the surprising observation that the 
squadron a pilot was assigned to had an effect was accompanied by a similarly 
unexpected outcome of a lack of evidence to support the view that younger 
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pilots were more accepting of simulation.  The first ever RAF investigation into 
the effect of threat complexity on training environment would also allow the 
correct targeting of synthetic resources; finding the most complex level of threat 
being recommended for more simulation over the lowest threat level. 
 The trial to reduce time to Multi-Role Combat Ready through heavy 
synthetic use, informed by the preceding trials, was the first of its type within the 
5-nation Eurofighter community and demonstrated the effect of using synthetic 
strength to the maximum, namely CAST - Configurability, Availability and 
Serviceability to achieve speed or Throughput numbers.  This methodology led 
to a reversal of the LSB, just as it had done in Trial PANDORA’S BUZZARD, 
and laid down a process-based syllabus that would output a trainee in a 
consistent time in between squadron deployments that would otherwise 
elongate this process.  Whilst there are measureable cost savings associated 
with this work the intent was to generate equally-well trained pilots whilst 
creating spare capacity that could be reinvested into higher complexity training 
or alternatively reduce the burden on the Typhoon Force manpower by 
increasing leave, adventurous training or force development opportunities.   
 Not all elements of the trials have been successful but the observations 
from failure have led to a more informed position on the limitations of synthetics.  
The non-recommendation of the combat phase of Trial PANDORA’S BUZZARD 
owing to slow counters to the enemy manoeuvres, was identified as down to 
weaknesses of the visuals.  Despite the failure, use of the simulator for 
conceptual training in the combat role was recognised, supporting the earliest of 
studies in the field (Pohlman and Reed, 1978; Payne, 1982).    Even within the 
Counter Air phase that was recommended there were unexpected difficulties 
again associated with the visuals of the simulator, namely the effect of intrusive 
into-sun conditions and dissimilar representation of formation members 
between environments, both of which were to have a debilitating effect on the 
student’s workcycle.  This was further supported on a larger scale in the QRA 
phase that saw the inability of the visuals and radar software to represent real-
world conditions found in the phase.  These observations across a number of 
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skillsets would have been unlikely to have been found in the increasingly 
popular (and cheaper) quasi-transfer trial and therefore they lend weight to the 
view of Bell & Waag (1998) that witnessing transfer to training within live flight is 
the only measure of establishing simulation effectiveness. 
This research, therefore, has endeavoured to envelop the issue from 
three differing viewpoints and in doing so has led to new knowledge that has 
been employed by the peer community; re-issuing of the OCU and Combat 
Ready Syllabus (Layden, 2015b) and increased use of the synthetic assets up 
from 37% usage rate at the start of the research to 100% for FY 2015/16 (taken 
from Force Headquarters figures 23 Jul 16).  Additionally the work has informed 
the future Typhoon simulation vision (Pemberton, 2014), leading to an 
investment in synthetics that will enhance collective training through the 
connection of the Air Battlespace Training Centre at RAF Waddington to new 
Typhoon simulators at the two bases.  This will allow a distributed network that 
will promote training in the largest and most complicated environments with the 
UKs most important allies. 
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Chapter 7.  CONCLUSIONS 
 The answer to the research question  
“ What is the maximum extent to which pilots of the Eurofighter 
Typhoon can incorporate synthetic training? ” 
has been demonstrated to be complex; bounded by cultural, resource 
and training location considerations. Broadly speaking increasing simulation 
from the lowest LSB of 75:25 on the front line will meet a cultural hurdle at 
50:50 as well as a resource barrier for those training on the OCU.  Correlations 
have been found between age, the manner in which simulation is used and the 
acceptance of simulation as a training environment that may offer insight as to 
where to target further increases. Nevertheless, increasing simulation past this 
point (50:50) is possible, with the maximum LSB achieved being 21:79 for the 
Multi-Role Combat Ready syllabus.  However, heavy synthetic use requires 
targeting to particular simulators, requiring an understanding of their 
weaknesses and, strengths and equally importantly, knowledge of previous 
failings. Only in this manner can targeting simulation for heavy use within a 
syllabus be successful.  
7.1 ACHIEVEMENTS 
The aims of the research were to understand the limits of synthetics in 
terms of both training and culture as well as determining if it was resources that 
limited their use (SQ1,2 and 3).  The work has achieved these aims and through 
the provision and delivery to Typhoon Force Headquarters of the first tested 
fully synthetic phases of Typhoon flight training, the first attempt to incorporate 
culture into longer term planning (LOSB equations of Section 4.17.2) and a 
conceptually tested training program, with resource assessment, to Combat 
Ready (Project JENX).  In reaching these milestones the work has also 
achieved the first European first solo from simulation for a front line combat 
aircraft without the use of surrogate aircraft or use of the dedicated twin seat 
  
204 
trainer.  It is anticipated that when viewed as a whole these pieces of new 
knowledge will help inform the RAF with the creation of a ‘single seat OCU’ 
syllabus when the twin seat aircraft begin to be phased out in a few years time, 
as well as better planning and use of assets in the present day.  Indeed the 
affect on the incorporation into the OCU of lessons already identified has led to 
the incorporation of the multi-role syllabus on to the OCU, whilst using extant 
resource, and a reduction of training time from 4 months to 4 weeks.  The LSB 
has moved from 1:1 to 1:3 and the simulator usage has increased from less 
than 50% to over 95% (Statement of Officer Commanding 29 Sqn Typhoon 
OCU - Appendix L) 
7.2 FURTHER WORK 
 Further work in this area should be centred around the issues of 
implementation; as simulation use increases resources in the live and synthetic 
domains will have to be managed to ensure all pilots receive training 
commensurate with their experience.  As an example, extremely poor weather 
might preclude all but the most experienced going live flying whilst the less 
experience trainees stay on the ground without their valuable instructors 
available to take them into the simulator.  Alternatively poor serviceability of 
aircraft might force the Squadron to choose between a pilot getting their live 
flying currency or participating in a simulator that will progress a trainee further 
down the syllabus.   Further work examining the ability to inject simulation into 
live flight will allow these issues to be solved together, permitting formations 
split between the simulator and live flight to undertake simultaneous training no 
matter which domain they are in.   The work should consider the synthetic 
replication of red air to those flying in the live environment, this would negate 
the need to choose between using valuable Typhoons or unrepresentative 
Hawk aircraft in day-to-day training.  A final area to examine is the possibility of 
embedding synthetics further back in the training pipeline.  Formations of 
trainees undergoing Advanced Fast Jet Training as part of larger mixed 
packages of Hawk and Typhoon aircraft would enhance training for all; giving 
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Typhoon pilots the escort aircraft they require for certain skillsets and the Hawk 
pilots an understanding of how to operate in larger formations. 
The research has exposed some of the weaker areas of simulation, 
particularly the visuals, which could be used to progress an understanding of 
the fidelity required to ensure the skillsets do transfer into live flight.  An area 
not covered during the synthetic training was the physiological effect of a heavy 
synthetic training regime. Might the performance of the students have been 
improved with physical coaching? Were the student’s performances in the first 
live flights of each phase reduced due to he/she having to fight unanticipated 
physical demands? Does a highly synthetic syllabus increase the likelihood of 
neck injuries in live flight or can they be reduced through training and monitoring 
of head position in the simulator? 
In the longer term this work can be incorporated within the developing 
realm of Live Virtual Constructive (LVC) synthetics: the injection of false (known 
as constructed) entities onto the displays and vision of the aircraft and pilot.  
These developments will allow simulation and live flight training to work together 
in a more symbiotic relationship to reduce resource use, improve output 
standards and increase the performance of students.  
7.3 SUMMARY 
 In summary synthetic training is an underused resource that has the 
ability to reduce pressure on Typhoon resources and the potential to alter the 
manner in which air forces train, across the globe.  Only through the continuous 
challenge of the status quo, intelligent implementation and a symbiotic 
relationship between industry and the military will this potential be realised.  
 
 
  
206 
  
207 
REFERENCES 
29 Squadron (2011a) ‘Typhoon Operational Conversion Syllabus 2011’. RAF 
Coningsby: Typhoon Force HQ, (20111027–OPCON_2011_Syllabus_AL0–U). 
29 Squadron (2011b) ‘White Ticket Calculation - Hours and Instructors 
Required’. RAF Coningsby: Typhoon Force HQ, (20100403–FY1112 White ticket QPI 
plus Hrs). 
Air Staff (2010) ‘Air Staff Comment RE SDSR Sim Study’. RAF High Wycombe: 
Royal Air Force. 
Alexander, A. L., Brunye, T., Sidman, J. and Weil, S. A. (2005) From Gaming to 
Training: A review of Studies on Fidelity, Immersion, Presence, and Buy-in and Their 
Effects on Transfer in PC Based Simulations and Games. Available at: 
http://www.aptima.com/publications/2005_Alexander_Brunye_Sidman_Weil.pdf 
(Accessed: 15 January 2014). 
Anderson, B., Walls, K. and Read, P. (2011) LiveWIRE - Post Trial Report. 
Policy and Capability Studies, Portsdown West, Portsdown Hill Road, Fareham, PO17 
6AD: DSTL. 
Atkins, R. J., Lansdowne, A. T. G., Pfister, P. H. and Provost, S. C. (2002) 
‘Conversion between control mechanisms in simulated flight: an ab initio quasi-transfer 
study’, Australian Journal of Psychology, 54(3), pp. 144–149. 
Ausink, J. A., Taylor, W. W., Bigelow, J. H. and Brancato, K. (2011) Investment 
Strategies for Improving Fifth-Generation Fighter Training. 1776 Main Street, PO Box 
2138, Santa Monica, CA, USA: RAND Corporation. Available at: http://www.rand.org. 
Bacchetti, P. (2010) ‘Current Sample Size Conventions: Flaws, Harms and 
Alternatives’, BMC Medicine, 8(17), p. 17. doi: 10.1186/1741-7015-8-17. 
Bacchetti, P., McCulloch, C. E. and Segal, M. R. (2008) ‘Simple, Defensible 
Sample Sizes Based on Cost Efficiency’, Biometrics, 64(2), pp. 577–594. 
Baldwin, B. T. (2008) Modified Flexible RAP: Linking Competencies and 
Experiences into Fighter Training and Readiness. Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama: 
  
208 
US Air Command and Staff College, Air University. 
Bell, H. H. and Waag, W. L. (1998) ‘Evaluating the Effectiveness of Flight 
Simulators for Training Combat Skills: A Review’, The International Journal of Aviation 
Psychology, 8(3), pp. 223–242. doi: 10.1207/s15327108ijap0803_4. 
Blyth, J. (2015) ‘Exploring the Balance of Live and Synthetic Training for Military 
Pilot Courses’, MSc Thesis. Cranfield University. 
Bock, T. and Sergeant, J. (2002) ‘Small Sample Market Research’, International 
Journal of Market Research, 44(Collins 2000), p. 235. 
Bryman, A. (2008) Social Research Methods. Oxford University Press. 
CAA (2012) FSTD User Approvals. Available at: 
http://ecfr.gpoaccess.gov/cgi/t/text/text-idx?type=simple (Accessed: 5 June 2013). 
Chambers, M., Chong, M., Daniels, C., Davies-Knapp, G., Abraham-Araya, H. 
and Jackson, B. (2011) Management of the Typhoon Project - Report by the National 
Audit Office. London, UK: National Audit Office. 
CINC-Air (2009) Minimum Safe and Sustainable CFT (Live Crew Flying Task) 
for Fast Jet Operations. MoD: RAF. 
D’Alessandro, N. (2008) Transference of PC-based simulation to mission 
training, Indian Aviation News. InSite Solutions. Available at: 
net/allimages/AlessandroPaper. pdf (Accessed: 20 August 2011). 
Dennis, K. a. and Harris, D. (1998) ‘Computer-Based Simulation as an Adjunct 
to Ab Initio Flight Training’, The International Journal of Aviation Psychology, 8(3), pp. 
261–276. doi: 10.1207/s15327108ijap0803_6. 
Dstl (2009) ‘Typhoon Mission Essential Competencies Summary Report’, DSTL 
Report. Farnborough, (DSTL No. 07-08-09). 
Etherington, T. (2012) ‘RAF Typhoon Capitation Rates’, FOI Response. High 
Wycombe: Royal Air Force, (14-2-2012-155233–7). 
FAA (2012) FAA Regulations, Advanced Simulation Training. Available at: 
http://ecfr.gpoaccess.gov/cgi/t/text/text-idx?type=simple (Accessed: 12 December 
  
209 
2012). 
Frazer-Nash (2010) ‘Simulation Assessment for the RAF’, Frazer-Nash Report. 
Stonebridge House, Dorking Business Park, Dorking, Surrey, RH4 1HJ: Fraser Nash 
Consultancy, (FNC 37508/36635R). 
Gray, T. H. and Fuller, R. R. (1977) ‘Effects of Simulator Training and Platform 
Motion on Air-to-Surface Weapons Delivery Training’, AFHRL Report. Brooks Air Force 
Base: Air Force Human Resource Laboratory, (AFHRL-TR-77-29). 
Hansard (2010) Parliamentary Answers to Question by Peter Luff to Angus 
Robertson. Available at: 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201011/cmhansrd/cm100914/text/100914
w0001.htm (Accessed: 29 August 2011). 
Hansard (2011) Evidence to Public Accounts Committee - MOD: Typhoon. 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201011/cmselect/cmpubacc/uc860-
i/uc86001.htm. Available at: 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201011/cmselect/cmpubacc/uc860-
i/uc86001.htm (Accessed: 29 August 2011). 
Harper, C. N. A. and Hillier, S. J. A. C. (2007) ‘RAF Air Synthetic Training 
Strategy’, RAF Internal Paper. Royal Air Force, (ID N/A). 
Houck, M. R., Thomas, G. S. and Bell, H. H. (1991) ‘Training Evaluation of the 
F-15 Advanced Air Combat Simulation’, ATRL Report. Williams Air Force Base, Ariz.: 
USAF, Armstrong Laboratory, Aircrew Training Research Division, (AL-TP-1991). 
JAA (2012) Aeroplane Flight Simulation Devices (Testing). Available at: 
http://www.jaa.nl/publications/jars/JAR-FSTD-A_sec1_0508.pdf (Accessed: 1 May 
2012). 
Jacobs, J. W., Prince, C., Hays, R. T. and Salas, E. (1990) ‘A Meta-Analysis of 
the Flight Simulator Training Research’, NTSC Report. Orlando, (No. NTSC-89-006). 
JTES (2009) MoD Strategy for Simulation. 20091214–MOD–Strategy–for 
Simulation–U. High Wycombe: Ministry of Defence. 
Kline, P. (2000) The Handbook of Psychological Testing. London: Routledge. 
  
210 
Kruzins, E. (2008) Defence Simulation Investment Reference Guide. 
Department of Defence, Russell Offices [R1-3-B065], Canberra, ACT 2600: Australian 
Department of Defence, Simulation Office. 
Laerd (2015a) ANOVA Assumptions. Available at: 
https://statistics.laerd.com/premium/spss/owa/one-way-anova-in-spss-7.php 
(Accessed: 30 December 2016). 
Laerd (2015b) Laerd Statistics. Available at: 
https://statistics.laerd.com/premium/istt/independent-t-test-in-spss-9.php (Accessed: 5 
December 2016). 
Laerd (2015c) One Way ANOVA Test, Laerd Statistics. Available at: 
https://statistics.laerd.com/premium/stata/owa/one-way-anova-in-stata.php (Accessed: 
30 December 2016). 
Laerd (2015d) Pearson Correlation. Available at: 
https://statistics.laerd.com/premium/spss/pc/pearson-correlation-in-spss.php 
(Accessed: 30 December 2016). 
Lard (2015) T-Tests Leard Statistics. Available at: 
https://statistics.laerd.com/premium/stata/pstt/paired-samples-t-test-in-stata-18.php 
(Accessed: 30 December 2016). 
Layden, C. (2015a) ‘Project Jenx - OCXI Assessment’, XI Sqn Report. RAF 
Coningsby, (20150126–Project Jenx–OCXI). 
Layden, C. (2015b) ‘XI(F) Squadron Recommendations Following Project Jenx’, 
XI Sqn Report. RAF Coningsby, (XI(F) Sqn/A7/Training-Air). 
Lockwood, G. A. (2006) ‘The Assessment of Current and Future Synthetics to 
Augment and Enhance Conventional Flying Within the Typhoon Force’, 29 Squadron 
QWIC Report. RAF Coningsby, (QWI_Cse1_Lockwood). 
Macchiarella, N. D., Brady, T. and Arban, P. K. (2005) ‘High Fidelity Flight 
Training Devices in the Training of Ab Initio Flight Students’, in The 24th Digital 
Avionics Systems Conference, 2005. DASC 2005., p. 5–B. doi: 
10.1109/DASC.2005.1563375. 
  
211 
Magnusson, S. (2002) ‘Similarities and Differences in Psychophysiological 
Reactions Between Simulated and Real Air-to-Ground Missions’, The International 
Journal of Aviation Psychology, 12(1), pp. 49–61. 
Marken, R. S., Taylor, W. W., Ausink, J. A., Hanser, L. M., Anderegg, C. R. and 
Wickman, L. (2007) Absorbing and Developing Qualified Fighter Pilots (The Role of the 
Advanced Simulator). 1776 Main Street, P.O. Box 2138, Santa Monica, USA: RAND 
Corporation. Available at: http://www.rand.org. 
McGrath, S. R. (2005) Leveraging DMO’s Hi-Tech Simulation Against the F-16 
Flying Training Gap. Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama: USAF Air Command and Staff 
College, Air University. Available at: 
https://www.afresearch.org/skins/RIMS/home.aspx. 
Minitab (2012a) ‘Minitab Help: Mallows Cp’, p. Help page: R-squared. Available 
at: www.minitab.com. 
Minitab (2012b) ‘Minitab Help: R-Squared’, p. Help page: R-squared. Available 
at: www.minitab.com. 
Minitab (2012c) ‘Minitab Statistical Software’. Available at: www.minitab.com. 
MoD (2006) United Kingdom Glossary of Joint and Multinational Terms and 
Definitions. Shrivenham, Swindon, Wiltshire, SN6 8RF: MOD - Development, Concepts 
and Doctrine Centre. 
MoD (2010a) ‘JSP 550 Military Aviation Policy, Regulations and Directives’. 
Ministry of Defence, p. R375.105.2. 
MoD (2010b) SDSR Study 9.2 Simulation and Training. London: Ministry of 
Defence. 
MOD (2016) UK armed forces monthly Service personnel statistics: May 2016. 
Available at: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/527838/
Monthly_service_personnel_statistics-May_2016.pdf (Accessed: 16 June 2016). 
Orlansky, J. and String, J. (1977) Cost-Effectiveness of Flight Simulators for 
Military Training. 400 Army-Navy Drive, Arlington, Virginia 22202: Institute for Defense 
  
212 
Analyses Science and Technology Division. 
Payne, T. A. (1982) Conducting Studies of Transfer of Learning: A Practical 
Guide. Williams Air Force Base, Ariz.: Air Force Human Resources Laboratory, 
Operations Training Division. 
Pemberton, G. (2014) Typhoon Force Synthetic Vision. RAF Coningsby: 
Typhoon Force HQ. 
Pohlman, L. D. and Reed, J. C. (1978) Air to Air combat skills: contribution of 
platform to initial testing. Williams Air Force Base, Arizona: US Air Force Human 
Resources Laboratory. 
Portrey, A. M., Keck, L. B. and Schreiber, B. T. (2006) Challenges in Developing 
a Performance Measurement System for the Global Virtual Environment. Human 
Effectiveness Directorate, Warfighting Readiness Research Division, 6030 South Kent 
Street, Mesa AZ, 85212-6061: Air Force Research Laboratory. 
Roscoe, S. N. and Williges, B. H. (1980) ‘Measurement of Transfer of Training’, 
in Aviation Psychology. 2121 South State Avenue, Ames, IA, 50014-8300, USA: Iowa 
State University Press, p. 182. 
Salas, E., Bowers, C. A. and Rhodenizer, L. (1998) ‘It Is Not How Much You 
Have But How You Use It; Toward a Rational Use of Simulation to Support Aviation 
Training.’, International Journal of Aviation Psychology, 8(3), pp. 197–208. doi: 
10.1207/s15327108ijap0803_2. 
Schank, J. F., Thie, H. J., Graff II, C. M., Beel, J., Sollinger, J., Graf, C. M., Beel, 
J. and Sollinger, J. (2002) ‘Finding the Right Balance. Simulator and Live Training for 
Navy Units’, RAND/MR-1441. Santa Monica, CA.: RAND Corporation. 
Schank, J. F., Thie, H. J., Yardley, R. J., Taylor, W. W. and Grammich, C. A. 
(2009) ‘RAAF F-35 Operational Pilot Training Live Training’. 
Seaman, K. (1999) Improving F15C Air Combat Training with Distributed 
Mission Training (DMT) Advanced Simulation, Training. Maxwell Air Force Base, 
Alabama: USAF Air Command and Staff College, Air University. Available at: 
https://www.afresearch.org/skins/RIMS/home.aspx. 
  
213 
Symons, S., France, M. and Bell, J. (2006) Linking Knowledge and Skills to 
Mission Essential Compency-Based Syllabus Development For Distributed Mission 
Operations. Warfighter Readiness Research Division, 6030 South Kent Street, Mesa, 
AZ: Human Effectiveness Directorate. 
Talleur, D. A., Taylor, H. L., Rantanen, E. and Bradshaw, G. L. (2003) ‘Personal 
Computer Aviation Training Devices: Their Effectiveness for Maintaining Instrument 
Currency’, The International Journal of Aviation Psychology, 13(4), p. 387. 
Thompson, M. (2013) Costly Flight Hours, Time.com. Available at: 
http://nation.time.com/2013/04/02/costly-flight-hours/ (Accessed: 15 July 2016). 
Vaden, E. a. and Hall, S. (2005) ‘The Effect of Simulator Platform Motion on 
Pilot Training Transfer: A Meta Analysis’, The International Journal of Aviation 
Psychology, 15(4), pp. 375–393. doi: 10.1207/s15327108ijap1504_5. 
Waag, W. (1991) The Value of Air Combat Simulation, Strong Opinions but Little 
Evidence. Air Force Research Laboratory/RHA, Warfighter Readiness Research 
Division, 6030 South Kent Street, Mesa, AZ, 85212-6061,USA: AFRL. 
Wells, R., Franklin, A., Holden, R., Anderson, R., Jarvis, S., Kirby, B. and 
Simmonds, G. (2009) The Optimal Blend for TornadoGR4 and Typhoon Post-OCU 
Aircrew Training in the Individual, Team and Collective Environments. RAF High 
Wycombe: Headquarters Air Command. 
Wikipedia (no date a) Coefficent of Determination, Wikipedia, The Free 
Encyclopedia. Available at: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Coefficient_of_determination 
(Accessed: 30 December 2016). 
Wikipedia (no date b) Cronbach’s Alpha. Available at: 
http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Cronbach%2527s_alpha&oldid=653002619 
(Accessed: 3 May 2015). 
de Winter, J. C. F., Dodou, D. and Mulder, M. (2012) ‘Training Effectiveness of 
Whole Body Flight Simulator Motion: A Comprehensive Meta-Analysis’, The 
International Journal of Aviation Psychology, 22(2), pp. 164–183. doi: 
10.1080/10508414.2012.663247. 
Wong, K. (2010) ‘Study Report for Phase 1 of ASTA TTF and ABTC Networked 
  
214 
Trial - Trial DevASTAtor’, QINETIQ/10/01413. Farnborough: QinetiQ. 
 
  
A-1 
Appendix A SRF Supporting Documents 
 
Table Apx A-1. Example of Grading Criteria for Overall Mark 
 
 
Figure Apx A-1.  Example of Task Grading Criteria 
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Appendix B Descriptive Statistics for the Population 
B.1 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS: IRT STD CSE  
 
Variable      N  N*   Mean  SE Mean  StDev  Minimum  Median  Maximum  Skewness 
IRT Std Cse  56   1  3.732    0.100  0.751    1.000   4.000    5.000     -0.85 
 
Variable     Kurtosis 
IRT Std Cse      2.26 
 
Figure Apx B-1.  Histogram of IRT Std Cse Results 
B.2 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS: BFM STD CSE  
 
Variable      N  N*   Mean  SE Mean  StDev  Minimum  Median  Maximum  Skewness 
BFM Std Cse  57   0  3.404    0.106  0.799    1.000   4.000    4.000     -1.31 
 
Variable     Kurtosis 
BFM Std Cse      1.26 
  
B-2 
 
Figure Apx B-2.  Histogram of BFM Cse Results 
B.3 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS: CA STD CSE  
 
Variable     N  N*   Mean  SE Mean  StDev  Minimum  Median  Maximum  Skewness 
CA Std Cse  57   0  3.842    0.119  0.902    0.000   4.000    5.000     -1.64 
 
Variable    Kurtosis 
CA Std Cse      5.08 
 
Figure Apx B-3.  Histogram of Counter Air Std Cse Results 
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B.4 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS: LOW SLOW STD CSE  
 
Variable           N  N*   Mean  SE Mean  StDev  Minimum  Median  Maximum 
Low Slow Std Cse  30  27  3.733    0.117  0.640    2.000   4.000    5.000 
 
Variable          Skewness  Kurtosis 
Low Slow Std Cse     -0.56      0.86 
 
Figure Apx B-4.  Histogram of QRA Low Slow Std Cse 
B.5 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS: 3 PHASE SUM  
 
Variable      N  N*    Mean  SE Mean  StDev  Minimum  Median  Maximum  
Skewness 
3 Phase Sum  57   0  10.912    0.223  1.683    5.000  11.000   13.000     -
1.26 
 
Variable     Kurtosis 
3 Phase Sum      2.22 
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Figure Apx B-5.  Histogram of 3 Phase Sum 
B.6 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS: 4 PHASE SUM  
 
Variable      N  N*    Mean  SE Mean  StDev  Minimum  Median  Maximum  
Skewness 
4 Phase Sum  30   0  14.867    0.361  1.978    8.000  15.000   17.000     -
1.43 
 
Variable     Kurtosis 
4 Phase Sum      3.58 
 
Figure Apx B-6.  Histogram of 4 Phase Sum 
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Appendix C Risk Register Example 
Table Apx C-1.  Example Risk Register 
ID Date Entered Risk Mitigation 
 
Likeness Seriousness 
1 06/01/2011 Malfunction during 
take off roll 
Student completes emergency CTs 
and pre solo emerg sim. Level of 
knowledge is same as present 
student. 
 
Low 
 
 
 
Medium 
 
 
 
2 06/01/2011 Heavy landing due 
to poor alpha 
Control 
 
Technique will underline trend of 
alpha at 100' 
Medium Low 
3 08/01/2011 SP G-LOCs during 
g- awareness 
SP will be instructed to carry out g 
experience - a controlled pull up to 
but not exceeding 5g. 
This will specifically look for pressure 
in mask, LSJ and FAGTS. 
 
Low High 
 
 
 
4 08/01/2011 Heavy landing 
caused by lack of 
simulator ability to 
replicate 
ground rush. 
Technique taught does not use sense 
of ground rush. Landing technique is 
flown using 'numbers'. 
 
 
Low Low 
5 11/01/2011 Aircraft damaged in 
crosswind 
landing. 
 
Solo cross wind minima limited to 10 
kts across. SP will conduct synthetic 
landings of up to 15 kts. 
Low Medium 
6 11/01/2011 Student unable to 
generate a 
safe finals approach 
from finals turn. 
If a safe touch and go has not been 
flown by div fuel + 400. SP will 
conduct short pattern 
GCA to land. 
Low Medium 
7 11/01/2011 Incident due to error 
in SP 
checks. 
SP is monitored by IP throughout 
synthetic phase. Sorties are end to 
end ie start up to shutdown. 
Risk is same as present methodology. 
Low 
 
Medium 
8 06/01/2011 Student becomes 
lost during nav 
Route 
ATC/ div airfields / Lon mil will be 
briefed on nature of solo. 
SP receives nav gndschl and practice 
exercises. SP briefed on use of guard 
/ Buzzard. Chase ac available for first 
solo. 
Low Low 
9 06/01/2011 Poor alpha control 
due to overly 
stable flight model 
and poor gust 
modelling leading to 
heavy 
landing. 
IP will manually vary wind by +_ 3kts 
to achieve more realistic atmospheric 
variation. 
Medium Low 
10 07/01/2011 Malfunction 
requiring need to 
Divert 
Synthetic sorties include emergency 
handling, use of buzzard, frequency 
entry and practice diversions 
Chase ac available to lead to 
diversion. 
Low 
 
Low 
11 11/01/2011 Loss of RADALT 
forcing ldg 
technique to use 
BARO - results 
in heavy landing. 
SP will report loss of RADALT. Chase 
pilot briefed to find and report 
accurate QFE to SP. 
 
Low 
 
 
Low 
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Appendix D Briefing Slide Example 
 
Figure Apx D-1.  Example of Briefing Slide Used for Standardisation 
 
  
E-1 
Appendix E Approvals and Requests 
 
Figure Apx E-1. MoD Ethic Committee Approval 
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Figure Apx E-2.  Typhoon Force Approval Example 
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Appendix F Entry Questionnaire 
 
  
F-2 
 
  
F-3 
 
  
F-4 
 
  
F-5 
 
Figure Apx F-1.  Entry Questionnaire - Trial PANDORAS DIAMOND 
The table below provides the themes that each of the questions sought to 
address. 
Table Apx F-1.  Entry Questionnaire. Questions v Themes 
Question 
No 
Question Theme 
1 
In general the amount of day to day training in the ASTA 
simulator COULD be increased.  
Cultural lean 
2 
In general the amount of day to day training in the ASTA 
simulator SHOULD be increased.  
Cultural lean 
3 
ASTA Simulation in general provides battle winning 
training 
Near future 
4 
Connected to a similar setup for land and sea the ASTA 
would provide battle winning training 
Near future 
5 The use of simulation in day to day training is too much  Cultural lean 
6 
Simulation can only be used for highly process driven and 
canned tasks. 
Simulation can 
provide 
  
F-6 
experience 
7 Simulation cannot replace live flight in any areas Cultural lean 
8 
Simulation can only be used to prepare for an airborne 
sortie of exactly the same profile. 
Simulation can 
provide 
experience 
9 Simulation will never provide battle winning training. Near future 
10 
Simulation provides training I cannot get during day to day 
live training in the UK. 
Simulation can 
provide 
experience 
11 
My operational capability is enhanced by the inclusion of 
tactical sorties in the simulator. 
Cultural lean 
12 
A reduction in live training in favour of simulation will have 
an overall negative effect on operational capability. 
Cultural lean 
13 
I would be happy to swap one live event per month for a 
Joint Warfare simulator with the Army & Navy.  
Near future 
14 
A 4 ship Simulation sortie fighting a STANEVAL approved 
threat, using artificial intelligence to mimic known tactics 
and shots, would be a valid way of testing my abilities. 
Near future 
15 
Testing of my tactical abilities can only take place in the 
air. 
Near future 
16 
1. A BVR experience gained in simulation is just as valid 
as one from live flight. 
Simulation can 
provide 
experience 
17 
The Live environment is better way of training for 
Electronic Warfare than simulation.   
Simulation can 
provide 
experience 
18 
I would be happy to increase ASTA use when preparing 
for large scale Exercises. 
 
Simulation can 
provide 
experience 
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Appendix G Post Sortie Questionnaire 
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Figure Apx G-1.  Post Sortie Questionnaire - Trial PANDORA’S DIAMOND 
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Appendix H Exit Questionnaire 
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Figure Apx H-1.  Exit Questionnaire - Trial PANDORA’S DIAMOND 
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Appendix I Statistical Tests and Results Explained 
This Appendix expands on some of the presentation of the results and 
tests used.  Firstly the results referred to in Section 4.13: 
‘ Thus, a statistically significant difference of 2.125 was demonstrated 
(95% CI, 1.237 to 3.013), t(47) = 4.82, p<0.001, d = 0.70 ’ 
1. 95% CI, 1.237 to 3.013 - the difference that was stated as 2.125 for 
this test can, for the population, be assured (to a confidence of 95%) 
to be between 1.237 to 3.013. 
2. t(47) = 4.82 – the ‘t’ shows that the comparison for this test is against 
a t distribution whilst the ‘(47)’ denotes the degrees of freedom of the 
test, which is one less than the sample used. ‘4.82’ is the t-value 
obtained from the statistical look up tables. 
3. p<0.001 – is the probability of returning the t-value stated if the null 
hypothesis was correct. 
4. d = 0.70 is the effect size and is becoming increasingly requested for 
journals (Lard, 2015) hence its inclusion here.  Known as Cohen’s d it 
is calculated, for a pairs t test, by dividing the mean difference 
between the two groups by the standard deviation of that difference. 
Nominally the values returned can be thought of as 0.2 – low, 0.5 – 
medium and 0.8 – high strength. 
Types of Tests 
The One-way ANOVA (ANalysis Of VAriance) test referred to in Section 
4.14 is a method of determining if there are any statistical differences between 
two or more independent groups (Laerd, 2015c). 
A boxplot as referred to in section 4.14.1 is a method of comparing 
sample distributions the components of which are shown in Error! Reference 
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source not found..  In particular boxplots were used to determine if there were 
any outliers associated with the data collected.  
 
Figure Apx I-1.  Components of a Boxplot.  Reproduced from the Help Section of Minitab 
2012. 
Levene’s test (section 4.14.1) is a method of checking that the variances 
of two or more groups are the same i.e. that there is homogeneity of variances.  
Tests such as the one way ANOVA are sensitive to unequal variances, such as 
those that occur within groups that significantly differ in size, and as such it is an 
assumption that the tests for homogeneity of variance and normality along with 
a boxplot examination have been run prior to an ANOVA being commenced 
(Laerd, 2015a). 
Pearson’s product moment correlation measures the direction and 
strength of the relationship between two variables that are continuous in nature 
the relationship is assumed to be linear.  The correlation value (denoted as r) 
returns a value between the two extremes of +1, a perfect positive relationship, 
and -1, a perfect negative correlation (Laerd, 2015d). 
R-Sq (adj) from section 4.16.8 and is a truncated form of ‘R-Squared’.  
The figure provided indicates the amount of variance in the dependant variable 
(in the given section this is either the ‘Cultural Lean’ or ‘Near future’) that is 
predicted from the independent variable.  An alternative view is that it attempts 
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to indicate how well a model might predict a response for a given observation. 
R-Squared (adjusted) is the attempt to allow for the increase in the R-Sq value 
when multiple variables are added to the model (Wikipedia, no date a; Minitab, 
2012b).   
Mallows Cp used in section 4.16.8 assists with determining the best 
model that provides the best balance of bias and precision against the number 
of predictors used.  Too many predictors may result in a model that in imprecise 
whilst too few may be biased.  In practice a model Mallows Cp number that is 
approximately equal to the number of predictors is optimum choice (Minitab, 
2012a). 
 The non-parametric Wilcoxon signed rank test used in section 4.17.3 
is the non-parametric version of the paired samples t-test.  As it is a non-
parametric test the data used is not required to pass a normality test 
correspondingly, it returns the median difference between paired observations. 
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Appendix J PANDORAS DIAMOND Supporting Tables and Figures 
Table Apx J-1. LOS Blend for Level 2 
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Figure Apx J-1.  LOS Blend for Major Tasks - Level 2 
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Figure Apx J-2.  LOS Blend for Common Skills - Level 2 
 
Figure Apx J-3.  LOS Blend for Sub Tasks - Level 2 
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Figure Apx J-4.  LOS Blend for Major Tasks - Level 3 
 
Figure Apx J-5.  LOS Blend Common Skills - Level 3 
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Figure Apx J-6.  LOS Blend for Sub Tasks - Level 3 
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Table Apx J-2. LOS Blend for Level 3 
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Table Apx J-3. Available Comparisons between the Complexity Levels 
 
Major Task 
Level 1 v 2 Level 2 v 3 Level 1 v 3 
CA Day    
Engage Day    
Engage Night    
ML CAS    
SCAR    
OCA Self 
Escort 
   
OCA Screen    
 
Sub Task 
   
ACT    
DACT    
EPW    
PWII    
 
Common 
Skills 
   
DA ECM    
DA Flares    
DA DASS    
DA Chaff    
NME Chaff    
NME Flare    
NME Jam    
CAP    
NME Comms 
Jam 
   
Datalink    
Dragon High    
Dragon Low    
Air C2    
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Table Apx J-4. Tasks and Skills Comparison Against Complexity-Level 1v2 
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Table Apx J-5. Tasks and Skills Comparison Against Complexity-Level 2v3 
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Table Apx J-6. Tasks and Skills Comparison Against Complexity-Level 1v3 
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Appendix K Project JENX Supporting Information 
 
PROJECT JENX SYLLABUS 
 
Table Apx K-1.  Project JENX Syllabus 
Day  Synth Sortie Title 
Sims 
Req   
Live Sortie 
Title 
WEEK 1 - Skillset generation        
1 AM DCA Sim 1 2 SIM   
1 PM ASDM BRF  BRF   
2 AM ASDM SIM 1 SIM   
2 PM EPM Brf  BRF   
3 AM EA 1 1 SIM   
3 PM EPM Tactics Brf  BRF   
4 AM EA 2 2 SIM   
4 PM AA ROE BRF  BRF   
5 AM EA 3 2 SIM   
5 PM AA 10 Brf  BRF   
WEEK 2 - Develop skillsets        
6 AM DCA Sim 2 2 SIM   
6 PM   LIVE F7 Arrival Cx 
7 AM DCA 2 2 SIM   
7 PM   LIVE F8 ACT 1 
8 AM DCA Sim 3 4 SIM   
8 PM   LIVE F9 ACT 2 
9 AM DCA 3 4 SIM   
9 PM AA 12 BRF  BRF   
10 AM DCA Sim 4 4 SIM   
10 PM Spare slot  SIM   
WEEK 3 - Contextual employment of skills 1      
11 AM DCA 4 4 SIM   
11 PM OCA BRF  BRF   
12 AM OCA SIM 1 2 SIM   
12 PM   LIVE F10 2v1 ACT 
13 AM OCA 1 4 SIM   
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13 PM   LIVE F11 2v2 ACT 
14 AM OCA 2 4 SIM   
14 PM   LIVE F12 ASDM 1 
15 AM Night DCA sim 1 2 SIM   
15 PM Spare slot  SIM   
WEEK 4 - Contextual employment of skills 2      
16 AM Night DCA 1 4 SIM   
16 PM   LIVE F13 ASDM 2 
17 AM Night DCA sim 2 4 SIM   
17 PM Helo BRF  BRF   
18 AM Night DCA 2 4 SIM   
18 PM Attack Brf  BRF   
19 AM Helo SIM 1 SIM   
19 PM   LIVE F25 Helo Affil 
20 AM AS,WSH,HOTAS  BRF   
20 PM 
EP2/PW4 Fuse+Planning 
Tools BRF   
WEEK 5 - AS Skillset generation        
21 AM Attack Sim 1 2 SIM   
21 PM AS ROE BRF  BRF   
22 AM Attack 1 1 SIM   
22 PM Range BRF  BRF   
23 AM Range Sim 1 1 SIM   
23 PM DT/TST BRF  BRF   
24 AM Attack Sim 2 1 SIM   
24 PM   LIVE F31 Range 1 
25 AM Attack 2 2 SIM   
25 PM Spare slot  SIM   
WEEK 6 - CAS           
26 AM Night Attack 2 SIM   
26 PM Strafe BRF  BRF   
27 AM Strafe Sim 1 1 SIM   
27 PM CAS Brf  BRF   
28 AM Strafe Sim 2 1 SIM   
28 PM   LIVE F34 Strafe 1 
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29 AM CAS sim 1 2 SIM   
29 PM Opposed AI Brf  BRF   
30 AM AI Sim 1 4 SIM   
30 PM Spare slot  SIM   
WEEK 7 - Test Week        
31 AM AI 1 4 SIM   
31 PM   LIVE F36 CAS Consol 
32 AM AI 2 (night) 4 SIM   
32 PM   LIVE F35 Strafe 2 
33 AM      
33 PM   LIVE F37 
CAS Qual 
(day) 
34 AM      
34 PM   LIVE F39 MR TAC Cx 
35 AM      
35 PM   LIVE N37 
CAS Qual 
(night) 
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RESOURCE CALCULATOR 
Table Apx K-2. Resource Calculator - Project JENX 
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PROJECT JENX SAVINGS - OVERVIEW 
Table Apx K-3. Project JENX Savings Overview 
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PROJECT JENX FEEDBACK FROM STUDENT 
Overall impressions of course 
Overall I thought it was a well structured course and was pleased to have 
briefs scheduled into the program. Having completed a CR workup on the GR4 
and spoken to my counterparts the ‘traditional’ way of doing things was to just fit 
it in when ever possible – sometimes this would be 10 minutes before a trip and 
the overriding priority would be to fly/Sim regardless of preparation. I also 
particularly liked having the initial phase being on a one-to-one basis (Flt Lt 
Skinner – effectively a QWI!). It meant he would know what standard I was at 
and could tailor the Sims as required – plus the briefs would not overlap and he 
knew what I had been taught. 
How do I consider the training transferred to live flight? 
Tactically the transition has been easier than I thought. When I started 
actually flying DCA/AI it was hard because I had flown twice in the previous 2 
months and G tolerance was noticeably poor during combat. During the week 
commencing 19 Jan 15, I flew 5 times. Currency was therefore now not an 
issue and I found the tactical side relatively straight forward including EA, 4 
ships and the occasional problematic jet! To feel fully comfortable I would like to 
live fly a night DCA (4 ship) as I would then feel more confident in my abilities to 
do this for real (not just in the Sim). 
Do I feel disadvantaged compared to counterparts on the standard 
course? How does it compare to the progress from my OCU course? 
With respect to knowledge and tactical exposure I would say (certainly 
compared to my course mates from the OCU) I have the upper hand. Just after 
Christmas I had spoken to 2 of them and both had completed 4 workup events. 
They had flown more than me but their workup was scattered and they were 
definitely bottom of the priority list. By this point I was almost complete. Due to 
Christmas and the rest of the squadron having to gain enough flying for Q 
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currency, my priority dropped and so barely flew. This is where I may have been 
disadvantaged (as they were flying more regularly).  
In summary I feel I am in a better situation as have completed all the CR 
workup trips (albeit in the Sim) and now can fly in 4 ships in any scenario and 
feel competent. The original plan was to fly 2/3 times per week so that would 
negate what I see as the main disadvantage of my individual workup. Christmas 
just got in the way! My OCU course may have flown more but have not 
achieved anywhere near the number of CR workup events, in fact the situation 
is not much better with people from 1 or even 2 courses ahead of me. 
Course structure/ Level of training provided 
The structure was well planned and I felt thoroughly confident at the end 
of each phase. Again noting one-to-one teaching and planned afternoons for 
briefs and study.  I would like to mention that it has been good to fly again a bit 
more regularly for familiarity in the jet – plus I have been doing live DCA where 
as good as the Sim is – it just cannot replicate the entire sensation (G, 
environmental factors, jet not working properly etc). The level of EA in the Sim 
is a known limitation so has been good to see live. 
Other comments 
This workup has been from my point of view very good. I definitely think it 
is the way forward, perhaps with a few tweaks as it hopefully gets people CR 
quicker and therefore able to concentrate on improving rather than constantly 
trying to get a CR tick. Changes I would make would be to fly a couple of 
elements (DCA/AI/OCA) towards the end even if it was just for confidence of 
being able to do it live, but more so to get used to real life jet issues. 
Negatives: 
 Lack of flying. Not down to the workup plan but what actually happened. 
This made both my G tolerance and ability to fly markedly reduced. 
 EA – not fully correct in the Sim. 
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 A-S – Pod not exactly the same as in the Sim – Only took a few minutes 
to get used to in the live environment – but I have had previous 
experience using it. 
 It is difficult to see the standard at which I should be at as I am 
comparing myself to the QWI (during the first 3 weeks) thus always 
appearing poor! A potential low moral point (was for me!)  
Positives: 
a. Programmable phase briefs and time to consolidate. 
b. Quick enough pace so everything remains fresh for the next event. 
c. The Sim can be limited but it can replicate many more hostiles that 
we get in the 323’s and they can all be going at parameters that we 
rarely can simulate live – this I think is great training. 
d. You can really nail down 4 ship ops - I didn’t have to think about it 
when I flew the first 4 ship. My arrow may have been a little slack but 
generally I felt it was good. 
Finally I think a point to make that makes this whole work up worth while 
is sticking to the plan. The lack of flying (couldn’t be helped I realise) detracted 
from the outcome. Additionally the first 4 weeks on 3(F) Sqn (who were kind 
enough to host us whilst 11 Sqn were on Exercise) were crucial to the initial 
learning. During this time there were occasions where the programmer was 
required to fill sims/flights and I was then tasked to do these on top of the 
workup. The upshot of this was very long days, increased fatigue and the 
inability to read/prepare as much for trips (due to crew duty). This had no 
benefit (apart from the every event being filled) and detracted from my ability to 
learn/perform well in the next CR trip.   
Experience 
As a second tourist I found some aspects (CAS theory, some threats and 
EA theory) easier to understand than an ab-inito would have. However as there 
was programmed time to brief/read up then I foresee this just taking a bit longer 
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to explain and would not affect the time scale of the CR workup. Lack of flying 
may have more of an impact for a less experienced pilot but this may just 
require an extra few trips to get current again. In my opinion I can’t see a less 
experienced pilot struggling more than I did as I have very little AD background 
and the A-S work is different enough to require additional learning. 
 
 
Flt Lt Jenkins  
XI Sqn MRCR pilot 
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Appendix L Officer Commanding 29 Squadron 
Statement of Impact 
 
